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A Blend of Old Wines in a New Wineskin:
Section 183 and Beyond
JOHN ,Y. LEN o
Introduction

A

problem of long standing has bet>n the practice of using
losses from an operation to offsc.>t otht>r income, primarily either
to enjoy a "hobby," 1mrtially. at the expense of the fedt>ral fisc,
or for the ta..x shelter provided by the losses, but in either event
not primarily to carry on the wnture as a business at a beforetax profit. New section 183, enacted by the Ta.x Rt>form Act of
1969 to disallow certain ta..x deductions attributable to ''an activity
not engaged in for profit,'' is but thc.> latest government remedy
provided for this problem.
Section 270-which, wlwrever an individual's losses from a
trade or business exceeded its gross income by $50,000 for each
of fi,·e consecutiYe years, disallowed the Pxcess losst>s for all five
years-was the largely ineff<>ctiw statutory prc.>decc.>ssor to section 183. Its inefficacy was due to (1) thl• frPquent ta.xpayer ability
to slightly rearrange inconw and deductions in order to break
the five year string of losses and (2) tht• fact that specially treated
deductions, often comprising thc.> hulk of losses in tlte initial
years of a farm vc.>nturc.>, W(ll'l' ('Xeluded from the $50,000 loss
computation.1 The gon•rmn('nt had scor('d more, hut not spectacular, success with the judicially fa~hiom•d doctrim• that a ta.xpayer must han~ an int<>ntion to makl• a profit from the O}leration in order to dPduct his losses undl•r either section 162 or 212.
The rationale for tlw doctrim• was that the dl'finition of "trade
or business" under section 162 is limitc.>d to "that which occupies
TA..X

* .TOHX W. LEE· (B.A., Uuh·ersity of Xorth C:lrolin:l, 19(jj; LL.B., Uuh·ersity of
Virginia, 1968; LL.11L (Taxation), Georgetown Uuh·ersity, 1970) is n member of the
Virginia Bar :ulll is :1ssol"iatetl with the 1irm of Hirschler & Fleis~lwr, Rirlnnoml, VirgiuL,.
Tllis :1rticle is base<l on a speeeh gh·en at the 2.jth Aununl Yirginiu Conference on Fe<lernl
Taxation, .Tnne 7, 1973.
1 S. REP. Xo. 91-5:>2, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1!169). Sec Sonnnbeml ,., Comm'r, 377
F.2tl -12 (1st l'ir. 1967); Welcler ,.. Unitetl St:1tes, 32!1 l'. Supp. 739 (S.D. Tes. lOil),
aff'cl zlcr curiam, 72-2 U.S.T.C. ~ 9628 (.jth Cir. 1!172).
3-!7
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the time, attention, and labor of men for the purpose of liveli~
hood or profit" 2 and the section 212 standard of "production or
collection of income" is similarly limited to an individual's "profit~
seeking activities.'' 3 An alternatiVE:>, more recent, approach has
been the contention that where profit lay far in the future the
activities were merely preparatory to engaging in a trade or
business and were akin to amassing capital assets to commence
a business.
A similar tax problem, farmer utilization of special farm tax
accounting rules to currently deduct from .nonfarm income the
developmental costs of raising a farm commodity to a productive
state and then disposing of it at capital gain rates, initially caught
the administrative and lc>gislative attention that ultimately
resulted in the enactment of section 183 as well as section 1251
and other provisions.4 A n•\·iew of the legislative history result~
ing in section 183 is neePssary to fully appreciate it and, par~
ticularly, to understand the course taken by the extensive section
183 regulations.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The Treasury De}Jartment Tax Reform Studies and Proposals,
released in February 1969, noted that section 270, which of
course applied to all individual businesses, did not curb the farm
tax problem and proposed that if a farmer did not elect to
give up the favorable farm tax accounting rules in question,
only $15,000 of his farm losses could h'~ deducted against non~
farm income, with a carryforward and carryback of the disal~
lowed portions.5 The allowance of the first $15,000 of loss was
designed to exclude from the proposal bona fido farmers who
supplement<~d their farm income with part-time or off~season
employment. Thus, tlw two themes of tlwse proposals wm·e curb~
ing the tax shelter abus(• of farm tax accounting methods by
farmers with suhstantial nonfarm ineom<.>, while h•aving the bona
fide farmer as lw was.
The Nixon tax reform proposals, d<.>liYered two months later,
2 Flint

v. Stone

Tr:wy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 171 (l!Hl), quoting ft•om 1 BoUVIER'S LAW
273 (2d eel. 1897).
a United States ,.. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
4 U.S. TREASURY DEP''r TAX REFOR:II S•rUDJES AXD PROPOSALS {PART I), 91ST Co~G., 1ST
SESS. (Comm. Print 1969). ·
s Id. at 156-57.
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turned the proposed disallowance pro\·ision into a quasi-recapture
provision-" excess" farm losses were not disallowed but were
instead "placed" in an excess deduction account (EDA) which
converted any subsequent capital gain associated with the sale
of the farm or of farm assets into ordinary income to the extent
of the balance of the EDA. In addition, the administration proposed to strengthen section 270 by disallowing losses in excess
of $50,000 if they exceeded $50,000 in any three out of five consecutive years.6 Only the latter proposal is the direct antecedent
to section 183-the former became section 1251.
The House Committee on \\"'"ays and ::\I(lans also recognized that
section 270 had been ineffectual, but noted courts had fashioned
another basis for disallowing hobby losses under sections 162
and 212 which allow deductions of ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in a trade or business or for the production of
income: "[T]hat the activity carri(ld on by the ta.·qm:yer from
which the loss results is not a business but merely a hobby. Your
committee believes that this basic principle provides a more
effective and reasonable basis for distinguishing situations where
taxpayers are not carrying on a business to realize a profit,
but rather are me1·ely attempting to ·utilize the losses from, the
operation to offset their otlzer income." 7
The House Committee on Ways and :Means therefore proposed,
in August 1969, to replace old section 270 with a new section
270 which ''·ould have provided that if deductions from an activity exceeded its gross income by more than $25,000 in any
three out of five years, the activity would be rebuttably presumed to be not operated "with a reasonable expectation of
profit,'' resulting in a disallowance of all business deduction losses
attributable to the acth·ity in excess of its gross income. Thus,
the administration's section 270 test was amalgamated with the
judicial profit moti,·e test., probably effecting a sym•rgism which
would have been stronger than both considl•red st•parately. As
under old section 270, the losses wer<• to be determined separately
as to each activity carried on by th(l taxpayer.
In September 1969 the Treasury recommended that th<> House
provision be am(lnded to clarify that th(l rl'asonably anticipated
profit must he an economic profit, not a '' ta.x savings'' profit,
and such r>rofit need not be determined on an annual basis. Other
G I d. at 52-54 (Message from the President of A11ril 21, 1969, presented by Representatives of the Treasury Department).
1 H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part I), 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1969) (empbn.sis ndded).
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technical amendments, probably covered by the proposed statute
or committee report, were suggested as well. 8
The Senate Committee on Finance dPclared in late November
1969 that it was in basic agreement with the House approach,
but was concerned that a "reasonable expectation" of profit
standard-prior cases had split as to whether such an expecta~
tion must be present or whether merely a bona fide intent to
make a profit was sufficient 9-might cause losses of an activity
actually engaged in for profit to be disallowed. Therefore, it
modified the House provision, placing the focus on:
[w]hether the activity is engaged in for profit rather than whether it
is carried on with a reasonable expectation of profit.
In making the determination of whether an activity is not engaged
in for profit, the committee intends that an objective rather than a
subjective approach is to be employed. Thus, although a reasonable
expectation of profit is not to be required, the facts and circumstances
(without regard to the taxpayer's subjective intent) would hnve to
indicate that the taxpayer entered the activity, or continued the activity,
with the objective of making a profit.IO

The most significant Senate Committee on Finance change,
however, was the reversal of the presumption: A taxpayer is
presumed to be engaged in an activity for profit for a taxable
year, unless established otherwise by the government, if, in two
or more years of the five year period e>nding with the tax year,
the activity was carried on at a profit. ·with this, section 183 was
reduced to a codification of the judicial test where the presump~
tion was not applicable and a pro-taxpayer provision where it was
applicable-a far cry from the administration and House pro~
posals. The regulations specify that no inference that thE' activity
is not engaged in for profit is to arise from failure to meet the
presumption.11
s Deductions allowable un<ler the Code without regard to whether ineurrc<l ln n trndo or
business or for the production of income woulcl be clccluctible even if incm·rc<l in nn nctlvity
not engaged in for profit. Deductions (other than tho above) would bo nllownblo to n
proper extent where income is realized from an activity not engaged in for profit. TAX
REFORM Ar::r OF 1969, TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM OF TREASURY POSITION ON li,R, 132701
91ST CONG., 1ST SESS. 35-36 (Comm. Print 1969). The bill provided: 11 (I]tcms nttrib·
utable to an activity shall be allowed only to the extent of tho gross incomo from such
activity unless SU('h activity is (':trried on with n reasonable expe('t!ltion of ronlizing a
profit." H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 213(a) (1969).
o Compare Blackmon v. United States, 68-2 U.S.T.C. 1f 9655 (N.D. Tex. 1968); witl1
Patterson v. United States, 459 F.2d 487 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
10 S. REP. No. 91-552, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 103-04 (1969).
11 Reg. § 1.183-1 (a). Practitioners hacl been concerned that agents would creuto n nogn·
tive inference a la the House approach in such circUUIStances.
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In addition, the Senate Committee on Finance basically followed
the Treasury's technical suggestions as to (1) continuing to
permit deductions allowable without regard to whether they were
incurred in a trade or business or for the production of income
(the standards under sections 162, 167 and 212) such as interest,
taxes and capital gain deductions, and (2) allowing deductions of
business or production of income expenses in an activity not
engaged in for profit to the extent of gross income from the activity, reduced by deductions under (1) above, but made no reference
to the ''economic'' profit or nonannual basis of determining profit
concepts.
The Senate Committee on Finance was concerned that new section 183 (section 270 was repealed for ta.x years beginning after
December 31, 1969) might not be administered reasonably and
recommended that the Treasury establish ~vo advisory groups
drawn from the cattle and horse industries to aid the Service in
establishing standards for its application of section 183 in order
to achieve reasonable results and to resolve policy questions in
such application from tin1e to time, which the Treasury indicated
it was willing to do and, in fact, has done. A Senate Committee on
Finance news release announced:
These advisory groups would be composed of industry experts and
would examine and recommend action to the Service with respect
to cases involving their industries. Tltis action 1VOuld precede disallollJance by tlte Internal Revenue Service of deductions of losses 1mder
tltis provision. This would assure taxpayers of a high level review of
their cases by responsible representatives of their industry. This intent
will be repeated in the Committee reports and the ta.x reform bill.u

Such intent is apparently reflected in a considerably diluted
version by the Senate Committee on Finance print statement of
November 21, 1969 that the establishment of the advisory groups
''Should help limit the disallowance by the ·Internal Revenue
Service of the deduction of losses under this provision to cases
where it is generally recognized that this is appropriate." 13
The Service news releases announcing the formation of the
two advisory c01mnittees indicate that in the eyes of the Commissioner the role of the committees was to be purely advisory
and was to relate to (1) the early development of policies and
(2) proposed administrative guidelines and proposed revenue
12 Committee on Finanee, United States Senate Press :Release No. 31 (October 17
1
1969) (emphasis added).
13 S. REP. No. 91-552, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 103-04 (1969).
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rulings. 14 The committees contributed to the drafting of the proposed section 183 regulations/ 5 but it does not appear that the
Service contemplates review of specific eases befor<~ 90 day letters
can be issued assessing a deficiency in taxes due to a disallowance by virtue of section 183 of deductions.
In essence, section 183 codifies the profit motivation case law
approach, with legislative rejection of the reasonable expectation of profit and suhje('ti\·e approaches, in sections 183(a) and
(c). Section 183 (c) specifically adopts a netting approach (allowance of deductions up to the amount of gross income), followed
by most decisions, with the significant addition of a tier system
by which such gross income d('duetion is reduced first by deductions not within the purdew of section 183. The positive presumption is set forth in section 183 (d) and rules for its application are contained in section 183(e) (added by the Revenue Act
of 1971).
Comprehensive proposed r('gulations were issued under section
183 in August 1971 16 and moderately modified final regulations
were promulgated in July 1972.17 \Vhi]e the draftprs of the netting and positive presumption provisions of these regulations
declined in the first instance to follow the Senate Committee on
Finance report statements and in the second to follow the literal
words of the statute on point,t 8 the r('gulations appear to reach
the correct results here and are unlikely to be successfully challenged in litigation. The paragraphs dealing with the definition
of activity and the manner in which the determination whether
an activity is engaged in for profit is to be made (including nine
nonexclusive objective factors), on the other hand, contain quite
controversial elements and may generate considerable litigation.
The activity paragraphs are larg<>ly patterned after developments
under section 270 and app('ar shaped in some aspects by the
14 I.R. 1075 (Oct. 30, 1970), reprinte<l in MERTENS, LAW Ol' FEDEIIAL INCOME TA."<·
ATION, 1969-71 RULINGS, l\fiscellnneous Announcements 159.
1s See Thrower, Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation, 21 TUL. '!'AX INs'r,
I, 23 (1972); Oshins, Proposecl Regulations Prat:itle New Rules for t1w Ilobby Loss Gmnr,
35 J. TA.XA'riON 214, 215 n.9 (1971). The latter author wns the nttornoy·ndvisor in tho
Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, United States Trensury Department, nt tho timo the
propose<l regulations "·ere issue<l an<l appears to hnve been responsible for <lrn ftiug them.
BITTKER & STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 236 (4th C<l. 1072).
10 Prop. Reg. § 1.183, 36 Fe<l. Reg. 16112 (Aug. 19, 1971).
11 Reg. § 1.183.
1s See Oshins, Proposed Regulations Provide New R11lcs for tTIC Hobby Loss Game, 3fi
J. TA.\:ATION 214, 217 (1971), for au excellent discussion justifying tho positions tnken by
the regulations.
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genesis of section 183 in the use of farm accounting rules to
enjoy current ordinary deductions at a favorable ta.x cost of
future capital gain appreciation in the farm product or farmland itself. The.''objective factors'' provisions are derived principally from the farm loss section 162 and section 212 profit motive
decisions. Here again the origin of section 183 in attention on
deduction by high bracket ta.xpayers of farm losses against nonfarm income, together with concern for the lower bracket or
marginal farmers, have strongly influenced the emplmsis of this
portion of the regulations, particularly in the examples illustrating the nine factors. Significant also are two topics the :final
regulations do not expressly consider : ( 1) the definition of profit
and (2) the preparatory to engaging in a trade or business and
similar arguments frequently applied in the alternative to the
profit motive test to activities.
Applicability
The statute provides that section 183 is applicable to individuals and subchapter S corporations.19 The regulations add
estates and trusts to the reach of section 183 under the e}..-press
rationale that their taxable income is computed in the same
manner as that of an individual with certain minor exceptions.21l
Both the regulations and the statute are silent as to partnerships
and partners. Since section 270, by its terms, applies only to individuals and the partnership regulations pro,·ide that each partner
must take into income his distributive slmr<• of partnership "hobby
losses" under section 270, it appears clear that section 183 can
affect a partner as well. 21 The Senate Committee on Finance
report states that no inference is to be drawn from the decision
not to include regular corporations in the coYerage under section 183 as to wl1ether any activity of a corporation constitutes
a business or is engaged in for profit. The articulated justification is that individuals }Jrimarily enter into an activity to obtain
a loss in order to offset other income and that coverage of
regular cor}Jorations would present a numh<>r of difficulties, such
as its effect on shared facilities provided on a cost hasis.22 The
provision in the regulations that no infN'<•nce is to be drawn from
I.R.C. § 183(a).
Reg. § 1.183-l(a).
21 Reg. § 1.702-1 (a) (8) (ii); BlTTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL
l'ORATIOXS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1-26 (3d eu. 1911).
22 S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1969).
19

20

L~CO~E

TAX/.TIO!< OP

COll.·
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the provisions of section 183 and the regulations thereunder that
any activity of a regular corporation is or is not a business or
is engaged in for. profit is probably intended to have no broader
import than the committee report reference, but is capable of the
construction that the nine factors for determining profit motive
could not be used by analogy or as a codification of prior judicial
factors in applying the section 162 profit motive test to a regular
corporation.
Section 183 is to be applied at the corporate level in determining allowable deductions of a subchapter S corporation according
to the regulations. 23 Presumably this means it is the corporate
motive for engaging in the activity and not the shareholder's
motive that is determinative. A similar question arises as to
whether motive for engaging in the activity is to be determined
at the partnership or partner level. Commentators generally agree
that character of income is determined at the partnership level
retaining such character, e.g., capital gain or section 270 hobby
loss, in the hands of the partner.24 Arguably character encompasses motive. Indeed, the Service has ruled: "The purposes for
which the partnership incurs any indebtedness shall be attributed
to the general partners in applying section 265(2)." 26 However,
a limited partnership interest is considered by this revenue procedure to constitute a portfolio investment, which gives rise to
an inference of a purpose by the limited partner to carry taxexempt obligations, regardless of the actual purpose of the partnership in incurring the indebtedness. 26 Nevertheless, following
the character of income rules, profit motive for section 183 should
be determined at the partnership level with no distinction between
limited and general partnerships.
Presumption

An activity is rebuttably presumed under section 183(d) to be
engaged in for profit for a taxable year if its gross income for
Reg. § 1.183-1(£).
Reg. § 1.702-1(b). See, e.g., Wolfman, Level for Determining Character of Partner·
sl&ip Income-"Entity" v. "Conduit" Principle in Partnership Taxation, 19 N.Y.U. INST.
287, 290-92 (1961). Lee, Operating Expenses and Section 114: Will Snow Falll, 27 TAX
LAWYER 381, 405-09 (1974).
25 Rev. Proc. 72-18, 1972-1 C.B. 740, 742 § 4.05.
2a I d. at § 4.04. Snell distinction appears inconsistent with George A. Butler, 30 T.O.
1097, 1106 (1961) (partnership business imputed to limited partner). But sec Young,
Income Tax Consequences of Investment Losses of Individuals, 27 TAX L. REV. 11 27-28
(1971).
2a

24
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two or more of the taxable years in the five consecutive year period
ending with such year (seven year period in the case of an
activity consisting in major part of horse breeding, training,
showing or racing) exceeds the "deductions attributable to such
activity (determined without regard to whether or not such activity is engaged in for profit)." The near identity of the parenthetical language to that of section 183(b)(l) where "deductions
which would be allowable . . . without regard to whether or not
such activity is engaged in for profit" means deductions tltat do
not require a profit motive to be deductable (tier 1 deductions),
such as interest or ta.-x:es, lends itself to the construction that
gross income from the activity need only exceed the tier 1
deductions in two out of five consecutive years for the preswnption to apply. Congress probably meant to say gross income exceeds the deductions attributable to the activity determined as
if the activity were engaged in for profit.27 The Senate Committee
on Finance almost left the impression that gross income had
only to exceed tier 2 and tier 3 deductions (deductions allowable only if the activity is engaged in for profit), but ended
on the note that for the purposes of the presumption all deductions attributable to the actiYity other than the net operating loss
deduction are to be taken into account.28 Seizing upon the ambiguity created by the inconsistency between tl1e statute and the
committee print, the drafters of the regulations followed the latter.
The choice is correct; otherwise the presumption would be of
little worth and undoubtedly would easily be rebutted. The statutory construction offered in supJlort of the drafters' choice is,
however, quite intriguing.
The analysis is as follows: The language in Section 183 (d) speaks of
"deductions attributable" to the activity while the language in Section 183 (b) (1) refers to "deductions which would be allowable.,
The term "deductions attributable" found in Section 183 (d) i'> also
found in Section 183 (a). The reasoning continues that since Section
183{a) states that "no deduction attributable to such .activity shall be
allowed" the term "deduction attributable" includes both deductions
allowed ancl disallowed and as such is broader and encompac;ses more
than "deductions allowable" as used in Section 183 (b). Accordingly,
the draftsmen decided to adopt the same meaning of "deductions
attributable" for both Sections 183(a) and 183(d).2D
2r Comment, Section 189: Work Horse or Hobby Loss, 20 Ct.TUOLJC U.L. REv. 710, 731
(1971).
2s S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 104-05 (1969).
29 Oshins, Proposed Regulatio11s Provide New Rules for tllc Hobby Loss Game, 35 J.
TAXATIO:t\ 214, 217 (1971).
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The draftsmen did not follow the surface import of the committee print statement that all deductions attributable to the
activity except the net operating loss deduction were to be taken
into account in applying the presumption. They added that for
the purposes of the presumption determination, the section 1202
deduction was not to be taken into account. Apparently the drafters followed the reasoning of an early commentator on section
183 who pointed out that (1) under section 270 the Service had
ruled that the 50 per cent gain deduction under section 1202 did
not constitute a deduction "attributable to a trade or business"
carried on by an individual for the five year $50,000 test and
(2) activity under section 183 is to be determined by the scope
of the term "trade or business" under section 270. 30
The regulations provide that the five or seven year presumption period begins with the first profit year and the positive presumption applies with respect to the second profit year and all
years subsequent to the second profit year.31 Thus, if in the period
from 1970 through 1975 the only profit years were 1971 and
1974, the presumption would apply to 1974 and 1975 only. This
was probably not the original intent of Congress but is supported
by the literal language of section 183(d) in another of the drafting infelicities in which section 183 abounds. For the legislative
history to section 183 (e) (enacted by the Revenue Act of 1911)
reveals that it J1ad come to thP attention of the committee that
if the period ending with tlw current tax yPar did not include a
profit year, the taxpayer was not being allowed to use the presumption, even though at that time thPrP WPre not :five (or seven)
consecutive years in which to measure the presumption. ''The
committee believt>s that this intt>rpretation does not reflect the
intent of Congress in originally adopting this provision." 32 Of
course, under the rt>gulations years prior to the two profit years
could never receive the benefit of the presumption even if there
were at that time five yt>ars in which to measure the presumption.
30 Comment, Section 183: Work Horse or Hobby Loss, 20 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 710, 729
(1971). This excellent artirle highlights a number of problems created by section 183 nnd
appears to have been frequently reliecl upon by the clraftsmen of the regulntions in nddrcss•
ing them.
31 Reg. § 1.183-l(c). Literally section 183(c1) would limit the presumption to tho fifth
or seventh year. Consequently, its extension by the regulntion to the se~oml pt•oflt ycnr
(which may be earlier than the fifth year) mny be viewed :ts n dcpnrturo from tho
statute. Carl.'y & Gnllngher, Requisite Grcc1l: The Section 183 RcouTatioll,q, 19 LoYOLA L.
REV. 41, 01-02 (1973).
32 S. REP. No. !12-437, 9!!11 Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1969).
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The regulation result appears required by section 183(d) since it
provides for a presumption only as to a ta.xable year which ends
a -five or seven year period in which two years were profitable.
Rather than amending section 183(d) to conform with what
Congress originally intended (all years in the five or seven
year period receive the benefit of the presumption), section 183(e)
was enacted. It provides that a ta.xpayer may elect that the section 183( d) presumption not be made before the end of the fourth
(or sixth) year following the year in which the ta.'\.-payer :first
engages in the activity. If such election is made and two years
in the five (or seven) year period beginning with the :first year
ill which the taxpayer engaged in the activity are profitable,
the presumption provided by section 183(d) applies to all five
or seven years. In reality, this constitutes a new section 183(e)
presumption. Under section 183(e) the presumption in the above
hypothetical would apply to 1970 through 1974. If the tnA-payer
is able to apply the presumption under section 183(d) to 1975
as well, he will have been able to use;the same two profit years to
create presumptions extending to sLx years.
The regulations provide that the section 183 (d) presumption
arises only if the activity is substantially the same activity during
each of the relevant taxable years, including the ta.x year in question.33 This requirement undoubtedly extends to section 183(e)
as well. According to an example in the regulations an activity
can continue to qualify as the same activity although conducted
on a much reduced basis and. in a different manner.3' This test
is probably more liberal than the substantially the same trade or
business prerequisite of section 382(a) as e}..-plicated by the accompanying regulations.
The regulations also state that in applying the presumption
under section 183( d) only tax years beginning after December
31, 1969, are to be taken into account. Thus, they conclude that
section 183(d) does not apply prior to the second profitable year
beginning after December 31, 1969. Most commentators would
agree that the position taken in the regulations-pre-1970 profit
years cannot be used for the presumption-is correct.3s For the
Senate Committee on Finance report, in discussing the £-ffectivc
33 Reg.

3~ Reg.

§ 1.183-1(e) (1) (ii).
§ 1.183-1(e)(2) Ex. (2)(ii).

35 Comment, Section 188: WorT; Horse or Hobby Loss, 20 CATIIOLlC U.L. REV. 71G,
730-31 (1971) ; Oshins, Proposed Regulations Prot'icle New Rules for t11c Hobby Loss
Game, 35 J. TAXATION 214, 218 (1971); Rhodes, Hobby Losses-A New Cllallenae, 5G
A.B.A.J. 893, 896 (1970).
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date for section 183, stated that while the general effective date
was to be December 31, 1969,36 in applying the presumption
section 183 would be applicable to prior taxable years, but the
conference committee declared it was following all the Senate
amendments to the House version of section 183 "except for
the effective date relating to the presumption.'' 37 Against this
clear legislative history several commentators have argued pre1970 profit can be used for the presumption because the conference committee ''deleted'' the Senate Committee on Finance reference "probably because it was considered superfluous," accordingly, with no express reference in the statute the plain meaning permits reference to pre-1970 profit years.38 This reasoning
is in error because the conference committee did not delete the
Senate reference, it rejected it.
The literal language of section 183 (d) suggests-and is corroborated by the legislative history of section 183(e)-that the
first year to which the section 183(d) presumption can apply is
the fifth year of the activity, even if the first two years are profit
years. Assume then that the first year which an activity was
engaged in was 1967 and the first and second profit years were
1970 and 1971. The draftsman of the section 183 regulations has
written that in drafting the regulations it was decided to avoid
the result that pre-1970 years could not even be used for purposes of aggregating the five or seven year period.39 Therefore,
one must conclude that the regulation statement that only post1969 years are to be taken into account in applying the section
_183( d) presumption was intended to apply only to the two profitable years requirement and not to the five year requirement.
The five year prerequisite itself is surely another drafting error;
Congress could not have intended that if the first two years of
an activity were profitable the presumption would only apply to
the fifth year. In any event all of th~sc problems are rendered
academic if the section 183(e) election is made.
Indeed, both presumptions are rather superfluous. We are
told by the regulations that if a taxpayer does not meet the
requirements of section 183( d) "no inference that the activity
so S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1969).
37 CoNF. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 299 (1969).
38 Sharpe, New "Hobby Loss'' Rule Is Tougher But "Engaged in for Profit" Dilemma
Remains, 32 J. TAXA'IION 289, 290 (1970); DICKINSON, FARM AND RANCH LossEs, BNA
TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 241, A-21 n.151 (1970).
39 Oshins, Proposed Regulations Provide New Rules for tlw Hobby Loss Game, 35 J.
TAXATION 214, 218 (1971).
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is not engaged in for profit shall arise by reason of the provisions of section 183.'' 40 Presumably this means section 183 should
be applied as if section 183(d) did not exist and does not mean
no inference can be drawn (independently) from the nine regulation factors for determining profit motive. On the other hand,
in most of the reported decisions in which there were some profit
years present the taxpayer won even where section 183(d) would
not have resulted in the favorable presumption. Likely the significance of this provision will lie in the Service not pursuing the
controversies, probably few, to which the presumption will apply.
Most cases will turn on the nine factors and ta.x planning should
be of more avail there than in attempting to juggle income and
deductions to meet the presumption.
Deductions Allowable: The Tier System

The regulations under section 162 treating farm deductions
applicable to pre-1970 tax years provided that if a farm ·were
operated primarily for recreation or pleasure and its e:ll..-penses
exceeded its receipts, the entire receipts were to be ignorea in
reporting income and the expenses incurred since personal would
not be deductible.41 On the other hand, the regulations under section 212 were silent on this point. It has been suggested that by
virtue of section 262 the Service could have disallowed the entire
amount of the deductions while taxing all the gross receipts, but
administratively allowed ta.xpayers to deduct e:ll..-penses up to the
income generated in the activity. Apparently the rationale was
either that the taxpayer was engaged in the activity for profit
to the extent income ·was earned or that the harslmess of taxing
gross income without permitting pt·o tanto deductions was
unfair.42 Although in at least one reported decision the Commissioner did disallow all of the deductions of an activity not engaged in for profit while at the same time not ta.xing any of the
gross receipts from the activity,43 in most of the decisions in
which "netting" takes place the Service merely disallowed the
Reg. § 1.183-1(c)(1)(ii).
41Reg. § 1.162--12(b).
42 Osbins, Proposed Regulations Provide New Rules for t11C Hobby Loss Game, 35 J.
TAXATION 214, 215 (1971). But cf. Adirondack League Club, 55 T.C. 796, 819-20 (1071) 1
aff'ii per curiam, 458 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion; question left open
whether corporation that is not carrying on a trade or business liB to recrentional facilities
is permitted to deduct C.'.1Jenses to e.xtent of gross income or denied any deduction nt nll).
43 Bertha R. Conyngham, 23 T.C.M. 1179 (1964).
40
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net losses from the activity. 44 The majority of the netting cases
holding for the government did not comment on this aspect. In
Ernst H. Martin, 45 however, the Tax Court held in the context
of a yacht chartering activity which it had determined was not
profit motivated that where there is taxable income the taxpayer
is entitled under section 212 to deduct expenses paid or incurred
for the production of that income. ·while this rationale has sur~
face appeal, it overlooks the basic principle that the expenses
should first be allocated between the income producing and per~
sonal uses and only then would deduction of the amount attributable
to the income producing use be permitted up the amount of gross
income-in some instances the gross income might exceed the so
allocated expenses. In another controversy the Tax Court held
that a trade or business existed to the extent of the actual income
from the activity. 46 In T. Gardner Hill, where the Commissioner
had disallowed net losses only, the Tax Court in contrast turned
this factor against the Service.
Our first observation is why, if respondent feels there was no separate
business engagement, he did not disallow all of the claimed business
expenses. Surely they should all be disallowed as personal expenses
under section 262 if petitioner was not engaged in an independent
business. Respondent's determination practically admits petitioner car·
ried on a separate business yet his first argument on brief is that he
did not. 47

Yet where the taxpayer in Five Lakes O~tting Olub v. United
States 48 raised a similar argument (to find a profit motive essential to deductibility is to hold that the Service cannot allow
deduction of a social club's expenses in operating its nonprofit
recreational program even to the amount of club revenues), the
Eighth Circuit's immediate reply was that one should not look
a gift horse in the mouth, but then in a more serious 'Vein it
adopted the rationale that the income producing activities for
tax purposes were to be considered as separate from the social
activities.
44 E.g., Mitchell v. United States, 70-1 U.S.T.C. 1]' 9129 (W.l). 'l'enn. 1969); V.ll.
Monette & Co., 45 T.C. 15, 41, 44 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 374 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1967);
Harold I. Snyder, 25 T.C.M. 1326 (1966).
45 50 T.C. 341, 364-65 (1968), acq.
46 Richard L. Westerman, 55 T.C. 478, 481 n.5 (1970).
47 22 T.C.?tf. 1056, 1060 (1963).
48 468 F.2d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1972). Although there were income producing activities
apart from the recreational activities, the recreational activities themselves produced
considerable income ($13,380.49) and the Senice ruled that the recreational expenses
($24,234.80) could be deducted to exfent of such income.
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It is not surprising in vit>w of the uncertainties in this arl,a
that when the House proposal did not address netting tlu• Treasury recommended clarifying amPndments.
It shofrld also be made clear that those deductions which are nllownble

under the Code without regard to whether they are incurred in a
trade or business or for the production of ineome, such as interest and
certain state and local taxes, will continue to be deductible e\·en where
incurred in an activity not engaged in for profit. Similarly, it shoulcl
be made clear that deductions incurred in nn acth·ity not engaged in
for profit (other than those described in the preceding sentence) slmll
be allowable to a proper extent where income is realized ft·om that
activitr. The amount aUowed should be that proportio1t of the total of
such deductions which the income rcalizccl buu·s to tlte total cleclw:ti.ons att,-ibutable to the aC'fil'ity, including deductions clesrt·ibecl in the
first sentence of this paragraph. Thus, if the taxpayer with a ltobby
farm has interest and taxes of $100,000, operating costs of $120,000,
and depreciation of $80,000, and if the ineome from the farm is
$30,000, the taxpayer should be entitled to deduct the full $100,000
amount of interest and taxes plus $12,000 of operating costs and $8,000
of depreciation.49

The Senate Committee on Finance did provide a netting rule,
albeit less lilwral than Trt>asury's n•rommendation. Section
183(d) classifies dE:'ductions in two categories: (1) those not
dependent upon profit motiYc for dt>ductihility (tier 1 deductions,
in the dE>vE>loping sE>ction 183 ta.x jargon), i.e., "deductions which
would be allowablE:' ... without regard to wheth<>r or not such
activity is engaged in for profit," and (2) those allowable only if
the acth·ity is Pngaged in for profit (tier 2 and tic.>r 3 deductions).
Rather than following the JH'Ol>ortionatt> approach proposed by
the Treasury, the Code pro,·idcs that dl•ductions requiring a
profit motive are dPductible only to tlw t•xtent gross income exceeds tier 1 deductions. Thus.• ratlwr than tier 1 dl•ductions "eating up" only a proportionatt> amount of gross income from the
activity, undPr tll(> Senate Counnittt>l• on Finance approach (section 183(b) ), tlwy eat it up dollar for dollar, with only the excess
available as thP nH>asuring rod for dt>ductibility of tier 2 and
3 deductions. Section 162 farm t>Xpt>nse rl•gulations in effect permitted the deduction of ti<>r 2 and 3 cxpensPs to the full extent
of gross income not rPduced by tier 1 dl'ductions.50
The t~u·ee tier system comt>s about as thl• r<>gnlations further
divide deductions requiring a profit motive into those not inYolv49 TA..'i: REFORM Ac:r OF 1969, TECIIKICAL ::\[EMOR.\KDUJII OF TRI'..ASLIRY POSITIO!\
13270, !JIST Coxa., 1sT SEss. 35-36 (Comm. Print 1969) (cml'lmsis nd1lcd}.
so Reg. § 1.162-12.
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ing basis adjushrwnts (tier 2) and those resulting in basis adjustments (tier 3), such as depreciation and amortization, partial
losses with r(:'Sp(:'ct to propt>rty and partially worthlt>ss debts.G1
Tier 3 deductions in turn art> allowablP only to the extent gross
income exceeds tier 2 deductions. The Senate Committee on
Finance report similarly set a priority on the type of deductions
to be first allowed aft<.>r tier 1 deductions, but would have allowed
first (tier 2) those deductions resulting in basis adjustments.G2
The draftsmen of the regulations rewrs(:'d the committee's order,
reasoning that if basis adjustment d<~ductions, particularly depreciation, were tier 2 ratlwr than tier 3, then the application of
the recapture rulPs upon the subse<1uent disposition of the property would result in sPction 183(b ){2) d<•ductions not being
allowed to the extent of gross income in excess of tier 1 deductions.53 \Yhere tier 3 d<>ductiom; im·oln• more than one asset,
the deduction is allocat<>d to t>ach asset proportionat(lly based
upon the total amount which would han• he<>n dPductible had tho
activity been <>ngag<•d in for profit. 'Phe basis of such assets is
then reduct>d only by the amount of tlw tiPr 3 deductions so allocated to them. 54
Most of the controwrsy in this area will undoubtedly arise as
to tier 1 deductions since tlwy will h<l dPductible regardless of
whether tlwy an~ associated with the activity, but their amount
directly affects the dPductibility of tier 2 and 3 deductions in
an activity not engag<>d in for profit. F,or instance, one commentator has suggested that contrary to the rpgulations where
property is us<"d partially for J>Prsonal purposes and J>artially for
rental ust>, hut the Pntire acti,·ity is d<>terminPd not to be engaged
in for profit, the tier 1 dt>ductions should be divided hHtwe<m
personal and busin<>ss usc. 55 Thus, in the calculation under section 183 (b) gross income would h<> reducpd only by the tier 1
deductions attributabl<> to the rt>ntal operation. This suggestion
has the surface appeal of synmwtr~·, particularly since the regu..
lations allocate the tier 2 and 3 deductions to the rental activity
Reg. §§ 1.183-1(b) (1) (ii) and (iii).
S. REP. No. 91-552, 9lst Coug., 1st Sess. 104 (1969).
53 Osltius, Proposccl Regulations Provitlc New Rules fol' tllc Jlobby Loss GalliC', 35 J.
TAXATION 214 (1971); sec Rhocles, Hobby Losses-A New Clwllellgc, 56 A.B.A.J. 8931
894 (1970); Comment, Section 188: Work Horse o1· llobby Loss, 20 CATUOLIO U.L. llEV,
716, 726 (1971).
54 Reg. § 1.183-1(b)(2)(ii).
55 Thrower, Recent Developments in Fccleral Income TaxaUon, 21 TuL. TAX INST. 1,
23-24 (1972).
51

52
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and to personal use (with the latter allocated deductions being
independently disallowed under section 262}.56 It overlooks, however, the fact that the obvious function of section 183(b}, as
enacted, is to preclude the ta.x.ation of gross receipts while section 183(b)(2) deductions are disallowed, in order not to allow·
the taxpayer to use any amount of such deductions against ot11er
income as the Treasury proportionate proposal would have
·
allowed.
.Another commentator has suggested that in situations of dual
use, rental and personal, the ta.x.payer should treat the operation
as two activities. While his goal was to enable the rental portion
to qualify separately as an activity engaged in for profit, the
same approach would result in allowance of a greater amount of
tier 2 or 3 deductions where both activities are not engaged in
for profit, assuming that all the gross income is allocated to the
rental activity but the tier 1, 2 and 3 deductions are allocated
between the two activities.57 Although characterization as two
activities may prove difficult and is inadvisable if the entire
operation can be shown to be a single activity engaged in for
profit with secondary IJersonal use, the ta.x.payer lms notlling to
lose with such a fragmentation approach if as a single activity
the entire operation is not engaged in for profit.
Not surprisingly the first substantive revenue ruling under
section 183 involved tier 1 deductions. In Revenue Ruling 73-219 58
the Service treated interest paid on an insurance policy loan, the
proceeds of which ha_d been used to 1mrchase a beach house used
in an activity not engaged in for profit, as a tier 1 deduction
indirectly attributable to the activity. The rationale that the use
of the borrowed money is determinative appears correct, but the
ruli?g more likely signals the ad\·ent of a tracing concept like that
applied in section 265. In its more extreme form this concept
reaches some situations in which the taxpayer could sell taxexempt obligations to meet economic needs, but instead incurs
indebtedness to do so.59 But there the reasoning is tltat such interest is incurred to carry the ta.'\:-exempts, whereas interest att1·ibuta.ble to rental property arises from indebtedness that was insa Reg. § 1.183-1(d)(3) Ex. (ii).
Gage, Treasury's Tough New Filial Regs on Partly-Re11tctl Vacation Home Deductions:
.Analysis, 37 J. TAXATION 312, 313 (1972) (ndvocntes two nctivities); Cnrey & Gnllngher,
Requisite Greed: Section 189 Regulations, 19 LOYOLA L. REV. 41, SS (1973) (two nctivities
result in more nllownble tier 2 nnd 3 deductions).
581973-20 I.R.B. 9; Note, 39 J. TAXATION 94 (1973).
59 Fox, The Leslie Case, 26 TAX L. REV. 159 (1970).
s1
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curred, or the proceeds of the loan were used, in connection with
the rental property or with the production of income therefrom. 60
The latter does not appear to encompass interest on indebtedness
incurred to carry property used in an activity not engaged in for
profit.
The most complicated portion of the tier 1 deduction regula~
tions-section 1.183-1(b) (4) (ii)-deals with the section 1202 net
long-term capital gain deduction. No section 1202 deduction is
allowable with respect to an activity not engaged in for profit
(section 183 activity), unless (1) without regard to section 183
there is an excess of net long-term capital gain over short~term
capital loss and (2) that excess is allocable to such section 183
activity. The function of the first prerequisite is quite subtle,
even nice. The regulations provide a constructive profit motive
as to tier 2 and 3 deductions to the extent of gross income in order
to achieve netting. With such a constructive profit motive a bad
debt would qualify as a business bad debt giving rise to an
ordinary loss under section 166(a). A nonbusiness bad debt, on
the other hand, is treated as short-term capital loss. Accordingly,
without the constructive profit motive of section 183(b)(2), a bad
debt incurred in an activity not engaged in for profit is allow~
able only as a short-term capital loss. Thus, it could be said
that a business bad debt ordinary loss is a section 183(b)(2)
deduction because it is allowable as such only if the activity is
engaged in for profit. By virtue of the above tier 1 section 1202
deduction rules such a loss, rather than being allowed as a tier
3 deduction, must reduce long-term capital gains, which then may
give rise to a tier 1 deduction. In some instances such calcula~
tion of net long-term capital gains without regard to section 183
results in more taxable income.
.
An early commentator offered the following example, which
may have brought the question to the eyes of the draftsmen of the
regulations: A taxpayer carrying on an activity without a profit
motive has a long-term capital gain of $10,000 and a bad debt
of $6,000. If, as under the regulations, the bad debt is treated
as a short-term capital loss, it reduces the net long~term capital
gain in excess of short-term capital loss, to $4,000. After deduction of the 50 per cent capital gains deduction (here $2,000), the
net gain from the activity would be $2,000. If on the other hand,
~he $6,000 bad debt were treated as a tier 3 deduction, there
so Reg. § 1.183-l(b)(4)(ii).
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would be no taxable income from the activity, computed as follows: tier 1 deduction, $5,000 section 1202 deduction, and tier 3
deduction, $6,000 bad debt ordinary loss allowable to tlte extent
of gross income in excess of the tier 1 deduction, i.e., $5,000.61
An argument in support of the regulation technique is that tier
1 deductions are to be allowed first, tier 1 contains no constructive
profit motive, therefore, the bad debt would be nonbusiness and,
as a short-term ordinary loss, must be netted with th(' longterm capital gain in order to first dE.'t(:>rmine th{• amount of tier 1
deductions. A counter argument would he that a ti(lr 3 deduction
is being lifted up into tier 1 and, more significantly, that a tn..xpayer is being taxed on income from tlw activity without being
able to offset this income with a deduction he would be entitled
to were the activity deeuwd to he {•ngaged in for profit up to the
amount of gross income from tlw activity. The latt(lr point, it is
submitted, is more consonant with tht> pur1>0se of section 183(b),
but whether the rt>gulation is an invalid intC'rprlltation of its literal
words is more problematical.
If all acth·ities, profit motivated and st>ction 183 acth·ities, ltave
an excess of net long-tPrm capital gain over short-t('rm capital
loss calculated without regard to section 183, the section 1202
capital gain d(lduction is allocah•d to each acth·ity in proportion to its share Of such Pxcess. If any aeth·ity hns a net capital
loss, the section 1202 dC>duction is allocated only to net longterm activities, in the ratio that each activity bears to the total,
not excess, net long-term capital gains of all activities. The total
section 1202 deduction is reduced by tht• allocable deduction to
section 183 activiti(ls and such reduction is then allowable ns a
tier 1 deduction attrihutablP to capital gains.62 The purpose of
these com1mtational gymnastics is to force section 1202 deductions into section 183(h) (1) wlwre the activity generating the
activity is not engaged in for profit, thereby reducing tier 2 and
3 allowable deductions.
Activity

The term activity is not dE.'fined in section 183. Prior to promulgation of the regulations, comnwntators raised two main points:
(1) lest the Service tend to seE.'k a narrow definition of tlte term
61 Conm1ent, .Section 188: Work Horse or Hobby Loss, 20 Ct..TUOLIC U.'L. REv. 71G,
724-25 (1971) . .See Carey & Gallagher, Requisite Grcecl: .Section 183 Reoulaticms, 19
LOYOLA L. REV. 41, 48-52 (1973).
62 Reg. § 1.183-1(b)(4)(iii).
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so as to fragment an integrated activity and disallow expense
attributable to an isolated slice of a single trade or business, they
advocated that the term be defined broadly; and (2) it was argued
that since the House Committee on ·ways and Means stated that
"as 'ltnder present law, the loss would be determined separately
with respect to each activity carried on by an individual" and
earlier had referred to section 270 as the present law, the content of the term "activity" should be governed by the section
270 separate business rule. 63
The regulations under section 270 provided little guidance as
to whether one or two businesses were involved. They did state
that the mere use of different forms of carrying on the same
business did not create separate businesses. Furthermore, where
several business activities emanated from a single commodity,
such as a tract of land, it did not necessarily follow that such
activities were one business for the purpose of section 270. "However, in order to be treated separately, it must be established
that such business activities are actually conducted separately
and are not closely interrelated with each other." 64 Two cases
developed the scope of the separate business rule considerably:
Arthur V. Davis 65 and Joseph ill. Oollins. 66 The principal contention of the Service in the Davis case was that the "nature"
test is controlling-activities which are the same or substantially
the same in nature constitute a single trade or business even
where conducted at more than one location. Its alternative position was that two or more business ventures, though differing
in nature, would still constitute a single trade or business unless
they were separately conducted for a bona fide business purpose.
Application of these two tests may be illustrated by:
[A] man raising potatoes on a farm in Maine and also raising potatoes
on a farm in Idaho would be carrying on only one business regardless
of the fact that the operations on each farm were conducted separately,
and also . . . a man raising cotton on a farm in Alabama and cattle
on a ranch in Texas [would be] carrying on one business if there was
a common management of the two farms. 67
63 H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part I), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1969) (emphasis tul<lcd).
See Comment, Section 188: Work Horse or Hobby Loss, 20 CATliOt.IO U.L. REV. 716, 721
(1971); DICKINSON, FARM AND RANCH LOSSES, BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No.
241, A-21 (1970); Rhodes, Hobby-Losses-.A. New Cliallcnge, 56 A.B.A.J. 893, 895
(1970); Diamond & Horne, Hobby-Losses; Miscellaneous Individual ancl Corporato Prob·
lems, 23 'TAX LAWYER 609, 610-12 (1970).
64 Reg. § 1.270-1(a) (4); Rev. Rul. 54-178, 1954-1 C.B. 128.
o5 29 T.C. 878 (1958).
66 34 T.C. 592 (1960), no11acq.
67 Arthur V. Davis, 29 T.C. 878, 889 (1958).
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The taxpayer maintained that the proper test was whether the
ventures ·were, in fact, separatE'ly and ind<"pendently conducted
and were not materially interrelated: the "economic interrelation" test. Under it, if one farm owned by a ta.xpayer were used
for the running and pasturage of hogs and anoth(;'r farm also
owned by him were used for thE' production of feed for those
hogs, the operation of both farms would he considered a single
business, even though they wert~ physically separated and each
farm had its own resident managE'r, for then• would be sufficient
economic interrelation in tllE' operation of tl1e two farms to
justify the conclusion that as a practical matter there was but
one business unit. Although in the Dads case the Ta.'\: Court
concluded that it did not have to choos<' among the ta.xpayer's
approach and the goYermuent 's two tests, sincl• the same result
would obtain under all, it did state that tht' t'conomic interrelationship test had much to commE'nd it.
Subsequently, in Joseph M. Collins 68 the~ Ta.x Court was forced
to make the choice. It rE'jE'cted the nature test and held that tl1e
two businesses in question W(lre separately and independently
conducted by the taxpayer with no E'Conomic or other interrelation between them. Because in Collins the court found the activities
were conducted separatE'ly and indE'pt>ndcmtly as well as having
no economic relationship, tlw question wht~ther cmnn1on management alone without any E'Conomic relationship would result
in a single business remained unanswered.
The regulations eclectically adopt all of the tests set forth in
Collin-s and Davis, both those approved and discarded by the
Tax Court. For the regulations provide that in ascertaining the
activity or activities of the ta.xpaycr all the facts and circumstances must be taken into account and gt•nt'rally the most significant facts and circumstances are (1) the degree of organizational and economic interrelationship, (2) the business purpose
for carrying on the various undertakings St'}>arately or togetlter
and (3) the similarity of the various undertakings.6!l The similarity
test was clearly overruled in Collins. Had the Tax Court had
to make a choice in Davis, it probably would have rej£>cted as
well the organizational and busin(>SS purpose tests which were
presented as a single alt(lrnati\·e test tlwre. Only the economic
interrelation test has the full sup}>ort of the prior case law,
although the organizational intN·rE'lationship tC'st finds some validss 34 T.C. 592 (1960), 11011acq.
Reg. § 1.183-l(d)(l).
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ity in the fact that in Collins the court held that there was no
economic or organizational interrelationship. In short, litigation
may be expected as to these factors derived in part as they are
from defeated litigating postures of the Service under section
270, which the legislative history provides as the pattern for
the term "activity." Only the degree of organizational and economic interrelationship factor should be sustained.
Probably to forestall any temptation on the part of field agents
to fragment a single integrated activity, the regulations provide that generally the Commissioner will accept the characterization by the taxpayer of several undertakings either as a single
activity or as separate activities. However, this characterization
will not be accepted if artificial and will not be reasonably supported under the facts and circumstances of the case.70 This
approach is apparently derived from the business purpose factor
set out in the definition of activity. Again the taxpayer's characterization should be struck down only if it fails the organizational
and economic interpretation test.
The section 183 activity provisions on this point can be said to
be substantially broader than their section 270 predecessor only
in that they adopt tests rejected under those cases. Indeed, the
government argued for a broad single business rule under section
270 to maximize the losses for the five year $50,000 rule. 71 Contrary to the evident belief of the draftsmen of the regulations,
it is submitted that they are narrower here than the section
270 rules, at least as to the question of whether farming and
the holding of the land on which such farming is conducted constitutes a single activity.72 The significance of this question lies
in the fact that the term ''profit'' encompasses, according to
other provisions of the regulations, appreciation in the value of
assets used in the activity, such as land. Thus, a taxpayer may
satisfy the profit motivation standard because he intends to
derive a profit from operating the activity, but also intends that
even if no profit is derived from current operations, an overall profit will result when appreciation in the value of the
land used in the activity is realized. This factor of unrealized
appreciation has been an increasingly significant factor in the
10

Ibid.

n Diamond & Horne, Hobby Losses: Miscellaneous Individual ana Corporate Problems,

23 TAX LAWYER 609, 610-11 (1970).
12 Oshins, Proposed Regulatio118 Provide New Rules for tlle Hobby Loss Game, 35 J.
TAXATION 214, 216 (1971).
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farm loss cases under section 162.73 The activity defining provisions of the regulations maintain, however, that the farming
and the holding of land used for such farming, which was acquired or held primarily with the intent to profit from its appreciation, will ordinarily be considered a single activity ''only if
the farming activity reduces the net cost of carrying the land
for its appreciation in value." 74
It may be noted that the proposed regulations couched this rule
in terms of the taxpayer's intent-=whether he expected or intended
that the farming activity would reduce the net cost of carrying
the land.75 This earlier approach seems more consonant with the
thrust of the profit motive factor-that the ta.xpayer may intend
to make a profit from farming activities, but may also intend that
in any event an overall profit will result considering land appreciation-with which it was clearly designed to mesh. Furthermore, for over four decades, such intent has won judicial approval.
As early as 1931, the ta.xpayer in Edwin, S. George argued, to
the court's satisfaction, "that he planted the orchards for the
purpose of increasing the Yalue of his property and because he
thought that the proceeds of the sale of the fruit would help
him to carry his land until the proper time for the sale of the
land arrived.'' 76
It might be inferred from this formulation of activity as applied
to a farming venture and from the section 162 case law, that
where the taxpayer shows he has not purchased or acquired the
farm land primarily as an investment he can continue to rely
upon any unrealized appreciation of the land as establishing profit
motivation ·wlwre his primary intention was to derive a profit
from the farm operations.77 On the other ltand, the regulations
illustrate the general statement that where the ta.xpayer's primary
intent is to profit from appreciation in farm land, the holding
and farming of the land will ordinarily be considered a single
activity only if the farming activity reduces the net cost of
carrying the land with the much broader, absolute example:
[T]he farming and holding of the land will be considered a single
activity only if the income derived from farming exceeds the deductions
73 See Comment, Tlle Effect of Unrealized Appreciation in Determining Profit Motit:o in
Farming Enterprises, 16 KAN. L. REv. 529 (1968); sec Reg. § 1.183-!:l(b) (4).
74 Reg. § 1.183-1(d) (1).
75 Prop. Reg. § 1.183-1(d) (1), 36 Fed. Reg. 16112 (August 19, 1971).
76 22 B.T.A. 189, 195 (1931).
77 See Crouch, How Treasury's Final Regulations on t11c New Hobby Less Rules Operate,
38 J. TAXATION 184, 187 (1973).
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attributable to the farming artivity which are not directly attributable
to the holding of the land (that is, deductions other than those directly attributable to the holding of th<' land such as interest on n
mortgage secured by the land, annual property taxes attributable to the
land and improvements, and depreciation of improvements to the lnncl. 79

Thus, it is clear that tlw thrust of this }Jortion of the rpgulations
is to deny use of land ap]H'Peiation in tPsting profit motivation in
all unprofitable farming actiYitiPs, thPrC:'hy undercutting the factor
of unrealized farm land ap]H'Pciation providPd p}sewhere. This
technique, design<'d to ohYiat<> tlw prior taxpayN' success with
land appreciation, may be PX]JPCtPd to provoke litigation in two
areas: (1) whether tlw "automatic" sPparatP activity rule is
limited to situations wherp tlw taxpayl-'r's primary intention with
rl-'spect to thl-' land is to hold it for a}JJH'Pciation and (2) wht>ther
that rule is genprally com;istPnt with tlw (propPl') meaning of
the term ''activity.'' 'Plw ans\\'Prs to tlwsP isstws will turn on
the resolution of SP\'Pral eontli<'fing factors, e.,r;., the prior separate business dt>\'Plopnwnt undt>r se<'fion 270, tlw contPxt in which
section 183 was <•nacted, tlw vast body of seetion 1G2 case law
implicitly treating holding and farming of land as a singlP activity
and the ha:ndful of rPePnt deeisions questioning wlwtlwr farming
expenses wPre nec<•ssary t>XpC'nst>s in tlw maintPnancP of Jn·operty
for future sale or produetion of inconw.
Under the "connno'n manag<'mPnt" tt>st for d<>tPrmining whether
undertakings constituted a singlt> bm.;int>ss argu(ld for by tho
Service in Daris 79 as an altPrnative tPst, and which is reincarnated in the crit<>rion in sP<'fion 1.183-l(d){l) of tho rE'gulations of tlw dPgree of organizational int<>rrPlationship of tlw
various und<.>rtakings, a farming v<>ntur<• anrl tlw holding of land
used for it would he a singlP aeti,·ity as long as tlwy arn under
the sauw manag<•uwnt. l\Iore Rignifieantly, tlw 'Pax Court illustrated in Davis a singlP hm;iness under tlw ''practical <~conomic
interrelation'' test, also rPinearnatPrl in tlw rpgulation 's d<•flnition
of activity in the factor of Pconomic intPITclationship, with the
example of two farms, om• us<'rl for running and pm;turage of
hogs and a second connnonly owned farm, und<'l· a difft•rent resident manager, USE:'d for production of fepd for the same hogs .
.A. similar production link exists lwhn•en raising livestock or
crops and holding tlw land on whi(•h tlwy arP raised. Thus, from
the point of vi<>w of tlw farming und<•rtaking, the holding of
rs Reg. § 1.183-l(d)(l) (emphasis added).
7D Arthur v. Davis, 29 T.C. 878 (1938).
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the land used in that activity bears a close economic and management interrelationship to the farming ventur(.l. Accordingly,
under section 1.183 (1 )( d)(l) of the regulations holding and farming the same tract of land would appear to constitute a single
activity.
Just as the incorporation by the l(lgislative history of the section
270 single-separate busines development into S(.>Ction 183 cuts
toward treatm(lnt of the holding and farming land as a single
activity, consid<:>ration of tll(l context in which section 183 was
enacted reveals that in many instances such treatnwnt would produce results inconsist<:>nt with tlw gen£>ral purpos<• of the farm
provisions of the Tax R£>form Act of 1969. The original impetus
for farm tax. reform arose from a pl•rcPi\·(.ld distortion of income
from taxpayers enjoying ordinary inconw deductions incurred
in the development of a farm product, such as a breeding herd,
and tl1en disposing of th<:> mature product at more favorable capital
gain rates. It was felt that the "existing 'hobby loss' provision
of the Internal Revenue Code [i.e., section 270 was] ineffectual
in dealing with this problem.'' 80 In tlw final version of the Ta."'
Reform Act l£>gislation thP S!>Otlighh•d distortion abuses were
handled principally by section 1251 and th<• direct legislative }tistory of section 183 does not n•fer to such abuse. N'ev<.•rtlteless, the
enjoyment of current ordinary inconw deductions from farm operations when it is ex}wcted that tlw ultimat(.l profit will be capital
gains from appreciation of thP farmland falls into thP pattern
the farm tax reform lH'o\·isions in g<•neral wer<• d<•signed to curb.
Thus, the Treasury's attempt to preclude this rpsult through using
the word "activity" is not surprising. It could be argued, }towever, that since Congress Pssentially co\·en•d this problem through
the carefully structurc>d provisions of sl•ction 1251, tlw Treasury
should not be }>ermittPd to fashion its own broader, overlapping
tool, with a differc>nt rpmedy, in the section 1R3 r(.lgulations. In
short, it is not likely this factor will lw giv<•n ov<•rt weight in tJ1e
resolution of thl' issues here but it may new~rtheless influence
the result.
Certainly, the large numbPr of farm loss decisions turning at
so U.S. TREASURY DEP'T TA.X REFORM S'j:'UDIES AND PROPOSALS (PART 1) 1 !llST Com;.
1ST SESS. 153 (Connn. Print 1!169). This Iegislath·t:' history supports the rt:'sult of tltis
portion of the regulations, wbidt is to deny use of the unre:tlized np11re<"intion iu Inntl
whieh is nsecl in a farming neth·ity, but one eomment:ttor bas ntised tlw counter arguments
that (1) sinec Iaml is n ne~•essary eapital asset in f:mniug, it is nrtilidul to separnte the
Iancl :nul farming aml (2) sudt :tppreciation is not limite<l to hobby fnnns. C'nrey &
Gallaglter, Requisite Greed: Section 183 Rcgulatio11s, 19 LOYOLA L. Rl:.>". 41, :i1 (1073).
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least in part on unrealized appreciation in land used in farming
implicitly have considered th(l farming and land holding as a
single business or V(lnture. As a recent such decision held "The
farm increased in Yalue (no doubt at least in part as a result of
his efforts) ... considerably more than the aggregate net losses
claimed, so that in fact there was a net ultimate profit from the
venture.'' 81
Invariably these cast>s have approached the issue of profit motivation in the context of wlwther the farm operations constiN
tuted a trade or busin('SS within the meaning of section 162.
Focus on appreciation in farmland might suggest, however, that
the analysis should be whetht>r the expenses are ordinary and
necessary in the maintenanc<' or holding of the farm property
for the 1>roduction of income and, h<>nce, be deductible under
section 212. ·when the isslw has been franwd in that manner, the
taxpayer has had to show that the farming undertaking helped
financially carry or otlu.•rwis<' aided in the maint<'nance of the
land, or that the farm activity its<>lf was inde}J<•ndently carried on with an expectation of profit. rphH leading, and virtually
only, analysis on point is contain<>d in Richard R. Riss, Sr.,sz
involving the issue whetlwr various farming expenses were ordinary and necessary in the manag<>ment, conservation or maintenance of the taxpayer's gr<>atly a}>]H'Pciat(ld property which, the
court had found, he h<>ld primarily for inYestment. It concluded
that they were not:
To our knowledge, no connection existed between the raising of these
animals and the maintenance of the . . . propert;v for future sale,
or for use as development property. Nor do we find grounds for eoneluding that the raising of these animals constituted a separate nnd
independent income-producing endeavor, related to the ... property only
by reason of location. Accordingly, we hold that Richard's breeclin~
activities amounted to little more thau a hobby or pastime ... ,sa

The same r(lasoning, albeit inarticulat(ld, appar('ntly underlies
the jury charge in Cavender v. United States 84 that the taxpayer
must have a bona fid<' ('Xp<>C'tation of making a profit at farming
before the farm <>X}wns<>s would he dPductible: An intention to
81 Woodrow L. Wroblewski, 32 T.C'.M. No. 37 at 172 (1973); Sec, e.g., DuPont v,
United Stntes, 234 F. Supp. 681, 688 (D. Del. 1964); Israel 0. Blake, 38 B.'r.A. 1457,
1460 (1938); George Thacker, 28 T.V.:\L 1433 ( 1!J69); llcrbet·t C. Snmlcrsou, 23 •r.C.M.
1723 (1964).
82 56 T.C. 388 (1971).
83 I d. at 422.
s4 71-2 U.S.T.C. ~ 9723 (S.D. W. Va. 1971).

1974]

SECTION

183

AND BEYOND

373

merely hold the farm as a real estate investment would not be
sufficient. The court went on to state tltat a long-range goal of
profitable disposition for commercial purposes would not render
farm e:A'}Jenses nondeductible, if during the interim the ta.'\.'}Jayer
decided, and had a bona fide intent, to Ollerate the farm at a
profit.
These two decisions, essentially the only authorities to consider
the problem, suggest that where farm property is held primarily
as an investment, any farm activities undertaken by tlte ta.xpayer
in connection with the propE.>rty either must be ordinary and
necessary in such holding to be deductible under section 212 or
must constitute "a SE.'parate and independent income-producing
endeavor" with expenses deductible under section 162. Under this
approach, operating a farm and ownership of land held primarily
as an investment are separate activities if the operational expenses are not ordinary and nE.>ct>ssary section 212 e::-..'}Jenditures
in the holding of the land. HowE.'\·er, these cases do not directly
answer whether the unrealized appreciation in the land can be
considered in determining wht>ther tlw farming activity is engaged
in for profit, the implication is that it cannot. In any event, other
authorities suggest that in smut> circumstances farming e::-..'}lenses
are helpful in maintaining the lH'OlWrty for future sale, although
they are not helping financially to carry it. In DuPont v. Uniteil
States,85 the court accepted the taxJ>ayer's argument that he
carried on a cattl<:> breeding O}Jeration on land held for appreciation in order to keep it from becoming ovt>rgrown "ith woods and
underbrush and to prevent erosion. Therefore, the emphasis on the
farming operations helping financially to carry the land should not
result in an absolute bar of the deductibility under sections 162 and
183 of the expt>nses of farm operations in excess of gross receipts,
as one reading of the regulations would clearly do.
The activity definition in the regulations, the appreciation factor
in the profit motive portion of the regulations, Riss 86 and Oavender,87 and the large body of farm loss decisions beginning with
Ismel 0. Blake 88 finding profit motivation satisfied by appreciation in assets including, or sometimes only consisting of, farmland could all be reconciled by c>ncompassing unrealized farmland
appreciation within the term "profit" for determination of
234 F. Supp. 681, 689 (D. Del. 1964).
Richard R. Riss, Sr., 56 T.C. 388 (1971).
87 Cavender v. United States, 71-2 U.S.T.C. "J 9723 (S.D. W. Vn. 1971).
88 38 B.T.A. 1457, 1460 (1938).
85

86
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whether a farming operation constitutes a trade or business only
when the taxpayer holds the land primarily for use in a farming operation, and not primarily for its appreciation. This would,
of course, reintroduce the question of subjective intent. It is submitted, however, that Riss and the Blake progeny conflict in
most instances. ·where an asset is held primarily for appreciation
rather than for use in an asserted trade or business, unrealized
appreciation should only lw a factor in determining whether the
property is held for the production of income and not in ascertaining whether the actidty for which it is used is profit motivated.
\Vhile such appreciation is relevant to expectation of realizing
a profit UJJOn the disposition of the property, in which case it is
held for the production of income, it is not relevant to an expectation of profit from day to day operations. Of course, appreciation in inventory-type assets, such as livestock, would be relevant
to an expectation of profit in the business of raising such livestock for sale. Appreciation in noninventory assets becomes no
more relevant to an expectation of profit from everyday operations when the property is held primarily for use in that activity.
Furthermore, a man planning to make a profit from an activity
usually does not plan to do so by liquidating it. Perhaps most
significant is that the Riss approach forces the operations deductions to qualify as ordinary and necessary expenses of holding
the asset for production of incomo where an overall profit is
expected only from tlw sal<> of the asset.
Under this conclusion Blake was correctly decided as to the
appreciation in th<' liYestock but not as to the appreciation the
land used in raising the liwstock. Rather than facing the difficult
task of overruling the old and well <>stablished rule that appreciation in noninventory assets may indicate an expectation of profit
from the activity in which tlw assets were used, the drafters of
the regulations Pndors<'d it and then sought to undermine it
through special activity rules, which arguably conflict with the
general definition JH'o\·ided for the term "activity." Furthermore,
by separating operational PXJWnsPs from the production of income activity in all instancPs in which they exceed income from
operations, the regulations would in som<> instances disallow
operational deductions which are in fact ordinary and necessary
section 212 expenses. Thus, both this portion of the activity provisions and the factor of Pxpectation of appreciation in value of
assets used in an activity should he reevaluated, administratively
or judicially.
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In addition to offering guidelines as to the ascertainment of
activity, section 1.183-1(d) (2) of the regulations provides rules for
allocation of expenses. \Vhere property is used in several activities
and at least one is not engaged in for profit, the deductions relating
to such property must be allocated between the various activities
on a reasonable and consistently applied basis.
A similar question of allocation has frequently arisen under sections 162 and 212, as well as other sections permitting deductions
for business use. The rule there is that a deduction for maintenance and depreciation, for example, is permitted where acquisition of property is associated primarily with business motivated
purposes and any personal use is distinctly secondary and incidental. On the other hand, if the acquisition and maintenance was
motivated primarily by Jlersonal cm:isiderations, no deductions
are allowed. This primary purpose criterion is applicable, however,
only where the secondary purposes are incidental and relatively
insignificant. "\\There substantial business and personal motives
exist, however, allocations become necessary.'' 89 The Service's
usual posture, as set forth, for instance, in Revenue Ruling
62-180,90 has been to make such allocation on a time-use formula
utilizing in the time factor the ratio of business use time to total
time regardless of whether such time was utilized for personal
purposes. Thus, if during a 24 hour period, business use was two
hours and personal use was two hours, the business use time
would be one twelfth. Some early decision adopted this approach,
while others sub silentio rejected it.91
The Tax Court in International Artists, Ltd.,92 made the allocation on the basis of business use to personal use; disregarding
the time when the facility was not used at all. Moreover, in George
W. Gino,93 a recent decision following bztenzational Artists, the
same court expressly refused to follow this aspect of Revenue
Ruling 68-180, reasoning:
International Artists, Ltd., 55 T.C. 94, 105 (1970), acq.
1962-2 C.B. 52, 56 Ex. 5.
o1 Compare Hoggard v. United States, 67-2 U.S.T.C. 1! 9741 (E.D. Vn. 1967) nnd
Martha E. Henderson, 27 T.C.M. 109 (1968), wit11 International Artists, Ltd., Sa T.O. 94,
107 (1910) ; Demor, Inc., 27 T.C.M. 1496 (1968) ; cf. Hnrlnn H. Hilliker, 31 T.O.M. 895
(1972).
s2 55 T.C. 94, 107 (1970).
D3 60 T.C. No. 37 (1973), on appeal. Section 1.274-2(e) {4) {i) of the regulntions, in
interpreting the "primarily for the furthemnce of the tm:payer's tmde or businC23" te·
quirement of section 274{a) (1) (B) incorpomtes, in n mnnner similnr to section 183{e) the
ordinary and necessary tests of sections 162 nnd 212; and the nctnal use test is dcsmbed ns
establishing deductibility under those provisions.
89
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The obvious difficulty with an allocation of business use as a percentage of total hours of availability for use rather than total hours
of use, is the erroneous and distorting assumption that a dual-use
facility is not, when unused, just as much available for business as it
is for nonbusiness use. The correct rule is to pro-rate in proportion to
actual use, in the manner specified in regulations section 1.274-2(e) (4),
without the thumb on the scales provided by the allocation to personal
use of all hours of non-use.94

The regulations under section 183 implicitly adopt this more reasonable approach of ratio of actual personal use to business use.
\Vhile they do not provide an illustration of property used both
in an activity engaged in for profit and in an activity not engaged
in for profit, tlwre is an example in which expenses, for application of the rule that deductions ar<> allowed under section 183(b)
(2) to the extent of inconw, are allocated to rental use and personal use of propPrty used in a single activity. In Example 2
of section 1.183-l(d)(3) of the r<>gulations, the beach house example, the property was used for three months out of the year,
two months for r<>ntal use and onP month for personal use. The
expenses were allocat<>d two thirds to rental use and one third
to personal use. 'T'hus, tlw S<>rdce has in this context rejected at
least the broad implications of RPvenue Ruling 62-180.
This beach house illustration, the sole l'Xample accompanying
the activity paragraph of the regulations, docs not provide any
guidance for the application of the prineipl<'S set forth for determining whether a singlP activity or sevc>ral activities are present.
It recites tlmt a taxpayl•r owned a beach house in a resort community, which could be rent<'d for only three months out of the
year. Customarily, tlw taxpayer lPas<>d the beach house for two
months of the tlm•e month rN'reational season to vacationers and
reserved the housP for his own u::;e during the remaining month
of the recreational s<>ason. The rPntal income was less tlmn the
expenses attributable to tlw house. 'Phe example concluded that
"under these facts and circumstances, A is engaged in a single activity, holding the beach house primarily for personal purposes,
which is 'an activity not engag<>d in for profit.' " A comm<>ntator
has pointed out that this conclusion is presumed without any indication as to its rational<> and maintains that there is nothing in tho
Code or the committee prints which support this conclusion. 05 The
example appears to he deriYed from John R. Cm·khuf1. 96
George W. Gino, 60 T.C. No. 37 (1973), on appeal.
Gage, Treasury's Tough New Final Regs on Partly·Renteil Vacation Home Declue·
tions: Analysis, 37 J. TA.'I::ATION 312, 313 (1972).
9G 28 T.C.M. 375 (1969), aff'cl, 425 F.2cl 1400 (6th Cir. 1970); sec Kanter v. United
94,

-95
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In the Carkhuff case, invoh·ing a beach l10use, the peak rental
period ·was for four and one lmlf months each year and the
taxpayer reserved the house for h\·o of those months: an action,
in the words of the review court, not entirely consistent with profit
making. The taxpayer did not argue strongly in the Ta.x Court
that he was holding the beach property for rental as a trade or
business so that the expenses would be deductible under sections
162 and 167. Rather, he maintained that he held the property
for production of income within the meaning of section 212.
The taxpayer offered no evidence of any intention of making
a profit from the rental of thl' beach property and did not present
evidence as to his intl'nt in listing the property for rent when
it was not being occupied. The trial court drew the inference that
the listing for rental was in hope of rt>couping some of the costs
of maintaining a personal residence which he did not intend to
occupy for the entire year. The taxpayer's answer was that since
he acquired the house partially for personal use and partially for
business use, he did not lmve to have a reasonable e.'\.-pectation
of making a profit from the business use of the house. The Tax
Court concluded, however, that there lmd to be a bona fide conversion of the property to an income producing use for section
212 to be applicable and, concerning that issue, the possibility of
profit would be a factor, but only a factor, to be weighed with
other objective factors. The court did not decide whether property
may be converted to income production for part of the taxable
year and then reconverted to personal use for the remainder of
that taxable year, in a recurring pattern. For it found there was
no sufficient conversion of the property to any use which could
be said to have been primarily for the production of income.
From the Tax Court's decision in Carklm,ff, one commentator
has concluded that the rental lJortion and owner occupied portion
of a beach house, for example, could be separate activities.97 The
Sixth Circuit, however, in affirming the Tax Court sidestepped the
recurring partial conversion issue by reasoning that tm..-payers
can make a dual use of I>roperty and an allocation of the e:l>..-penses
and depreciation is 1>ermissible to that part of the use which
States, 73-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 9311 (E.D. Va. 1973) (substantial personal usc), af!'d per CUI"i!lm,
74-1 U.S.T.C. U 9182 (4th Cir. 1974). In William K. Coors, 60 T.C. No. 44 (1973), the
court contrasted the substantial personal usc in Carkhuff witb the holding out of the
property in question for rental about 95 per cent of tbc tax year.
s1 Gage, Treasury's Tough New Final Regs on Partly-Rented Vaa~tion Homo Dciluc·
tions: Analysis, 37 J. ~AXATION 312 (1972).
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relates to earning income or making a profit. It found the taxpayer did not have any expectation that ownership of the beach
property would be an income producing operation. In essence,
the circuit court's analysis appears to support the basic approach
of the regulation example, i.e., the ownership and rental of the
beach property would be a single activity. If the rental portion
were engaged in for profit, then an allocation of expenses to the
personal use and the rental use would be called for and those
attributable to the rental use would be deductible.98 The controversy would then arise as to whether the single activity was
engaged in for profit.
It is unfortunate that the example does not give more factors
a.s to why the single activity was not engaged in for profit. It
omits completely any reference to possible appreciation in the
property and, in terms of the nine factors provided elsewhere
in the regulations as guidelines as to whether an activity is engaged in for profit, the example touches only upon personal use
and the fact that losses are incurred. ·while the Carkhuff opinions
do disclose that personal use during the peak rental period is a
factor inconsistent with a profit making motive, there were many
other negative factors in the case.99 Nevertheless, with the slteletal
example provided, it may be expected that revenue agents will
tend to take a blanket approach in treating all second residences
used partially for personal use as activities not engaged in for
profit.
Ironically, based on the facts provided in the regulation example, and some conservative estimates as to the fair market
value of the property and annual rate of appreciation, a strong
argument can be made that the taxpayer actually could expect
a profit from the ownership of the property if unrealized appreciass But see William K. Coors, 60 T.C. No. 44 (1973) (no apparent allocation of doprccln•
tion to personal use; perhaps taxpayer used only deducted portion attributable to roatnl
use).
99 For example, the cottage was neither specifically mentioned nor advertised imllvidually
by the Sea Island Company which owned the local hotel and maintained a list of all tho
cottages on the island available for rent. Such rental activities, which wore not n major
concern of the company, were not sufficient to sustain the taxpayer's burden of proof. Tho
taxpayer did not install air conditioning in the cottage although it was boglnnlng to fnco
more severe competition from air conditioned homes. Tho tnxpnyer in Joseph W. Johnson,
Jr., 59 T.C. No. 78 (1973), did add air conditioning to his Sen Island cottage nnd offered
it for rent during the entire peak rental period, but was found not to have bold tho
property primarily for production of income on the following objective facts: (1) no
prepurchase investigation as to rentability, (2) no allocation of expenses between per·
sonal and rental use, (3) no books and records and (4) over-expensive improvements.
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tion were included. The total expenses attributable to the property in the example, including depreciation, were $3,900. Allocating all of these ex1Jenses according to the ratio of the rentaluse to the personal use results in $2,600 hring attributable to the
rental use. Rental income of $2,000 was rect•i\·ed in the example.
However, due to the fact that the income dt•rived from the rental
exceeded the deductions attributable to the rental activity which
were not directly attributable to tlw holding of thl' building, i.e.,
deductions other than int<>rest, annual prop<.>rty ta.xes and dt>preciation, the renting and the holding of tlw building would be considered a single activity based on tlw analogy of farming and
holding of land used in thl' principl<>s supplied in seetion 1.183-1
(d) (1) of the regulations.
The beach house illustration dol's not state the fair market
value of the beach house, nor does it supply tltc annual rate of
appreciation in local land valu<>s. Howpver, based on the facts
that the deprl'ciation which would have been allowed had "the
activity been engaged in for profit" was $1,200 and that theguideline useful life for residences is 45 years,100 the ta.xpayer's
costs for the house ·would range from $39,394 to $54,545 depending upon whether the depr<>ciation was tak<>n under the 150 per
cent declining balance or the straight-lint• methods, respectivelyreal property that does not qualify as residential rental property,
as defined in section 167(k)(3)(C), cannot be depreciated at a
rate in excess of 150 per cent declining halanee if new, or straightline if used.101 \Ylwther new or used, the current rules of thumb
as to annual rate of appreciation on m•w real estate is 10 per
cent a year and on ust>d improved r<>al <>state is bl'tween 3 and 5
per cent, the annual unrPalizt'd appreciation of the bt>ach property
·would be far in exc<>ss of tht• $600 gap betwC'C'n the rental income
and the expenses attributable to the rental use of the property.
It is indeed unfortunate that the beach house example lms
such bare bones since it oll\·iously Jms a chilling effect upon investors desiring to make dual use of similar property. For instance prospectusE:'s for puhlic offerings of dual use condominium
units have expressly referred to this example in disclosing the
100 Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 O.B. 418.
1o1I.R.O. § 167(j)(1). Under stmight·line deprerintion $.14,!i4G X2.2 per cent
$1,199.
Useful life is 45 years; 1/45 = 2.2 per cent. Under 150 per cent declining b:ilnn~c de·
preeintion $39,394 X 3.3 per cent = $1,199. .Assuming tbnt U10 beach house would ba
rented only on a transient basis, lloublc declining balance deprcclntion would not be
available. I.R.O. § 167(j) (2).
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potential section 183 risks an investor faces. 102 Moreover, it will
undoubtedly encourage agents to attack such dual use of property.
Accordingly, the beach house example should be clarified to indicate the reasons that the single activity was not engaged in for
profit, with particular attention given to the factor of unrealized
appreciation.

Profit
The term ''profit'' is not defined in the Code. The Treasury
recommended that the House "provision be amended to make
it clear that the reasonably anticipated profit [the House standard
rejected by the Senate] must be an economic profit, not a 'tax
savings' profit, and that such 'profit' need not be determined on
an annual basis.'' 103 Although Congress did not heed this suggestion, the proposed regulations provided that (1) the fact that
a taxpayer could not reasonably expect to produce an ''economic
profit" from an activity may indicate the taxpayer is not engaged
in it for profit and (2) the term profit encompasses appreciation in
the value of assets used,in the activity. 104 The first element was·
deleted in the final regulations, no doubt due to the reasonable
expectation of profit aspect. The Senate Committee on Finance
report applied the term profit to the trigger in the section 183{d)
presumption provision-income from the activity in excess of
deductions attributable to the activity which would be allowed if
it were engaged in for profit-but such definition, or better,
description, should not be determinative as to the general definition of profit under section 183 (c) defining an activity not engaged
in for profit: (1) The Treasury did not follow such a definition
as to section 183(c) since it stated in the regulations that profit
includes unrealized appreciation which does not come within gross
income until realized and (2) some cases under sections 162, 212(1)
and 212(2) adopt a broader definition not necessarily coincident
with taxable income, i.e., gross income less deductions. 105
Prospectus, :r.fontaneros Shareholclers Recreation Programs, Inc. 43 (Oct. 13, 1972).
TAX REFORM ACT OF 19691 TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM OF TREASURY POSITION ON
H.R. 13270, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS. 35 (Comm. Print 1969).
104 Prop. Reg. §§ 1.183-2(b) (9) and 1.183-2(b) (10), 36 Fetl. Reg. 16112 (August 191
1971). The later factor is identical with Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (4).
105 S. REP. No. 91-552, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS. 104-05 (1969), Section 183(d) docs not
base its presumption on the term "profit"; rather the presumption is triggered when 11 tho
gross income . . . exceeds the deductions attributable to such activity.'' The Senate Com•
mittee on Finance was describing an activity with such excess of gross income ovor <leduc·
tions as being engaged in for profit, which indeed it is. There is, however, no indication
102

103
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A model for e}..-ploring the perimeters of the concept of profit
is a limited partnership interest in a syndicate operating nonowner occupied residential real estate. Tn>ically, such a partnership generates large ta.x losses (often a limited partner's pro rata
share exceeds, over a si..x to seven year period, his initial investment) through accelerated depreciation and mortgage interest
deductions during the first six and one half years of operation and
thereafter (the turn-around or cross-over) generates ta.xable income so that the limited partner ultimately recoups Ius ta.....: losses
and enjoys an overall profit.106 Furthermore, ta.x-free distributions
of cash flow are commonly made during this period to the limited
partner, again often in an amount equal to his invesbnent and, in
addition, the partnership assets may be e}..-pected to appreciate
considerably during this period.107 Finally, if at the end of the
seven year loss period the limited partner disposes of his partnership interest, he will recognize a ta.xable gain, in addition to any
cash consideration received, equal to his prior ta.x losses and cash
distributions, less his capital contribution to or invesbnent in the
partnership.108 Such gain may be ta.xed in part as ordinary income
that profit (not the dispositive term in section 183(d)) ns used in section l83(c) is
limited to gross income in e.-;:cess of deductions, nttributuble to the nctirity. In short, tho
committee report appears to have used profit as n description of gross income in t:XCCZl of
deductions, rather than gross income as a definition of profit. Sec Note, .d.tzalysis of New
Code Section 189 and Some Ramifications for tlle Resort Home, 9 WILLA~E L.J. 117,
122 (1973) (profit not restricted to e.-;:cess of income over expenses).
1os Guido, Xhe Impact of the Taz Reform Act of 1969 on t1u! Supply of Adequate
Housing, 25 VAND. L. REV. 2891 303 n.55 (1972); :McKee, The Real Estate Tax. Shelter:
A Computerized Expose, 57 VA. L. REV: 521, 529 (1971) (turnaround in tenth year);
Rabinowitz, Realty Syndication: An Income Taz Primer For Intcstor and Promoter, 29
J. TAXATION 92-96 (1968); Pircher, Xaz Slzcltercd Intcstmcnts: Wl1at, Who, Wilen and
Which?, 28 Bus. LAWYER 897, 902 (1973).
101 In computation of cash flow income, mortgnge amortization but not depreciation is
deducted. :Rabinowitz, Realty Sync1ication: An Income Xax Primer For Int·cstor and Pro·
moter, 29 J. TA..XATION 92, 95 (1968). Another wny of e.-;:preESing the concept, wl1ich does
not differ in results, is "net profits after ta.-;:es plus non-cash clmrges, such ns deprecintion,
depletion, and amortization." 1IERWITZ1 BUSINESS PLA.."<NING 6 (1966). While there nrc
many alternative definitions of real estate investment return (sec Roulnc, Truth in Bcai
Estate Reporting, 3 REAL ESTATE REV. 90, 91 (1973)), nDil methods for distributing cash
flow (see Schwartz, How to Find Xax Sl1cltcr as a Limited Partner, 1 REAL ESTA'IE REV.
54, 57-58 (1971)), wl1en used in te.-;:t and footnotes the above llefinition of cnsh flow is
meant. Cash flow as a return on investment frequently exceeds 10 per cent of investment
on an annual basis. U.S. TREASURY DEP1T TA..X REFORM STUDIES ..U."D PROPOSALS (PA!l'r 1),
91ST CONG., 1ST SESs. 455 (Comm. Print 1969); Pircher, Taz Sheltered Intcstments:
Wlzat, Wlw, Wizen, and Which?, 28 Bus. LAWYER 8971 902 (1973).
1os The amount realized upon the sale of a partnership interest includes the }lartner's
share of partnership liabilities. Reg. § 1.752-l(d); Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1!.147);
Frank A. Logan, 51 T.C. 482 (1968). This is computed on the bnsis of his share of profits or
losses. Reg. § 1.752-l(e). Such share is included in his basis of his partnersl1ip interest. Reg.
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by virtue of section 751 to the extent of potential recapture at the
partnership level with respect to partnership property.
This model is particularly appropriate in view of the increas~
ing, in the words of one commentator, booming, market in the
sale of such limited partnership interests as tax shelters. 109 In~
deed, the SEC has recently informally required that prospectuses
for public offerings of units or participations in such syndicates
explain the possible impact of section 183 on investors lacking a
profit motive who inn•st in any tax shelter (limited partnership)
which is expected to gem•rat{' annual net losses for tax purposes
for a period of years. Such requirement is the apparent source for
the following statement in a recent prospectus for a public offering
of units in a limited partnership investing in government assisted
§§ 1.752-1(a) (2) and 1.722-1. It serves as a ceiling on the clccluctibility of n partner's
distributive share of partnership losses. I.R.C. § 704(<1). This basis is recluccd (but not

below zero) by the partner's share of partnership losses aml cash distributions. I.R.O.
§§ 705(a) (2) and 733. To the extent such losses all(l cnsh flow distributions nro in excess
of the partner's equity investment, they reduce his share of the partnership Iinbilitlos in·
eluded in his basis. Thus, the difference between the partner's share of tho linbllitics still
in his basis and his share of the liabilities in the amount rculizecl constitutes tnxnble in·
come. In short, prior deductions ancl cash distributions in excess of n partner's cash in·
vestment increase his taxable gain on disposition. Rabinowitz, Realty Sync1ication: ..dn
Income Tax Primer For Investor ancl Promoter, 29 J. TAXATION 921 96 (1968); Pirchor,
Tax Sheltered Investments: What, Who, When ancl Whiclll, 28 Bus. LAWYER 891, 902-03
(1973). Assuming there is no recapture depreciation (I.R.C. §§ 1245 uud 1250) nt tho
partnership level and no other unrealized receivable or substantially npprc~inted inventory,
as clefinecl in section 751, a bnnclonment or gift of the purtnership interest produces tho
same tax consequences since withclrawal from the partnership recluces the partner's shuro
of partnership liabilities to zero, which is treated as n constructive cash distribution to
him. Reg. § 1.752-1(b) (1); Rev. Rul. 74-4, 1974-4 I.ItB. 10. Such tlistributions to tho
extent in excess of the partner's basis nrc treated as gain from the snle or exchnngo of his
partnership interest. See Bonovitz, What is the Tax Cost of Getting Out of a Losing
Partnersliip Venture?, 25 J. TAXATION 106 (1966). I.R.C. § 731(n). If, however, section
751 property is present, the constructive eash distribution is uppnrently trcntecl under tho
section 751 regulations us (1) a pro rata distribution of section 751 nml non·7u1 property
to the withdr::ming partner with (2) a simultaneous sale by him of the section 161 prop·
erty to the partnership in return for constructive cash. See Aronsohn, Admission of a N cw
Partner For Cash, Property or Services, 23 TAX LAWYER 3251 337 (1970). Such construe·
tive sale could result in a larger gain than what woulcl result from n reduction in basis
alone.
In a synclicated real estate tnx shelter a limitecl partner's share of cleductions is usually
in excess of his equity investment since such leverage is one of the basic components of tho
shelter. See McDaniel, Tax Reform ancl the Revenue ..dct of 1.971: Lesions, Lagniappes ancl
Lessons, 14 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 813, 823 (1973). In lute 1973, tho Sorvico was con·
sidering requiring for aclvance ruling purposes a representntion that the nggrcguto tnx
deduction for the first two operating years of a limited partnership would not excce!l the
equity investment. Remarks of t11e Honorable Donald C• ..dlczancler Before t110 Clcvclancl
Tax Institute, 27 TAX LAWYER 173, 176 (1974).
100 Perry, Limited PartnersT1ips and Tax Shelters: The Crane Rule Goes Public, 27 TAX
L. REv. 525 (1972).
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housing projects, which it declared were e>..'})ected "to provide a
return on investment primarily in the form of ta.x losses'' :
Counsel for the Partnership are aware of no situation in which the
foregoing provisions [section 183] have been applied to activities similar
to those of the Partnership. There can be no assurance, however, that
the foregoing provisions may not be so applied in the future to disallow
deductions attributable to operations of the Partnership.110

It appears well settled that an expenditure motivated by a
desire to effect a tax reduction, i.e., a ta.x shelter motive, does not
arise in connection with the ta.xpayer's profit seeking activities
which is the standard under section 212.111 While some of the cases
in this line equate profit with taxable income, usually in dicta,
others reject any definition of income as used in section 212 limited
to an excess of receipts over expenses and hold instead that the
word should be taken to mean an inflow of money or gross
receipts.112
The cases indicating that cash flow can satisfy the profit requirement manifest the profit is not limited to the excess of gross receipts over deductions. Cash flow may be defined as net profits
after taxes less debt amortization plus noncash clmrges, such as
depreciation. 113 To the extent that cash flow arises from adding
back depreciation, it may be viewed as income from the activity
which is sheltered by the depreciation, indeed, the Treasury in another context has so viewed it. 114 The Tax Court in Norman 0.
110 Prospectus, U.S. Shelter Limited Partnership 30 (December 18, 197~). 'l\fore recently
and after this article was substantially completed, the SEC apparently began to require
in such explanation a caveat that although the Sen-ice "bas ne\·er indicated that Section
183 is applicable to Limited Partners, it is conceivnble that it may take such a position,
notwithstanding any 'profit objective' which the Partnership may be deemed to hnve.''
Prospectus, DL.T Properties/73 at 46 (October 18, 1973). The reference here, of coum,
is to the level at which motive is ascertainecl. In addition, tl1e Conmtis:sioner recently stnted
that losses from syndieated tax sheltered investments may not be deducted if the only
profit will result from tax savings. On auclit, national staff economists are to ru:sist in determining "whether participants can, absent unexpected problems, rca.sonably expect to
earn a profit appropriate to the investment n111l tl1e degree. of risk in\"Ol\"ed.'' I.R. No.
1336, 749 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP.~ 6257 (emphasis udded).
111 Brown v. United States, 396 F.2d 459, 466 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Kue~h v. United States,
348 F.2d 932, 937-38 (Ct. CJ. 1965); cert. (le11icd, 383 U.S. 957 (1967); Samuel Ynnow,
44 T.C. 444, 452-53 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 358 F.2d 996, 998 (3d C"lr. 1966).
112 Compare, e.g., Weir v. Comm'r, 109 F.2cl 996, 998 (3d Cir.), cc:rt. tlenietl, 310 U.S.
637 ·(1940) and .Tustin A. McNamara, 32 T.C:M. 11 (1973), with Hartford , •• United
States, 265 F. Supp. 86 (W.D. 'VlS. 1967); c{. Goldsborough v. Burnet, 4G F.!'!d 432, 433
(4th Cir. 1931).
113 HERwrrz, BUSINESS PLANNING 6 (1966).
114 TAX REFORM BILL OF 19731 AIIMil!\ISTRATION'S PROPOSALS FOR TAX CIIANGE WITH
TREASURY EnLANATioN, 93RD Co::.o., 1ST SEss. 15 (Cklmm. Print 1973); Sec Young, The
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Demler,115 a prophetic decision in other respects, stated that it ex~
pressed "no opinion as to the extent to which depreciation (and
particularly the method used for tax purposes) should be taken
into account in determining 'expectation of profit' "-depreciation
being the primary factor causing cash flow to be greater than tax~
able income.116 Moreover, in Worrell v. United States, 117 the district
court pointed out: '' [V] iewed on a cash-flow basis, the cash loss
was not nearly so great as the tax loss.'' ':Phe court went on to point
out that in one year the taxpayer realized an actual cash profit
from the farm operations on a cash flow or economic basis. In J olm
R. Carkhuff,U 8 on the other hand, the Tax Court stated that if the
taxpayer's beach residence were fully rented for the period and at
the rental for which offered, in fact, in some years it was not
rented at all, the property would not have returned an amount
equal to depreciation, taxes and costs of operations, ''although
it would have returned an amount in excess of direct operating
expenses.'' 119 \Vhile this language could be construed as equating
profit with taxable profit and not cash flow, in fact the decision
clearly turned on other factors. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit in
affirming the Tax Court did not address the question.
It is submitted that profit should not be limited to taxable
income (gross income in excess of deductible expenditures) for
purposes of section 183 (c), but should encompass income or cash
flow. Certainly cash flow comes within one definition of profit
under section 165(c)(2): "the advantage or gain resulting from
the investment of capital, or the acquisition of money beyond the
amount expended; a pecuniary gain.'' 120 The section 165 and
Role of Motive in Evaluating Tax Slleltereil Investments, 22 '.rAX LAWYER 2751 289-90
(1969).
115 25 T.C.M. 6201 626 n.IO (1966). One commentator lms suggested that tho oxpcctu•
tion of profit should be ascertained by calculating profits and losses in accordance with
general accounting rules, rather than special rules which accelerate deductions, such as
accelerated depreciation, since this is the approach ordinarily used by businessmen to de·
termine their profits or losses. Allington, Farming as a Taz 811/Jlter, 14 S.D.L. Rev. 1811
193-94 (1969).
116 U.S. TREASURY DEP1T TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS (PART 3) 1 91ST CON0.1
1ST SESS. 455 (Comm. Print 1969).
111254 F. Supp. 992, 995 n.4 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
11s28 T.C.M. 375, (1969), aff'il, 425 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1970).
110 28 T.C.M. at 379. It may be significant that Judge Scott, the trier of fnct in
Carkhuff, recently ruled in Justin A. McNamara, 32 T.C.M. 11, 18(1973) 1 thnt 1111 motive
to effect a tax reduction is not a 'profit' motive since it is not intended to prolluce tnxnblc
income!'
120 Goldsborough v. Burnet, 46 F.2d 432, 433 (4th Cir. 1931), quoting from Brooks
Bros. v. Cassebeen, 157 App. Div. 683, 142 N.Y.S. 781, 782 (1913). A commontntor on
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section 212 cases defining profit as taxable income could have
reached the same result by merely holding that reduction in taxes
does not constitute profit for those provisions-the approach taken
by the majority of decisions in the area. Cash flow qualifies as
profit in the economic sense of the term, which should be the
standard under section 183, and in the everyday meaning investors
would ascribe to the term.
As previously discussed, profit motive should be determined at
the partnership level, with such motive being transmitted to the
partner. Thus, where a partnership is engaged in an activity for
profit-as is the case in our model since it expects after the
initial loss period to make a ta.xable profit once the cross-over
point is reached and after a certain point earn net income from
operations over all prior losses-the limited partner has incurred
the loss in an activity engaged in profit. Ne\·ertheless, the Service
will probably be tempted to examine the partner's motive where
he contemplates disposing of his partnershi!l interest prior to
the cross-oYer point.121 In such circumstances motive should be
determined at the partner level as to expectation of profit from
operations. Although, such a disposition "ill trigger a realized
gain equal to prior losses, that would not constitute a before tax
profit, only a wash, or if such gain is taxed in part as capital
gains on after-tax profit, which is not sufficient.122 But, at the same
time, the partner usually may expect a further gain from appreciation in the partnership assets, which he may indeed have already
realized but not recognized through his partnership's refinancing
its liabilities and distributing to the limited partners the proceeds
from the new mortgage in excess of the outstanding principal
profit motive under sections 162, 212, et cetera, has concluded thnt n tnxpnyer's claim to
be holding property for the production of income would seem to be impro\'N by cash
flow. Young, The Role of Motive in Emluating Tax STtcltcrcd Im:cstmrnts, 22 TAX
LAWYER 275, 290 (1969); sec Note, Death and Taxes: .tin .tinalysis of 1014, US, 2SC, and
the Limited Partnersllizl, 59 VA. L. REV. 122, 149 u.144 (1973).
121 See Young, Tlle Role of Motive in Et:aluatiug Tax STtcltcrctl Im:cstmcnts, ~ TAX
LAWYER 275, 289 u.38 (1969). Where the tmqmyer bases his llrofit motit·c ou the un·
realized appreciation in the residual value of the rental property aml thus elnims mixed
motives, profit and tax reduction, "[e]\-idencc introduced by the CommiEsioner of an actual
or planned premature disposition of the 11ropcrty in su~h a wny tlmt the tmq.myer would
not realize the residual value would C:J.st doubt upon the tn:I.Jlayer's n£Sertion of milted
motives."
122 Hjorth, Farm Losses and Rclatctl Provisions, 2:J TA.X L. REV. l:iSl, 607-09 (1070)
(a wealtl1y taxpayer anticipating that his only profits will be ettilitnl gnin nttributablc to
recovery of the ordinary deductions (through basis adjustments) is not cugnged in tho
activit;y for a before-tax p1·ofit1 oul;y an after·tax 11rofit).
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amount of the old mortgage. 123 Such appreciation in the regulations is recognized as profit:
The term ''profit'' encompasses appreciation in the value of assets, such
as land, used in the activity. Thus, the taxpayer may intend to derive
a profit from the operation of the activity, and may also intend that,
even if no profit from current operations is derived, an overall profit
will result when appreciation in the income from the activity together
with the appreciation of land will exceed expenses of operation. 124

The district court in Kanter v. United States 126 recently rejected,
however, the taxpayer's contention that production of income
under section 212 meant not only the production of rental income
from a dual use beach cottage, but also the production of prospective income from its capital appreciation (about $31,000 in appreciation versus approximately $22,000 in net losses during the
tax years).
The Kanter court reasoned that since capital appreciation and
taxable income therefrom only become a fact when a sale of the
asset occurs, it could not subscribe to such broad reading of
section 212. Furthermore, it believed that the consequence of the
taxpayer's contention would be ''any maintenance and repair
expense of any home, even of a permanent residence, whether
rented or not or even available for rental, would be a deductible
expense on the claim of the owner that he was holding the cottage
or home for the ultimate production of income upon its sale
at a hoped-for capital gain." 126 It is submitted that the court
was in error on both grounds.
The section 212 regulations provide that the provision applies
to the property held for investment even though it is not currently
income productive, echoing legislative history which contemplated
income which might be realized in the future. 127 Similarly, the
12a Cowan, Receipt of a11 Interest i11 Partl!crsllip Profits in Consideration for Services:
The Diamoncl Case, 27 TAX L. REV. 161, 200 n.118 (1972).
124 Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (4).
12s 73-1 U.S.T.C. fJ 9311 (E.D. Va. 1973), af!'cl per curiam, 74-1 U.S.T.O. fl 9182 (4th
Cir. 1974). By the time of trial, three years later, the property had npprecinted nn ndtli·
tiona) $45,000.
120 Knuter v. United States, 73-1 U.S.T.C. fl 9311 (E.D. Va. 1973) (emphasis by court),
af!'cl per curiam, 74-1 U.S.T.C. fl 9182 (4th Cir. 1974).
121 Reg. § 1.212-(b). Congress stated that the term "income" for tho purposes of tho
predecessor to section 212 "comprehends not merely income of the tnxn blc ycnr but nlso
income which the taxpayer has realizecl in a prio~ taxable year or may realize in .subsc·
qucnt taxable years, am1 is not <.'onfinecl to recurring income but npplics ns well to gnln
from the disposition of property." S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2t1 Sess. 87 (1042)
(emphasis addecl). Sec also Rev. Rul. 74-28, 1974-3 I.R.B. 7.
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regulations under section 183 recognize that profit encompasses
appreciation in the value of assets used in the activity. Thus,
they continue, the taxpayer may intend tl1at even '\ithout a profit
from current operations an overall profit will result when appreciation in the assets is realized. Furthermore, the Ta.x Court in
several section 162 hobby loss decisions has provided a direct
answer to the implicit limitation of income to realized income
provided in Kanter: ·while profits and losses must be computed on an annual basis for recognition of gains or losses, this is
not true in determining whether the ta.xpayer lms a profit motive.
For it is not necessary that the activity be profitable in the ta.x
year, only that the ta.x}Jayer lmve a bona fide expectation of an
overall net profit from income which he ex1lects to realize in a
subsequent year.128
As to the second leg of the Kmzte1· rationale, it acknowledged
the principle that for section 212, if the ta.xpayer is holding tl1e
property for production of income from appreciation, such appreciation must have taken place whilE.> it was dedicated to profit:
purposes, rather than while it was usE.>d for personal purposes.
Thus, the court's argument that reliance on unrealized capital
appreciation would permit deductibility under section 212 of maintenance and repair expense of a pE.>rmant•nt residence was a
straw man. To the extE.>nt that the court meant the appreciation
could not be considered because tlw cottage was being primarily
used for personal purposes, it was indulging in a bootstrap argument. For proper application of tl1is rule would mean tlmt if tl1e
taxpayer were engaged in two activities with respect to tl1e
beach prOJ)erty-onE.> personal and the other engaged in for profitonly the appreciation in the property during the latter activity
can be considered in determining whether the ta.xpayer lms conducted th(:' latt<:>r activity primarily for profit. The Tax Court in
Ca'rkhuff 129 was bothered by the possibility of a recurring conversion of b<:>ach property from personal use to business use,
then back to 1wrsonal use and so forth. Becaust• the requisite section 212 apprE.>ciation profit has het•n categorizt>d as post-conversion appr(:'ciation, it might provE.> difficult to t>stablish the amotmt
of post-conwrsion apprt>ciation, during all periods of business
dedication or only during the most n•ct•nt conversion to business
12s Sec Margit Sigro~y Bessenyey, 4j T.C. 201 (l!IO.i), aff'tl, 379 F.2d 2.:;2 {2d Cir. 1!107);
Herbert C. S:imlerson, 23 T.C.M. 1723 (190-!) ; accord, Lillinu Solomon, 20 T.C.M. 919
(1967).
1~u John R. Carkhuff, 28 T.C.!II. 375 (1969), aff'tl, 42.j F.2d 1400 (Gth Cir. 1970).
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use. 130 On the other hand, if only a single activity were involved,
part business and part personal use, the proper approach would
appear to be allocation of unrealized appreciation to business
and personal uses to determine whether the former portion is
in excess of losses attributable to business use.
The court in Kanter, due to its erroneous treatment of appreciation, never faced the difficult question of whether an activity
is engaged in primarily for profit where unrealized appreciation
attributable to a period dedicated to rental purposes is substantially in excess of losses attributable to such period, and the
taxpayer's business acumen as to such property is undisputed,
but substantial personal elements are present: personal use during
the entire peak rental period, selection of the particular lot on
the basis of personal factors and rental of cottages in the area for
ten summers prior to construction of the property. Garkh'ztff contains the seeds of the proper approach to this question. There,
in many years no rents were received at all and the gross receipts
when received were substantially less than the total expenses
including depreciation. As to appreciation, the coul't aclmowledged
the property had increased in value but found no evidence that
the taxpayer ever intended to dispose of the property after future
increase in value. Thus, the court concluded that the property
could not at any time be said to have been held as an investment.
Judge Scott, the trier of fact in Garkh1tjJ,131 recently expanded in
Leonard F. Barcus 132 the thougllt she had presented in the earlier
decision. The taxpayers in Barcus purchased and sold antiques
which they also used as the furnishings in their home (95 per cent).
Their testimony that many of the antiques had or would increase
in value and that some day they might sell them at a large profit
indicated to the court more of an interest in keeping valuable
purchases than an interest in making a profit from a trade or
130 Frank A. Newcombe, 54 T.C. 1298, 1302 (1970) (production of income limited to
post·conversion appreciation).
131 John R. Carkhuff, 28 T.C.M. 375 (1969), aff'cl, 425 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1070). Allo·
cation of unrealized appreciation to business and personal usc finds support in Sharp v.
United States, 199 F. Supp. 743 (D. Del. 1961), aff'cl per curiam, 303 F.2d 783 (3d Cir.
1962) (alloeation of basis of aircraft and proeceds of sale to business nnd porsonnl uso).
1a2 32 T.C.M. 660, 664 (1973), aff'cl per curiam, 74-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 9288 (2d Cir. 1974).
Sec Note, Analysis of New Code Section 183 ancl Some Ramifications for tlw Resort llomc,
9 WILLAMETI'E L.J. 117, 134 (1973) (apprceiation factor may be outweighed by personal
aspect). Significantly, the Fourth Circuit in its per ('Uriam affirmance of ](antcr rcnsonc1l
that the district court had found that "the home was not purclmsc1l nnd mnintninctl for
purposes of finant'ial gain, whether by way of <'apitnl appreciation or current incomo.11
74-1 L'.S.T.C. II 9182 (4th Cir. 1974).
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business of purchasing and selling antiques. Thus, unrealized
appreciation alone is not sufficient, the ta."(payer must show tlmt
his primary purpose is ultimately to realize such appreciation in
order for the appreciated pro1)erty to be held for the production
of income or to be held as inventory in a trade or business of
selling such items. Under such analysis Kanter might ltave
reached the correct result, but there are no findings in the reported
decision on the point.
Even more difficult is the question whether alloeation and partial
deductions are called for wlwre the ta."(payer does intend to ultimately realize the income from the appreciated property, but
this motive is outweighed by personal motiYes for holding the
property. Of course, this would only be a problem in areas in
which the investment is of a type particularly subject to personal
use-antiques, paintings or dual use beach houses.133 The answer
to ·whether such allocation is permitted is difficult to find. On the
one hand, section 212 is commonly thougltt to adopt an all or
nothing primary purpose test; but, on the other, most of tl1e
various areas of deductions under seetion 162 follow an allocation approach where the secondary purpose is more than merely
incidentaP34 Although conceptually sound, an alloeation rule where
133 See, e.g., Wrightsman v. Unite<l States, 428 F .2tl 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (paintings);
Kanter v. United States, 73-1 U.S.T.C. 11 9311 (E.D. Vn. 1973) (ben~h bQU£0); IA>onnnl
F. Bareus, 32 T.C.M. 660 (1973) (antiques).
134 A judicial conflict bas arisen under section 162 ns to whether in a mised motive
situation profit motivation must be the dominant or primary intent or need it be only a
purpose. See Oshins, Pro11oscd Regulations Provide New Rules for t1u;: IIouuy Lass Game,
35 ;r. TA.'i:ATION 214, 215 (1971); DicKINSON, FARM AND RANcn LossES, BNA TA.-..:
:MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 241, A-26 (1970). The majority of tlae bobby loss ll~isious
favor the <lominant or primary purpose test. 1\foreo\·er, the Surmmae Court rei!ently resolved, in Unitecl States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 105 (1972), n similar eontlict under
section 166(<1) as to the test for whether :t ba<l !lebt was business motimtell in fn\·or of a
dominant motivation st:amlanl over :a signifir:mt motimtion st:uulnnl. The Court nlso eon·
eluded. that the <lominant motivation stamlard was consistent with Umt applied to loz::cs
incurred in a tracle or business uncler set·tion lli.i(!") (1) :unl that consistency is desimble
in such related areas. It may be note<l that some e:trlier hobby loss llei!isious liml relietl
upon seetion 165(c) in opting for n primary purpose test, Alice D. Worcester, 21 T.C.M.
1138, 1143 n.3 (1962), aml that Gcllrrcs has nlre:uly bt'en read to tlietntc tbe use of n
primary purJlOSe staml:ml under section l 62 in :are: as other than hobby losses, Leo1mrd F.
Cremon:a, 58 T.C. 219, 223 (1972) (eonrurring opinion). Finally set"Uon 1.212-l(r) of tht:
regulations (mirrored in regul:ation set·tion 1.183-2 (b)) follow u neg:ati\'e primary JIUrposo
test: "expenses of (':trrying on tr:ms:artions •.• wbirb :arc (":arried on primnrily ns n S!lort,
bobby, or recreation nrc not allowablc :as tiontr:ule or noubusiucss expl'li&'S.'' Homl\·er,
:Myron Edwin Cherry, 26 T.C.:M. 537 (l!llli), imlie:ttes that thl" primnry purpOS!.' test untler
section 212 is not npplirable to set·tion 162. Xe\'erthcless, it is most likely thnt the priumry
purpose test will be applit'!l to set·tion 183. The harder qnt'stiou is whether 11 partial
deduction \\ill be :tllowed nll!lt'r section 183 wht'tl" tbt> taxpayer's bnsiiJC£3 llllfliOSe .is not
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profit motive is not the primary motive may offer the same insurmountable administrative problems that the travel and entertainment expenditures did prior to the enactment of section 274.
In conclusion, the limited partner in our model expects a profit
from appreciation and cash flow in addition to tax shelter. Accordingly, he may be engaged in this activity for profit by virtue o.f
the :first two elements, but cannot consider the last element.135
Definition of Activity Not Engaged in for Profit

Section 1.183-2(a) of the regulations, as well as the statute,
ties the phrase, "activity not engaged in for profit" into sections
162 and 212(1) or (2) :
[A]n activity other than one with respect to which deductions are allow~
able for the taxable year under section 162 or under paragraph (1)
primary but is more than merely incidental. One commentator states tho apparent rule as
being that if the taxpayer's use of the vacation home is not incidental to the rental nc·
tivity, maintenance of the home will be treated as primarily personal, with expenses do·
ductible only under the tier system. He further notes that H.R. 1040 would treat ownership
of such a vacation home as an activity not engaged in for profit. Emory, Tile Corman ana
Mills-Mansfield Bills: A Look at Some Major Tart Reform Issues, 29 TAX L. REV. 11 58
(1973).
In general under section 162 an all or nothing approach is followed only whore tho
secondary use or motive is merely incidental. Where the secondary uso or motive is more
than incidental then allocation is called for. International Artists, Ltd., 55 T.O. 941 107
(1970). Thus, where business use of an airplane was 27 per cent, that percentage of do·
preciation was allowed. Sharp v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 743 (D. Dol. 1961), afl'il,
303 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1962). In the area of travel expenses, l10wever, if a trip is primarily
personal, section 1.162-2 (b) (1) of the regulations provides that the traveling expenses to
and from the destination are not deductible, even though the ta.'\-payer engages in business
activity while at such destination. In effect an all or nothing approach, rather than aileen·
tion, was followed here. See Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a
Combination Business and Pleasure Trip-A Conceptual Analysis, 18 STANFORD L. :REV.
1099 (1966).
1as Commentators have suggested on the basis of George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688 (1968) 1
afl'd per curiam, 420 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1970), wllich held that the intention of a tnxpnyor
purchasing raw whiskey to hold for the normal four year aging was to acquire four ycnr
old bourbon so that be had to capitalize insurance and storage costs ns acquisition costs,
that (1) the costs of acquiring the residual interest in the appreciation might bnvo to bo
capitalized as acquisition costs of such interest (Allington, Farming as a Tart Sl10Ztcr 14
S.DL. REV. 181, 203 (1969)) and (2) the investor has not acquired new rental property,
only the residual interest, and therefore would not be entitled to interest or depreciation
deductions since he is not the present owner of the property securing tbo lonn whlcl1 is
being depreciated. Young, Tlie Role of Motive in Evaluating Tart SluJltcrcil Investments,
22 TAx LAWYER 275, 290 (1969). But sec Daniel D. Kinley, 51 T.O. 1000, 1004 (1969)
aff'd, 70-2 U.S.T.C. ~ 9462 (2d Cir. 1970) (Tax Court rejected Commissioner's argument
that taxpayer grew scotch pine trees which he converted into marketable Ohristnl!ls trees
through annual shearings; ratl1cr be planted Christmas trees which through proper care
during their growth matured into marketable trees).
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or (2) of section 212. Deductions are allowable under section 162 for
expenses of carrying on activities which constitute a trade or business
of the taxpayer and under section 212 for ru..-penses incurred in connection with activities engaged in for the production or collection of
income or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income. Except as provided in section
183 and § 1.183-1, no deductions are allowable for expenses. incurred
in connection with activities which are not engaged in for profit. Thus,
for example, deductions are not allowable under section 162 or 212 for
activities which are carried on primarily as a sport, hobby, or for
recreation.

The basis of this close relationship of section 183 to sections 162
and 212 was the decision of the Ta.x Reform act Congress to
adopt the judicially fashioned principle under the latter sections
that losses or expenses are not deductible if the loss generating
activity is not a business, but merely a hobby. From the articulation of this decision in the statute through cross reference to
sections 162 and 212, commentators on section 183 prior to the
issuance of the regulations, uniformly concluded that the provision was, in essence, a codification of prior hobby loss cases.13 f.l
The section 162 and 212 case law contains, however, several
areas in which splits of authority exist. Congress resolved two of
these conflicts: (1) an objective rather than a subjective approach
is to be employed in determining profit motive and (2) a reasonable expectation of profit is not required.137 Accordingly, cases
136 Diamond & Home, Hobby Losses; Miscellaneous Indit;idual and Corporate Problems,
23 TAX LAWYER 609, 610 (1970); Comment, Section 183: Wor1; Horse or Hobby Loss,
20 CATHOLIO U.L. REv. 716, 732 (1971}; Rhodes, Hobby Losses-.A New C11allenoo, fiG
.A.B.A.J. 893, 894 (1970); O'Byrne, New Low Greatly Limits Xaz Shelter Formerly Pro'lJideil by Farming Operations, 32 J. TAXATION 298, 299 (1970) ; Oshins, Proposctl1lcoula·
tions Pro'lJide New .Rules for tT1e Hobby Loss Game, 35 TAXATIO!i 214, 215 (1971).
137 See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (191i9). One commentator has
suggested that the objective approach adopted by the Senate C,mmittce on Finance
militates against total repudiation of the reasonable expectation of profit test, the npparent reasoning being that limitation to objective manifestations of profit motive v;ould
result in the expectation also being reasonable. Seo DICKINSON, FARU ..U."D RANCII LosSES,
BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 2411 A-26 (1970). To the contmry1 the commit·
tee's news release prior to the publication of the committee print stating that "testimony
presented at the hearings indicated considerable difficulty could be expected front the subjective nature of the test (reasonable expectation of profit) applied by the House Bill,
Committee on Finance, United States Senate Press Release #31 (October 17, l9G9), cuts
toward indentifying rejection of the subjective approach wiili repudiation of tho reason·
able expectation of profit, so tbat subjective evidence mny be considered ns to aspects
other than the reasonableness of tl1e e.'-11ectation of profit.'' The lnngunge of the committee
print is, of course, of much broader in1port. Sec Walter E. Edge, Jr., 32 T.O.M. 1291
(1973).
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which followed the contrary positions on these questions are not
applicable to section 183.
The regulations provide that the determination whether an activity is engaged in for profit shall be made on the basis of
''objective standards,'' taking into account all the facts and circumstances of each case. Nine factors, purportedly objective, are
provided. Yet, section 1.183-2(a) of the regulations further states
that greater weight is to be given to objective facts than to the
taxpayer's mere statement of his intent. In view of Congress's
rejection of the subjeQtive approach, it is somewhat surprising
that the regulations accord any weight at all to the taxpayer's subjective intent as manifested through his statements. The drafters
of the regulations meant that the taxpayer's actions speak louder
than his words and that his mere unsupported statement should
normally be accorded little or no evidentiary weight. Nevertheless,
they believed that "[w]here the taxpayer's words can justify
his actions and he is able to convince the trier of the facts of the
veracity of his statements, the case should be determined in his
favor.'' 138
Perhaps one should not look a gift horse in the mouth, but
this writer has the strong suspicion that the Treasury's apparent
liberality flowed from a refusal to accept the following corollary
of the Senate Finance Committee's adoption of an objective
standard: Where the objective factors, such as business like appearance and efficiency in operations are in the taxpayer's favor,
he should be found to be engaged in the activity for profit regardless of the presence of such subjective factors as his love of the
activity or desire to disseminate his philosophy. In this context,
another commentator had reasoned prior to the issuance of any
regulations under section 183 that while the outcome of the vast
number of prior cases would not have been changed by the application of the objective standards of section 183, the result of
cases like Schley v. Commissioner 139-the pattern for the first
138 Oshins, Proposed Regulations Provicle New Rules for tlle Hobby Loss Game, 3G J.
TAXATION 214, 215 (1971). This statement regulation has now been incorporated into tho
sections 162 and 212 case law. Joseph W. Johnson, Jr., 59 T.C. No. 78 (1973) ("No single
factor is controlling but greater weight is to be given to objective facts thnn to tho tax·
payer's mere expression of intent.").
13D Schley v. Connu'r, 375 F.2d 747, 750 (2d Cir. 1967); Rhodro, Hobby Losses-A
New Challenge, 56 A.B.A.J. 893, 895 (1970). Another commentator obviously views tho
mandated objective approach in the same light ns Rhodes: "In other WOl'!ls, tho tnxpnyer
does not have to clemonstrate that he hnd n subjective expectation of making n profit but
merely that the way in which he carries on the activity sl10uld make a 11rollt when con·
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example in the regulations accompanying the objective factorswould. The Tax Court opinion in Schley summarized the subjective factors indicating a lack of profit motive, but also stated
that the same picture was painted by the objective evidence: (1) a
28 year history of losses, (2) static gross profits with increasing
expenses, (3) retention of an inefficient manager, (4) failure to
consult with managers as to the extent of losses, and (5) a farm
suffering from numerous deficiencies, inefficiency and obvious indifference to profit making in the overall operation and management. The circuit court favored the subjective factors of the taxpayer's background, her love of the farm and her substantial
independent income, although also emphasizing the more objective
factor of the magnitude of the losses incurred for more than 25
years. Despite (or perhaps because of) the belief of the above
commentator that the love of the farm and the independent wealth
would reflect more on the subjective side, consideration of which
it will be recalled was prohibited by the Senate Finance Committee
report, the first· example, derived from Schley, mixes the objective
and subjective facts relying both on total absence of profit and
use of a farm manager, but not modern methods and on the subjective factors of large unrelated income, birth and rearing on a
farm, and expression of a strong preference for living on a
farm.
In La11wnt v. CO'Jmnissioner,l 40 in contrast to Sclzley, the objective criteria of business-like manner of operations, continuity
and efficiency were all in the ta.xpayer's favor, but the Ta.x Court
and the appellate decision disregarded them in view of the taxpayer's subjective interest in the wide dissemination of his
philosophical ideas and his independent financial status. The second example based upon Lamont omits those objective factors
which were in the taxpayer's favor and, instead, focuses almost
exclusively on the subjective factors of wealth ana great interest in
philosophy and dissemination of ideas.
Finally, the third example, patterned after Imbesi v. Oommissioner,141 most clearly reveals the bias of the drafters of the
regulations regarding subjective factors. The Ta.x Court appeared
to rely equally on the subjective elements of a desire to maintain
a fading breed of dogs and independent wealth and the objective
sidered objectively." Comment, .tbtalysis of New Coile Section 183 and Some RamificatiOP.s
for t7ze Resort Home, 9 WILLAME'ITE L. J. 117, 122 (1973).
140 339 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1965).
141361 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1966), rcu'd on otT~er grounds, 23 T.C.M. 1G78 (1964:).
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factors of extremely haphazard books and records in the taxpayer's activities of raising dogs and horses and the lack of any
attempt to cut costs by culling the horses or dogs. The Third
Circuit, while affirming the Tax Court as to the dogs, remanded
it as to the horses, ostensibly on the ground that some l10rses were
in fact culled. In reality its disagreement was with the objective
approach:
The Tax Court, in seeking to determine motive, appears to have
directed its inquiry to objective indications such as record-keeping, the
general profit-potential of the activity and the actual results achieved
by the taxpayer, and to have excluded his direct testimony regarding
his motive. Objective factors are, of course, valuable evidence of u
taxpayer's motive, although these are often burdened with the same
infirmity as a taxpayer's testimony, since the meticulous observance
of details which have been labeled as important objective signposts
is of doubtful value once their observance becomes self-conscious.t42

In the statement of facts in the third example the unbusinesslike records and failure to cull of the actual case underlying the
example are completely omitted while the large income and belief
that the breed of dogs was declining are early on emphasized. This
clear bias towards the subjective is, however, somewhat softened
by (1) the addition in the example of the objective factors of a
failure to advertise the dogs and showing of the horses only at
prestige tracks and (2) the reliance in the conclusion to the example essentially on objective factors (although the independent
income was noted). '
We may conclude that the Treasury was unwilling to accept the
implications of application of a purely objective approach to cases
such as Schley, Imbesi and Lamont and, consequently, cracked the
door slightly in the introduction to the nine factors for the
taxpayer's use of the subjective intention as a shield while flinging it open for the government's use of subjective factors as a
sword in the first three examples (surely not by happenstance,
beginning with the Schley illustration). Due to the basic disagreement in this context of many courts, like the Third Circuit in
lmbesi with the objective approach under section 162, it is not
possible to determine at this time whether the subjective bias of
the regulations, or at least of the first three examples in section
1.183-2(c) of the regulations, will be struck down as being inconsistent with the statute, which it clearly is.
The proposed regulations less subtly attempted to undo the other
142

361 F.2d at 645.
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legislative choice that there is no requirement that the e::...-pectation of profit be reasonable. While the proposed regulations, as
do the final regulations, state that a reasonable e::...-pectation is not
required, the former went on to provide in the ''relevant factors''
for ascertaining whether an activity is engaged in for profit that
"The fact that a taxpayer is engaged in an activity which could
not reasonably be expected to produce an economic profit may
indicate that the taxpayer is not engaged in such activity for
profit. The reasonableness of an expectation of profit is not conclusive but is merely some evidence of the intent of the taxpayer." 143
The drafters' apparent justification was that since a reasonable
expectation of profit was not required, it was only to be one of
the many factors to be considered, there was no conflict with the
legislative history.144· In fact, this general approach does appear
in some of the cases which followed the bona fide profit intent,
as contrasted ·with the reasonable expectation of profit approach,
but in at least some instances appears to reflect a sub rosa
adoption of the reasonable expectation of profit requirement145
In any event, this more obvious undermining of the legislative
mandate under section 183 was totally abandoned in the final
regulations . .Although we may expect to see the Service attempt
to resuscitate it as one of the factors not listed in the nine factors
of the regulations, the fact that it appeared in the proposed regulations and was deleted from tile final version will carry strong
weight against its use by the Service.146 Whether the subjective
bias of the regulations will similarly be deleted on judicial review
remains to be seen.
RELEVANT FACTORS PROVIDED BY REGULATIONS

The final regulations provide nine factors clearly distilled from
the prior case law for a·scertaining whether an activity is en143Prop. Reg.§ L183-2(b)(9), 36 Fed. Reg. 16112 (Aug. 19, 1971).
Oshins, Proposed .Regulations Provide New .Rules for Hobby Loss Game, 35 J. TAXA·
TION 214, 216 (1971).
145 Compare Henry L. Sutherland, 27 T.C.!IL 103, (1968) (e:tpectntion need not bo
reasonable, but prospeet of profit has bearing on intents; tiD:payer had hoped to mnho a
profit, but mere hope does not reneh even unreasonable expectntion), ttitl1 Brool!s v.
Comm'r, 274 F.2d 96, 99 (9th Cir. 1959) (hope for profit qunlifies ns good fniUt purpose
of making profit); Hieks v. United States, 72-1 U.S.T.C. 1j 9383 (S.D. :M.lss. 197!!); Gro:::J
v. United Stntes, 71-2 U.S.T.C. '![ 9715 (N.D. Fin. 1971); Nommn C. Denller, ::!J T.C.M.
620 (1966); Henry L. Sutherland, 25 T.C.M. 822, 8~4 n.l (19Gil).
146 Cf. Rnuptman v. Director, 309 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1962), ccrt. denied, 372 U.S. 909
(1963). See Continental Ins. Co. v. United States, 447 F.2d 061 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
144
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gaged in for profit. The proposed regulations contained eleven
factors, of which one was omitted as discussed above and two
others were consolidated in the final version.
The proposed regulations provided that (1) no one factor was
determinative, (2) the regulation factors were not the only factors
to be taken into account and (3) that any one factor (whether
or not set forth in the regulations) need not necessarily be given
more weight than any other factors used in making the determination.147 The drafter of the section 183 regulations has suggested that even if all the enumerated factors are against the
taxpayer, he still may prevail if he can show his intention was to
earn a profit. Quae1·e, whether this can be done without reliance
upon a subjective approach. Apparently this position was presented to mollify some members of the Commissioner's Advisory
Group on Cattle and Horses, who had expressed concern lest the
factors be used as a weapon by the Service rather than serve merPly
as indicia of the taxpayer's intention. The intention of the drafters
of the proposed regulations was that "the list be merely used as
an aid in the ultimate determination of the intention of the taxpayer." 14s
The final regulations deleted the ground rule that any one factor
must not necessarily be given any more weight than any other
factor and in section 1.183-2(b) of the regulations substituted in
its stead the statement that a determination was not to be made
on the basis of whether the number of factors, including those not
listed, indicating a lack of profit objective exceeded the number
indicating profit motivation, or vice versa. The case law clearly
supports this approach-a controversy is not to be decided on a
nose count of factors. 149 Similarly, in the overwhelming majority
of decisions no one factor was determinative, and like black letter
statements are frequently articulated in other ''all facts and circumstances" areas. 150 The implication of the deleted statement
that all factors are to be weighted equally, however, is clearly
Prop. Reg. § 1.183-2(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 16112 (Aug. 19, 1971).
Oshins, Proposed Regulations Provicle New Rules for Hobby Loss Game, 3ii J. TAX·
ATION 214, 215 n.9 (1971)_. This writer fails to see how agents could nvoi!l using nt le~ast
some of the nine factors (or the taxpayer's alleged failure to meet them) ns n sworcl,
and, in fact, in his experience they have been so used.
14D See, e.g., Bessenyey v. Comm'r, 379 F.2<1 252, 256 (2<1 Cir.), cert. cle~~iccl, 380 U.S. 031
(1967).
1so See, e.g., Albert Ravano, 26 T.C."M. 793 (1967) (constructive dividoml). Sco ocn·
erally Lee, Shareholder Withdrawal-Loan or Dividend: Repayments, Estoppel, aml Otlwr
..l1.11omalies, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 512, 516 (1971).
147

148
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not in accord with the existing case law. Indeed, one case ltas
stated that the ta...-x:payer's intent is best illustrated by his overt
efforts to accomplish the goals of the activity; and to a lesser
extent by the results actually attained. 151 Similarly, factors such
as absence of IJersonal use are viewed as not bearing directly on
the taxpayer's profit motive, but instead, as an indication that the
activity is not primarily engaged in for pleasure or recreation,IGZ
hence, are implicitly of less weight than the efforts to accomplish a profit. Applying these principles to the nine factors, it
would appear that the first, second, third and fifth factors should
be accorded more weight than the fourth, sL-x:th, seventh, eighth and
ninth factors.
The following discussion of these factors follows their order
in the regulations. Since the impetus for ta...-x: reform in this area
arose from farm losses, the overwhelming majority of hobby loss
eases involved such losses and the legal principles were most
developed there, it should not be surprising that these factors
are clearly distilled from the sea of farm loss authorities. Accordingly, the discussion is primarily derived from farm loss cases
and commentators, but evaluation of the factors in the other areas
to which section 183 applies is made wherever possible.
Manner in Which Taxpayer Carries on the Activity

The fact that the taxpayer carries on the activity in a businesslike manner and maintains complete and accurate books and records may
indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit. Similarly, where an
activity is carried on in a manner substantially similar to other activities of the same nature which are profitable, a profit motive mal•
be indicated. ·A change of operating methods, adoption of new techniques or abandonment of unprofitable methods in a manner consistent
with an intent to improve profitability may also indicate a profit
motive.153

In actuality this factor encompasses four criteria: (1) businesslike manner of operations, (2) complete books and records, (3)
similarity to profitable activities of the same nature and (4)
changes in operating methods. It should be initially noted that
the order of the factors set forth in the regulations does not
Harold I. Snyder, 25 T.C.M. 1326 (1966).
Rex B. Foster, Jr., 32 T.C.M. No. 14 (1973). Similnrly, the finnncinl stntus of tho
taxpnyer and his stnndard of living nppenr of less weight tllnn such fnctors ns lnck of in·
vestigntion, segregntion of expenses, nbsenco of records, et cetern. Josepb
Johnson, Jr.,
59 T.C. No. 78 (1973).
153 Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (i).
151

1s2

,V.
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indicate their relative weight, for the proposed regulations con~
tained a completely different order. For example, this factor was
the eighth in the proposed regulations.
Business-Like Manner. In some cases, the criterion of business~
like manner appears more a generic term overlapping several
other criteria set forth in this factor, such as accurate books and
records and adoption of new techniques, with perhaps a touch
of the third regulation factor by covering supervision of employ~
ees.154 Indeed, this item was not separately delineated by the
corresponding factor in the proposed regulations and a com~
mentator has described the application of this criterion in prior
decisions as based on the overall operations of the activity rather
than on individual factors. 165
Nevertheless, the term has various everyday meanings which
the case law has emphasized, such as economy and constant at~
tempts to cut costs and to improve income, as by switching from
commercial cattle to a purebred breeding herd or seeking in every
way to improve and upgrade the animals in a breeding herd.m
Another connotation of business-like operations is thoroughness
and a methodical approach. This aspect of business-lilce is also
manifested in the case law.157 Conversely, inattention to details or
a lack of knowledge as to the extent of expenditures and receipts
in the activity militate against profit motivation.158
154 Whitney v. Comm'r, 73 F.2d 589, 591 (3d Cir. 1934); Israel 0. Blako1 38 B.T.A.
1457 (1938); W. Jane Luce, 29 T.C.M. 894 (1970); Henry Potter Russel, 1938 B.T.A.M.
~ 38094.
155 DICKINSON, FARM AND RANCH LOSSES, BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No, 241 1
A-34-35 (1970).
156 John S. Ellsworth, 21 T.C.M. 145 (1962) (economy); accoril, Herbert 0. Sanderson,
23 T.C.M. 1723 (1964) (improve and upgrade livestock); Rowo B. Metcalf, 22 T.O.M.
1402 (1963) (switch breeds). A leading treatise acknowledges that n factor ovl<lonclng
operation of a farm activity for a profit where the principal goal of tho farm is growing
a long·term crop which will not produce an immediate profit is the 11fact that in tho do·
velopment period the taxpayer temporarily attempts to supplement income with short·
time crops." 5 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 28.73 n.20; sco Patterson 'V. United
States, 459 F.2d 487, 493 (Ct. 01. 1972); Margaret E. Amory, 22 B.T.A. 13081 1300
(1931); Walter P. Temple, 10 B.T.A. 1238, 1241 (1928). The converso of attempting to
reduce net losses by supplementing income is attempting to reduce gross oxpem1iturcs. Boo,
e.g., DuPont v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 122, 125 (D. Del. 1939); John S. Ellsworth,
21 T.C.M. 145 (1962).
157 Samuel Riker, Jr., 6 B.T.A. 890, 893 (1927). Sec also Thomas F. Sheridan, 4 B.T.A.
1299, 1301 (1926).
158 Ewing v. Comm'r, 213 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Margit Sigrey Bcssonyoy1 45 T.O.
261, 275 (1965), aff'il, 379 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967); Edward
J. Drew, 31 T.C.M. 799 (1972); Julian Panek, 24 T.C.M. 658 (1965) 1 af!'c1 per curiam,
66-2 U.S.T.C. ~ 9722 (7th Cir. 1966). But see Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., 16 T.O.M. 1081
(1957).
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In addition, utilization of scientific techniques indicates a
business-like operation, as does the element of self-education and
efforts to market the results of the activity or advertising.1G3 In
the same vein, a failure to advertise and, more recently, a failure
to establish a business name for a farm activity, may indicate
that an activity is not engaged in for profit.160
Books and Records. Professor Dickinson belieYes the theory
supporting the conclusion that the maintenance of business-like
records constitutes an important indication of profit intent is "a
taxpayer would not go to the trouble of keeping good recordsespecially in a farming context-unless he were genuinely interested in using the records to help achieve a profitable operation." 161 Cases that find significance in employment of a separate
bookkeeper or auditing of records by certified public accountants
support this theory.162 :Moreover, judicial emphasis on adequate
financial records as to the operation of a farming activity, which
are maintained separately from the ta.xpayer's hooks on his other
activities or which segregate the farm expenses from admittedly
personal expenses, appears bottomed on this assumption.163 A
further rationale is that such records are necessary to control
e},_'}Jenditures with an eye to reducing losses and eventually achieving a profit.164
Adequate records need not necessarily be formal books and
records, for in Thomas W. Jackson} 65 the taxpayer did not main159 Rose P. Crane, 9 B.T.A. 437, 440-41 (1927) (scientific technique:~); Rex B. Foster,
32 T.C.M. No. 13 (1973) (advertising); Johan A. Louw, 30 T.C."?I{. 14!!1 (1971) (attempts
to market); Lillian Solomon, 26 T.C.M. 919 (1967) (sclf·educntion); accord, Herbert C.
Sanderson, 23 T.C.M. 1723 (1964) (self·educntion).
16o Edward J. Drew, 31 T.C.M. 799 (1972) (no business name); accord, W. Jnne Luce,
29 T.C.M. 894 (1970); Robert E. Currie, 28 T.C.M. 12 (1969); sec Harold I. Snyder, 25
T.C.M. 1326 (1966) (failure to advertise). Conversely, usc of n trade name indicntcs a
profit motive. Rex B. Foster, Jr., 32 T.C.M. No. 14 (1973).
161 DICKINSON, FARM AND RANCH LOSSES, BNA TAX 'MA.~AGEME!-;T POUTFOL!O No. 241,
A-31 (1970). The Tax C-ourt (then the Board of Tax Appeals) reasoned similarly in
Harold T. Avery, 47 B.T.A. 538, 541-42 (1942): "If pleasure \ms the only in~entivo nnd
recompense sougbt by the petitioner in developing his meclmnicnl ideas, tllero \ms no ne·
cessity to go to the trouble and CA'JlCUSe of procuring patents."
1s2 Patterson v. United States, 459 F.2d 487, 493-94 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Worrell v. United
States, 254 F. Supp. 992, 993 (S.D. Tex. 1966); Israel 0. Blake, 3S B.T.A. 1457, 141.i!l
(1938); R<lse P. Crane, 9 B.T.A. 437, 439 (1927); E\·crell E. Fisher, 27 T.C."?.f. 104S
(1968); Leland E. Rosemond, 10 T.C.M. 625 (1951).
163 See, e.g., Teitelbaum v. C-omm'r, 294 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1961), ccrt. denied, 3ti!l U.S.
987 (1962); John Randolph Hopkins, 15 T.C. 160 (1950); C.J• .AnderEon, 14 T.O.?.r. 148
(1955); Dan R. Hanna, Jr., 10 T.C.M. 566 (1951).
164 Glen H. Morton, 30 T.C.M. 671 (1971).
1ss 59 T.C. 312 (1972). Similarly, in Norma Mathews Lauer, 20 T.C.M. 1038 (1961),
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tain a formal set of records in his yacht chartering business, instead, he required his captains to account for expenditures and
periodically turned over these records, together with cancelled
checks and stubs, to his accountant for preparation of the yacht's
financial records. The Tax Court observed that "[t]hough perhaps not the most efficient method of business accounting, it was
adequate and does not indicate any lack of profit motive.'' 106
On a few occasions courts have leveled the counter argument
that maintenance of books and records does not in and of itself
demonstrate the object of an enterprise. The rationale is that
objective factors in general, and record keeping in particular,
''are often burdened with the same infirmity as a taxpayer's testimony, since the meticulous observance of details which have been
labeled as important objective signposts is of doubtful value once
their observance become self-conscious." 167 However, such cases
generally have placed more weight on subjective than objective
factors in determining whether the activities were profit motivated 168-an avenue now closed in application of section 183 since
profit intent is to be established by objective facts and circumstances without regard to the taxpayer's subjective intent. Consequently, their continued value as precedents in construing these
regulations must be severely discounted. Of continuing significance, however, is the assignment of minimal weight to adequate
records where other counterbalancing factors point to a lack of
concern for the economical operation of the activity.169
Nonfinancial records can also be relevant. Indeed, keeping of
the taxpayer's records in conducting her horse breeding activities consiste(l of invoices,
cancelled checks, copies of bills of sale of horses soltl; her accountant had ndvisccl her
that a regular set of books was not necessary. On the other hand, n growing number of
recent decisions treat records limited to collections of cancelletl checks nml assorted bills
as a negative factor. W. Jane Luce, 29 T.C.M. 894 (1970); Robert E. Currie, 28 •r.O.M.
12 (1969). A commentator has suggested, however, that since (1) this first £nctor also
states that caiTying on an activity in a manner similar to other profitable activities of tho
same nature may be indicative of a profit motive and (2) it is common knowledge that
many farmers maintain few records other than cancelled checks and deposit slips, 11 tho
taxpayer's lack of farm records for a particular activity is not indicative of 11 luck of
profit intent in view of the record keeping practices of for·profit farmers." RIDENOU11 1
FARM AND RANCH LOSSES, BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 241-2d1 A-2(j (1973),
166 Thomas W. Jackson, 59 T.C. 3121 316 (1972) 1 acq., 1973-21 I.R.B. (j,
167 Imbesi v. Comm'r, 361 F.2d 640 1 645 (3d Cir. 1966); Harry C. l!'ishcr, 29 B.T.A.
1041, 1050 (1934).
168 Schley v. Comm'r, 375 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1967); Lamont v. Comm'r, 339 F.2d 377
(2d Cir. 1964); Louise Cheney, 22 B.T.A. 672 (1931); Everell E. Fisher, 27 T.O.M. 1048
(1968); Bertha R. Conyngham, 23 T.C.M. 1179 (1964).
169 Celeste B. Smith, 30 T.C.M. 5167 518 (1971).
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detailed agricultural records may be even more indicative of a
profit motive than maintenance of adequate financial records.
Thus, the district court in Wright v. United States 170 highlighted
the fact that the taxpayer regularly kept and maintained breeding records of his livestock, but made no reference to accounting
books and records. 1tforeover, in DuPont v. U?lited Btates/71 where
the government conceded that a subchapter S corporation's records were adequate from an agricultural standpoint, the district
court rebuffed the govermnent's assertion that the corporation's
failure to keep :financial records accurately reflecting its profits
and losses manifested an indifference to whether the operation
was profitable.
Ascertaining the relative weight to be ascribed to this factor is
difficult. At- one end of the spectrum are the plethora of authorities holding that the activities were engaged in for profit where
adequate business records were kept 172 and not engaged in for
profit where no records were maintained; 173 at the other, a more
moderate number of cases in which a profit motive was proven
in the absence of records or no profit motive was shown despite
adequate records.174 '\Vhile in a handful of opinions records were
a determinative factor 175 and in many the ju.-1\.taposition of business-like operations and careful records of expenses forms a leitmotiv,176 the majority merely catalogues the presence of accurate
books with a host of other factors. 177 Indeed, a few early reported
110 249 F. Supp. 508, 512 (D. Nev. 1965); (/. !lfnrshnll Field, 26 B.T.A. 116 (1!132),
af?d, 67 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1933) (both ngriculturnl nnd finnnejnl reeords); Jnme> S.
Bishop, 31 T.C.M. 829 (1972). But sec W. Jane Luce, 29 T.C.M. 894 (1970).
111234 F. Supp. 681 (D. Del. 1964).
112 Rood v. United States, 184 F. Supp. 791, 793 (D. Minn. 1960) ; Isrncl 0. Bllillc, 38
B.T.A. 1457 (1938); Lucien H. Tyng, 36 B.T.A. 21 (1937), rcv'tl on other grounds, lOG
F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1939), rcv'cl on otller grouncls, 308 U.S. 527 (1940) ; Lillian Solomon, 26
T.C.M. 919 (1967).
173 E.g., Teitelbaum v. Conun'r, 294 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1961), t:crt. c1cnicd, 3GS U.S. 087
(1962); Imbesi v. Comm'r, 361 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1966).
174 Theod<>re Snbelis, 37 T.C. 1058 (1962); Lnurn M. Curtis, !18 B.T.A. 631 (1033);
James Clnrk, 24 B.T.A. 1235 (1931); Norma !lfnthews Lnucr, 20 T.O.:M. 103S (1061);
Vincent Treanor, 10 T.C.:M. 336 (1951).
175 Samuel Riker, Jr., 6 B.T.A. 890 (1927). In Joseph W. Johnson, Jr., 59 T.C. No. 78
(1973), the court observed tl1nt the taxpayer did not keep books D.lld r~ords of mnintenance C.'--penses or rental incon1e "such as would be norrunlly ~-pceted of one engaged in a
transaction for profit"
11s See, e.g., Isrnel 0. Blnke, 38 B.T.A. 1457 (1938); Jnme> S. Bishop, 31 T.C.?.£. 829
(1972); Lillian Solomon, 26 T.C.M. 919 (1967).
:1.11 Helis v. Usry, 71-1 U.S.T.C. 'IT 9365 (E.D. Ln. 1971), rcv'd on ot11cr groumls, 464
F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972); Bennet v. Urutcd States, 65-!1 U.S.T.C. 9701 (E.D. Vn. 1065);
Margaret E. Amory, 22 B.T.A. 1398 (1931); Rose P. Crone, 9 B.T.A. 437 (1027);
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cases mentioned records in the facts only. 178 On the other hand,
most of the decisions holding against the taxpayer in the face
of adequate records employed a subjective rather than an objective approach. Conversely, the authorities sustaining a taxpayer
without adequate farm books and records have rested on other
objective manifestations of profit motivation, such as attention
to expenses or abandonment of unprofitable operations.179
Sintilarity to Profitable Act'ivities of Same Nat~tre. This factor's
approval of a comparison of manner of operation to substantially
similar profitable activities is too limited. For instance, the section 183 regulations themselves, in an example illustrating the
objective factors, compare the operation of questioned activities
with the operation of farms in the area, similar in size and production, many of which the example noted were unprofitable. 180
More significantly, the cases have drawn the comparison between
overall operations or specific techniques of the questioned activity
and similar activities in general without comment as to whether
the latter were profitable. 181 On one occasion, the Tax Court simply
found that from the standpoint of economy and efficiency the taxpayer's method of operation compared favorably to other similar
establishments.182 Other decisions have noted that specific techniques or equipment were those utilized· in the industry.183
More frequently, however, courts have compared specific aspects
Leonard M. Sasso, 20 T.C.~f. 1068 (1961); George Thacker, 28 T.C.M. 1433 (1!16!1);
Charles B. Pennington, 26 T.C.M. 520 (1967); W. Clark Wise, 16 T.C.:M. 361 (1057),
aff'd per curiam, 260 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1958).
178 Whitney v. Comm'r, 73 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1934); Lucien •r. Tyng, 36 B.'r.A. 21
(1937), rev'cl on otlzer grou11cls, 106 1!'.2<1 55 (2<1 Cir. 1939), rcv'cl 011 other groumls, 308
U.S. 527 (1940); Marshall Field, 26 B.T.A. 116 (1932), aff'cl, 67 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1033);
Thomas F. Sheridan, 4 B.T.A. 1299 (1927).
170 DuPont v. United States, 234 I!'. Supp. 681 (D. Del. 1964); Thomas W. Jurkson, fj!J
T.C. 312 (1972), acq., 1973-21 I.R.B. 5; Theodore Sabelis, 37 T.C. 1058 (1062); Laum M.
Curtis, 28 B.T.A. 631 (1933); James Clark, 24 B.T.A. 1235 (1931); Nol'IIIU Mathows
Lauer, 20 T.C.M. 1038 (1961).
180 Reg. § 1.183-2(c) Ex. 5.
181 Significantly the Tax Court refused in W. Clark Wise, 16 T.C.M. 361 (1057), aff'tl
per curiam, 260 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1958), to take judicial notice of the fact that fm·ms
below a certain size could not be profitably operated. Moreover, the Senate Conuuitteo on
Finance believed that a marginal farmer could be engaged in l1is farllling activity for
profit, albeit without a reasonable expectation thereof. S. REP. No. 91-li1i2, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 105 (1969).
1s2 John S. Ellsworth, 21 T.C.M. 145 (1962); accorcl, Rose P. Crane, 0 B.'r.A. 437,
440-41 (1927).
183 Helis v. Usry, 71-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 9365 (E.D. Ln. 1971), rcv'd on other orouiiCls, •!3-!
F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972); Samuel Riker, Jr., 6 B.T.A. 890 (1927); Charles D. EggN·t,
16 T.C.M. 1010 (1957); cf. Norman C. Demler, 25 T.C.M. 620 (1966).
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of the questioned activity to business operations in general rather
than singling out similar operations.184 Indeed, the observation, for
example, that a farm has all the physical characteristics and
appearance of an ordinary farm carried on for a business forms
a refrain in the reported farm loss decisions.185 Moreover, some
cases have drawn an even more attenuated comparison emphasizing that similar activities are a common business enterprise in
the taxpayer's locale, e.g., Thomas W. Jackson 186 began its
analysis with the fact that the chartering of boats, particularly
in the taxpayer's geographic area of operation, was a common
business enterprise.
Again, cases such as Schley v. Oommissioner/ 81 adopting the
tack now prohibited under section 183 of a subjective rather than
an objective approach, have dismissed evidence that the ta.A-payer's activities qualified as those usually performed by one in the
taxpayer's alleged business with the observation, for instance,
that "mere operation of a farm is not enough." 188
In addition to comparison to other similar activities or business
appearance in general, authorities have considered the method of
operation by other owners, both subsequent and prior, of the same
property.189 Indeed, the fourth example illustrating these factors
in the regulations states that the ta.xpayer operates the farm
activity in the same manner as the prior owners (his parents).
Not surprisingly, operation by other owners of the property as
a hobby or country estate militates against a profit motive on
the part of the taxpayer, unless he takes care to eliminate showplace practices or facilities of prior owners.190
In conclusion, the paucity of explicit comparisons of questioned
activities with similar operations in the extant cases as well as
the absence of such a factor in the commentators' lists of factors
1s4 Margaret E. Amory, 22 B.T.A. 1398 (1931). Sec generally Shnrpc, What the Xax·
payer Sl!ould Do to Have the Courts Recognize His Farm as a Business, ZS J. TAXATIO!\

48, 51 {1968).
1ss Samuel Riker, Jr., 6 B.T.A. 890, 893 {1927); Mnry Ellis Turner, ::!3 T.C.M. 1186
(1964).
1ss 59 T.C. 312 (1972), acq., 1973-21 I.R.B. 5; accord, Jnmea Otis, 7 B.T.A. 88!:!1 854
(1927); Charles B. Pennington, 26 T.C.M. 520 (1967).
187 375 F.2d 747 {2d Cir. 1967).
188 375 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1967); accord, Alfred :M. Cox, 24 T.C.:M. !:!3 (1965), aff'd
per curiam, 354 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1966).
189 Teitelbaum v. Comm'r, 294 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 987
(1962) (prior); Rowe B. Metcalf, 28 T.C.M. 1402 (1963) (subsequent).
190 Compare John Randolph Hopkins, 15 T.C. 160 {1950), wit11 Helis v. Usry, 71-1
U.S.T.C. 'If 9365 (E.D. La. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 464 F.!:ld 330 (5th Cir. 1972).
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used in determining profit motiYe portend that this factor may
be of minor significance. Nevertheless, the natural inclination of
taxpayers to develop their proof to nwet the criteria sot forth
in the regulations will probably shift tlw focus from business-lilw
appearance in gPnPral to dirPct comparisons with Sl)ecific similar
activities.
Change in Operating ill ethods. 'Phis factor occurs but once in
the examples accompanying the r<'gulation factors and then only
in a negative sense: the first example statPs that modern methods
were not used in operating the farm. Contrary to this lack of
emphasis, howPwr, changes in opPrating uwthods may well be
the most frequently relied upon factor of significance in the vnst
sea of case law. Indeed, thl' factor of abandonment of unprofitable
operating uwthods, and in particular unprofitabh• activiti<% historically has carried more weight than maintenance of hooks and·
records and comparability of operations to other similar activities, as wt>ll as the many otlwr factors set forth in the regulations.
This item has fr<•<tUt>ntly b<•en linked inextricably with rPliance
upon upon PXJ>Prt adYicP. 191 On one occasion, howevHr, such an
abandonment was gin•n nPgatiYe import by characterization as
"vacillation in tlw ohjectiws" of the enterprise manif<~sting a
lack of preliminary exploration as to tlw profit potential of the
activity. 192
Although the regulations speak only of changes in methods or
techniques, the cases almost invariably have dealt witl1 changes
in product lines or di\'h;ions. 193 A variety of patterns recur in these
cases. In some of the farm loss decisions, the taxpaym· began
operations with a broad range of crops and livestock and gradually eliminah•d tlw unprofitable lines. 194 Similarly, taxpayers have
constantly shifted from one farm acti\·ity to another in tlw search
for the Plusi\'e profitable product. 195 Such approach has been
1n1 Sec RIDENOUR, PARM AND RANCH LOSSES, BNA TAX l\IANA<lt:~IEN'f POil'l'i'OLIO NO,
241-2d, A-25 (1973).
102 Celeste B. Smith, 30 T.C.M. 5161 518 (1971). ~'rom this, tho ~ourt <•onchttled tlw
taxpayer's n~tivities were merely preparatory to engaging in a trade or business. ~'or 11
discus~ion of this ~on~ept, .~ce notes 496 through 533 infra 1111(1 the ~~~~OIIIJlllnying text.
1oa E.g., Rood v. United States, 184 P. Supp. 791, 94 (D. Minn. 1960); Dcnn Babbitt,
23 T.C. 850 (1955); Norton L. Smith, 9 T.C. 1Hi0 (1947); Hex B. Foster, 32 'r.C.M.
No. 13 at 47 (1973).
1o4 Norton L. Smith, 9 T.C. ll50 (1947); Marshall Pield, 26 B.T.A. 116 (1932) 1 c:jJ'tl,
67 P.2d 876 (2c1 Cir. 1933); Rose P. Crane, 9 B.T.A. 437 (1927).
lOS Pntterson v. United States, 459 I<'.2d 487 (Ct. CJ. 1972); Dean Babbitt, 23 ·r.c. s:;o,
857 (1955); Rowe B. 1\feh•nlf, 22 T.C.l\f. 1402 (1963). The Tnx Coul't in Eugene J. Dnvls,
25 T.C.l\f. 616, 620 (1966), concludecl: "Throughout the history of the fttl'lll 1 we find
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frequently described as experimentation. 196 In other decisions, the
changes were more modest: abandoning a minor activity while
continuing the major activity,197 undertaking new activities without terminating existing ones,198 replacing the single farm activity being engaged with a new aetivity, 199 and replacing employees.200 This factor has not been limited to farm loss easesin Rood v. United States 201 the court was favorably impressed
by the fact that the taxpayer, a sculptor, changed media several
tin1es in order to realize a profit by meeting specialized markets.
The most frequent, and apparently most convincing, change in
operations is abandonment of the activity in its entirety, either
in the tax year or, as is more frequent, in a subsequent year.202
Abandonment based on experience gained from operations that
the actiYity cannot be made profitable, on realization the profit
forecasts by adYisors were oYer optimistic, or in accord with
professional advice has impressed the eourts.203 As tlte Ta.x Court
stated in Benjamin E. Adams,204 its conclusion that the ta.'\.-payer
had intended to make a profit from his painting was strengthened
by the fact that when, after a few years, the ta.'\.-payer found that
he could not make money from his art activities, he gave up
the full-time pursuit of them and found other employment. Wltere
such abandonment has occurred, the Commissioner has scant success in arguing that tlw venture should have been abandoned
petitioners trying to operate it so as to make a Jlrofit, t'hauging from one type of opera·
tion to :mother in onler to attain that encl."
19G Whitney v. Comm'r, 73 F.2d 589, 591 (3cl Cir. 1934) ; DuPont ,•• United Stntes, 28
F. Supp. 122 (D. Del. 1939); George B. Lester, 19 B.T.A. 549 (1930); Mnry Ellis
Turner, 23 T.~L}L 1186 (1964).
m Theoclore Sabelis, 37 T.C. 1058 (1962); Rose P. Crane, 9 B.T.A. 437 (1927).
198 August }fen•kens, 7 B.T.A. 32 (1927).
199 George B. Lester, 19 B.T.A. 549 (1930) ; Rex B. Foster, 32 T.C.'~I. No. 13 (1973);
D. .Joseph St. Germain, 18 T.C.M. 1061 (1959); Dan R. Hmmu, Jr., 10 T.C.M. JGG (19Jl);
Vincent Tre:mor, 10 T.C.M. 336 (19:>1).
~oo Dean Babbitt, 23 T.C. 8ii0, 867 (195ii); Norton L. Smith, 9 T.C. 1150, 11:i1 (1947);
Lillie S. Wegefortb, 42 B.T.A. 633 (1940).
!!01}84 F. SUJlp. 791, 794 (D. :Minn. 1960).
~o~ T:tx year: Benjamin E. Admns, 2:> T.C.M. 1239 (1966); Aliee D. Woreester, !:!1
T.C.M. 1138 (1962) ; Harvey S. Farrow, 16 T.C.M. 836 (19:>7). Subsequent yenr: Wright
v. Unitecl States, 249 1!'. Supp. 508 (D. Nev. 196:;); DuPont , •• Unitell Stntes, !:!8 F. Supp.
122 (D. Del. 1939); Laura }L Curtis, 28 B.T.A. 631 (1933); Irving C. A~kennnn, 24
B.T.A. 512 (1931), aff'cl, 71 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1934); W. Brown llorlon, 16 T.C.M. 420
(1957).
~oa Alice D. Woreester, 21 T.C.M. 1138 (1962) (overly O}ltimistie for~nsls); Hnn·ey S.
Farrow, 16 T.C.M. 836 (1957) (experienee); cf. Lazonby , •• Tomlinson, 27!:! F. Supp. 55S
(N.D. Fla. 1967) (nbnndomncnt of planning of one activity before umlerlnking second).
2o~ 25 T.C.M. 123 (1966); DICKINSOX1 FARM AND RANCH LOSSES, BNA TAX l\L\!:AGE·
:MENT PoRTFOLio No. 241, A-31 (1970).
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earlier: "It is not for the Collector to second-guess the taxpayer
by concluding that the operating losses in earlier years dictated
an abandonment of the enterprise in 1957, 1958 or 1959 [rather
than in 1960].'' 205 On the other hand, the triers of fact ofh>n haw
ruled against taxpayers who fail to abandon a continually unprofitable line and especially have been critical of a failure to
cull unprofitable animals. 206 Conversely, culling unprofitable or
unproductive livestock, a variant of abandoning unprofitable
activities, evidences a profit motive. 207
Furthermore, while abandonment of the entire activity in subsequent years has usually been a determinative factor in a taxpayer's favor, mere changes in operation in later years or in the tax
year after prolonged use of less efficient methods have fared less
well-' 'While in 1963 petitioner changed his cattle raising activities, this change does not alter his intent for prior years." 208
Such authorities appear, however, by and large to be tainted by
a subjective approach. 209 Nevertheless, should abandonment occur
only after audit and the Service has begun to question the taxpayer's losses, it may not serve as a factor in the taxpayer's
favor and could even constitute a negative factor. 21 °Furthermore,
a recent trend has been to treat an abandonment of a purported
business activity coupled with a continuation of the same activity
as a hobby as practically tantamount to an admission that the
activity was never engaged in for profit, but rather was primarily
for personal satisfaction. 211
Courts have expressly noted that once it becomes apparent to
the taxpayer that the venture cannot be made profitable, the acWright v. Uniteu States, 249 F. Supp. 508, 513 (D. Nov. 1965).
Failure to abauclon: Brocleri<'k v. Derby, 236 F.2cl 35 (lOth Cir. Hlu6) ; Jack R.
Mavis, 14 T.C.M. 332 (1955). But see Mary Ellis Turner, 23 T.C.M. 1186 (1964). Failure
to cull: Anthony Imbesi, 23 T.C.M. 1678 (1964), rev'cl 011 otllr:r grou111ls, 361 ~'.2<1 640
(3d Cir. 1966); aeconl, Edward J. Drew, 31 T.U.M. 799 (1972); Celeste B. Smith, 30
T.C.M. 516 (1971).
201 Widener v. Comm'r, 33 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1929); Lucien II. Tyng, 36 B.'f.A. 21
(1937), rev'd on ot1wr groumls, 106 F.2d 5;) (2<1 Cir. 1939), rev'il 011 other grounds, 308
U.S. 527 (1940) ; James S. Bishop, 31 T.C.M. 829 (1972); Charles B. Pennington, 26
T.C.M. 520 (1967).
2os Alfred M. Cox, 24 T.U.M. 23, 25 (196:>), aff'd z1er curiam, 354 F.2d 659 (3<1 Olr.
1966).
200 See, e.g., Schley v. Comm'r, 375 F.2d 747 (2cl Cir. 1967); George T. McLean, 10
T.C.M. 673 (1960), aff'd per curiam, 285 F.2d 7:)6 (4th Cir. 1961),
210 See Billy V. Wmm, 27 T.C.M. 1301 (1968); cf. Leonard F. Barcus, 32 •r.o.M. 660
(1973), aff'd per curiam, 74-1 U.S.T.C. fi 9288 (2c1 Cir. 1974); Evcrott R. Tnylor, 28
T.C.:M. 941 (1969).
211 Robert E. Currie, 28 T.C.l\1. 12 (1969).
2os

200

1974]

SECTION

183

AND BEYOND

407

tivity may be continued during a reasonable period of liquidation
(during which deductions are allowable), which may last as long
as a year.212 Moreover, in such liquidation, the bu.-payer is apparently not required to dispose of all property if the only price
obtainable is in his opinion too low.213 However, the mere allegation by the taxpayer that he does not intend to remain in the
business if he were able to dispose of livestock is entitled to
little weight where he makes no actual efforts to sell his stock.214
Expertise of Taxpayer or His Advisors

Preparation for the activity by extensive study of its accepted business, economic, and scientific practices, or consultation with those who
are expert therein, may indicate that the ta."payer has a profit motive
where the taxpayer carries on the activity in accordance with such
practices. Where a taxpayer has such preparation or procures such e."pert advice, but does not carry on the activity in accordance with such
practices, a lack of intent to derive profit may be indicated unless it
appears that the taxpayer is attempting to develop new or superior
techniques which may result in profits from the activity.m

The case law development manifests a variety of approved
means by which a taxpayer may prepare for an activity to gain
e:ll..-pertise as to its accepted business, economic and scientific
practices.
In nonfarming activity areas, earli~r experience has been an
infrequent factor in the ta:ll..-payer's favor,zu; although occasionally
the questioned activity has been the ta.'\.-payer's sole occupation,
particularly in the field of writing 217 and inventing.218 Farming
has been proportionally less common as the ta.xpayer's sole occupation, but quite frequently expertise in a farming activity has
been acquired by childhood experience on a farm. 219 On the other
212 Lazonby v. Tomlinson, 272 F. Supp. 558 (N.D. Fla. 1967) ; Vincent Trronor, 10
T.C.M. 336 (1951).
21s Eugene J. Davis, 25 T.C.M. 616 (1966). Sec generally Oshii1S1 Proposed Rcoulations
Provide New Rules for the Hobby Loss Game, 35 J. TAXATIO:-< 2141 216 (1971) (minimiw·
tion of losses); Rev. Rul. 74-28, 1974-3 I.R.B. 7.
214 Edward J. Drew, 31 T.C.M. 7991 806 (1972).
215 Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(2).
216 See, e.g., Norman C. Demler, 25 T.C.M. 620 (1966); Thclmn C. Whitmnn, 19
T.C.M. 456 (1960).
211 Stern v. United States, 71-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 9375 (C.D. Cnl. 1971); Comcli11.9 Vanderbilt,
Jr., 16 T.C.M. 1081 (1957); cf. Benjamin E. Adams, 25 T.C.M. 1!!39 (1966); Selr.lstian
de Grazia, 21 T.C.M. 1572 (1962). But cf. Porter v. Comm'r, 437 F~d 39 (~d Cir. 1970).
21s Johan A. Louw, 30 T.C.M. 1421 (1971); Nicholas A. Dodiclt1 30 T.C.M. ~48 (1971).
Contra, White v. Comm'r, 227 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 195.1), cert. d~nicd, 351 U.S. 939 (19:i6).
219 Lucien H. Tyng, 36 B.T.A. 21 (1937), Tcv'd on otlicr grounds, 106 F ~d m; (2d Cir.

408

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:

hand, such early interest and experience has sometimes proven
to be a slippery factor, with the Service utilizing it as ammuniM
tion for an attack that such personal interest was the motivation
for the activity rather than profit. 220 In fact, in Mary Ellis
Tttrner 221 the Service even asserted (albeit to no avail) that the
taxpayer's scientific interest in the breeding characteristics of
her livestock, derived from experil>nce in applied genetics and usc~
ful in the taxpayer's scientific breeding program, dominatPd her exM
penditures to the complete subservience of any profit motivation.
Such posturP has, howen•r, usually been rebuffed: "'While it is
true that 1wtitioner has been interested in and engaged in farmM
ing and breeding lin-stock practically all of his life, this fact is
not fatal to a finding of a profit-making motive. In fact, it has
been observed that '[s]uccess in business is largely obtained by
pleasurable int<'l·<>st therein.' '' 222 Moreover, the Commissioner
has scon•d his greatest succ(.•ss with this tack in the subjective
intent decisions.
Robert E. Currie 223 presents perhaps an intermediate position.
A lifelong inh•rpst in the activity, there raising horses and dogs,
does not preclude profit motivation-the court not(ld that to tlw
contrary, familiarity could lw the motivating factor for embarking on a business wnture-but a history of hobby enjoyment
raises a prPsumption that the taxpayer is not engaging in the
activity for profit, which he must overcomP with a greater amount
of proof than he would n<>ed had he not previously enjoyed the
acti\'ity as a hobby. Ch•arly thl'n, it is not the prior experience,
but the prior engaging in tlw hobby that is a negative factor.
'\Yhere the taxpay<>r has had no prior Pxperience in the activity,
common uwans of ac<1uiring Pxpertise ar(l self-education through
study of books and periodicals in tlw arPa, attPndance at seminars
or trade uwetings or shows, uwmhPrship in trade organi:mtions
and association and consultation with thos<' expert in the activ1939), 1·ev'cl on otllel' gl'ouncls, 308 U.S. 527 (1940); Irving C. Ackel'llmn, 24 B.'r.A. CllZ
(1931), atf'cl, 71 P.2<1 fi86 (9th Cir. 1934); Hamilton P. Kcun, 10 B.T.A. 07 (1028);
George Thacker, 28 T.C.M. 1433 (1969); Eugcnc J. Davis, 2;; T.C.M, 616 (1006).
220 See, e.g., Imbesi ,•. Comm'r, 361 P.2<1 640 (3<1 Cir. 1966); Edwur!l J. Drew, 31 'l'.C.M.
799 (1972). The following l'ascs arc representative of those whi(•h rej('ct sUt·h n ron ton·
tion: James S. Bishop, 31 T.C.l\L 829 (1972); l\[onis A. Stoltzfus, 29 •r.C.l\[. 1010
(1970); William L. Brueck, Sr., 23 T.C.M. 1228 (1964); r.f. Woodl'OII' L. Wroblowski1
32 T.C.l\f. No. 37 (1973).
22123 T.C.M. 1186 (1964).
2221\lorris A. Stoltzfus, 29 T.C.l\1. 1610, 1634 (1970) (footnote otuittcd).
22a 28 T.C.l\1. 12, 18 (1969). Juclge Irwin decided both Stollz/11s mul Currie.
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ity.224 The fine arts cases offer mor<> <>xamples of full-time study.225
The agricultural activity cases, on the other hand, have proven an
especially fertile field for consultation with experts-owing no
doubt in part to the ready a\·ailability of federal, state and local
farm agents-which if followed may be even more persuasive tlmn
subscription to technical publications.226 Indeed, subscription to
trade publications has been described in one instance as a ''bare
essential'' in the search for knowledge.227
Consultation with goY(:'rnment soil conser\·ation experts and
following their recommendations forms a recurring factual pattern in farm loss authoriti(:'S constituting strong e\·idence of a
profit motive.228 Cases holding for the ta.xpayer are also legion.
In these taxpayers consulted local farm agents or university agricultural extension servic(:'s in efforts to conduct their farm activities along sound business-like lines.229 Such consultation, prior to
beginning an activity, as to the possibility of opt>rating at a profit
is a favorable factor. 230 Seeking advice is not limited to official
sources, for courts frequently have noted ta.~-payer consultation
with those engaged in similar activities including, for instance, in
the agricultural activities category neighboring farmers.zn Still
only procuring advice from acquaintances would usually be at
best a neutral factor. Accordingly, such advice seldom appears
in the reported cases. However, in Edu·m·d J. Dreu·,232 evidence
was adduced that the ta..xpayer, although not Imowledgeable about
horse training, only consulted his friends and colleagul's in medical
224 See, e.g., Patterson v. United States, 459 F.2d 487 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Rl'x B. Foster,
Jr., 32 T.C.M. No. 14 (1973); Alden B. Starr, 28 T.C.M. 167 (1969); Lilinn Solomon.
26 T.C.M. 919 (1967). See generally Sharpe, Wllat tile Taxpayer Slloultl Do to Hare tlte
Courts Recognize His Farm as a Business, 28 J. TA..,..\TION 481 51 (196!!).
22s E.g., Benjamin E. Adams, 25 T.C:M. 1239 (1966); S.:'bastinu tl.:' Grnzin, 21 T.C.M.
1572 (1962).
22G RIDENOUR, FARM .AND RANCH LOSSEs, BNA TA..._ MANMEME!\T PonTFOLIO No.
241-2d: A-25 (1973).
221 Rex B. Foster, Jr., 32 T.C.:r.r. No. 14 nt 52 (1973).
22s Mary Ellis Turner, 23 T.C.M. 1186 (1964); George ::\[. Ze:1gler, 17 T.C.'M. 454
(1958); Theron D. Stay, 17 T.C.M. 861 (1958).
229 Patterson v. United States, 459 F .2d 487 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Hnmiltou F. Ke:m, 10
B.T.A. 97 (1928) ; Harvey S. Farrow, 16 T.C.::'I[. 836 (1957) ; Hroi Kntz, 13 T.C.::'I[. 188
(1954).
230 Marshall Field, 26 B.T.A. 116 (1932), aff'tl, 67 F.2d 876 (::!(1 Cir. 1933); Mnrgnrct
E. Amory, 22 B.T.A. 1398 (1931); Re.'l: B. Foster, Jr., 32 T.C.'M. No. 14 at li2 (1073).
See generally Note, Breeding Farms and Racing Stables-Hobby or Business/54 KY. L.J.
92, 94 (1965).
231 Dean Babbitt, 23 T.C. 850 (1955); Jean A. LO\\"l'ntbnl, 27 T.C.)[. 387 (lOGS);
Lilian Solomon, 26 T.C.M. 919 (1967); Alice D. Worcestl'r, 21 T.C.l[. 1138 (1962).
232 31 T.C.M. 799, 806 (1972).
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practice and did not even follow the advice given-not surprisingly
the court held that the taxpayer carried out the activity without
a profit motive.
To date, the authorities have almost invariably analyzed experience and expertise in terms of study of the scientific practices
or techniques used in the activity,233 rather than of its accepted
business or economic practices-the regulations list all three in
the conjunctive. Glenn H. lvlorton 234 appears to be an unusual
exception. The taxpayer brought exceptionally useful advanced
education, experience, specialized study and self-education to the
activity of horsebreeding. Yet the court discounted this factor,
reasoning that while the taxpayer was informed as to the technicalities of breeding horses, he admitted to having no knowledge concerning the capital outlay needed to support such an
operation and, further, had not seriously investigated the market
for such horses in his locale. A conclusion that the taxpayer
was not engaged in the activity for profit would have been amply
supported by other objective criteria,235 but the court appears
instead to have turned the taxpayer's extensive preparation
against him, categorizing it as general investigation of the possibilities of breeding horses for profit, not going beyond the
exploratory and investigative stage of any plan to establish a
business-not an existing trade or business. Application of such
preparatory to engaging in a trade or business concept (a frequent government argument used alternatively with lack of profit
motive) to agricultural activities is discussed below; however,
Morton serves as clear warning of the danger that the Service
may attempt to use taxpayer preparation against him. Of course,
considering this factor alone, Morton clearly represents a minority view both in emphasis on lack of study of economic aspects
and on lack of investigation of the local market.
Failure to follow expert advice is quite rare in the reported
cases, Drew being one of the few examples. The regulation's ex233 See, e.g., Lilian Solomon, 26 T.C.l\I. 919 (1967); Charles B. Pennington, 26 T.O.M.
520 (1967); Hedi Katz, 13 T.C.M. 188 (1954).
234 30 T.C.l\I. 671 (1971). Taxpayers with equivalent or less preparation prevailed in
Rex B. Foster, Jr., 32 T.C.M. No. 14 (1973) ; Alden B. Starr, 28 T.O.M. 167 (l!J6!J) j and
Lilian Solomon, 26 T.C.M. 919 (1967).
235 For example, he did not maintain adequate books or records, devote much time to tho
activity, advertise, had no facilities and previously had engaged in the activity ns a ltobby.
Joseph W. Johnson, Jr., 59 T.C. No. 78 (1973), also relied heavily on the fact that tho
taxpayer "[h]ad no knowledge and apparently made no investigation prior to purchasing
the property to determine whether the property ha<l ever been rented by tho former
owner, or if so, for how much.''
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ception to lack of profit motive where such failure is the result
of attempts to develop new or superior profitable teelmiques is
perhaps even more rarely reflected in the ease law. 1\Iore common has been the recent ·trend to rely hea\·ily on lack of experience and, particularly, on failure to take positive steps to remedy
such a lack.236 Historically, taxpayers with this factor in their
favor have had the smallest chance, particularly in the agricultural activity area, of losing. Yet its absence lms been scarcely
noted by the courts; however, the recent trend of emphasis on
the absence of this factor will undoubtedly grow.
On the other hand, the Service's frequent attempts to turn the
taxpayer's expertise against him as evidence of a sul>jective motive other than profits will either cease or enjoy even less success
in view of the objective approach mandated by Congress. Nevertheless, taxpayer expertise can, in certain objective circumstances,
cut against establishment of a profit motive. N onnan 0. Demler 237
offers a succinct but cogent analysis of the pitfalls of reliance
on expertise in the prophetic observation that the elements of
experience and expertise ''can be a sword as well as a shield in
that, in some situations, they will clearly indicate that the taxpayer's asserted expectation of I>rofit is hardly worthy of belief.''
Such a situation subsequently arose in Carkhuff v. Oommissioner,238 where the Si.·dh Circuit dubbed the ta."{payers' argument-that their prior consultation with their ta."{ advisor as well
as preparation of a depreciation schedule and a method of accounting manifested rental of their summer home in a businesslike manner-a double edged sword in that it also revealed that
they were not ignorant of the reasonable prospects of profit and
loss. Consequently, the resulting losses did not reflect simply an
unwise investment, but rather a lack of profit motivation.239 It
may be significant that Oarkh1.t/f was an appellate decision and,
under the clearly erroneous principle, an ap1>ellate court will upset
a trial court's decision only if there -was no evidence to support
236 Compare Patterson v. United States, 459 F.2d 487 (Ct. Cl. 1972), tritll Edwnrd J.
Drew, 31 T.C.M. 799 (1972) and Harold J. Snyder, 25 T.C.M. 13~G (19GG).
237 25 ·T.C.M. 620 (1966).
238 425 F.2d 1400, 1404 (6th Cir. 1970).
239 Donald A. McCormick, 28 T.C.M. 1337, 1342 (1969), illnstrntcs the s:une principle
on a more general level. The Tax Court ren.soned that beeuusc the tnxpayer was an ex·
perieneed and successful bnsinessman, tbe unprofit:tbility of his ncthity could not oo
jnstified or explained on the basis of a lack of business c:~perience or on naivete. Sec W.
Jane Luce, 29 T.C.M. 894 (1970).
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that decision. 240 Trial courts, if the reported decisions are any
guide, may be expected to less frequently draw such negative inferences from the taxpayer's expertise.
Time and Effort Expended by Taxpayer in
Carrying on the Activity

The fact that the taxpayer devotes much of his personal time and
effort to carrying on an activity, particularly if the activity does not
have substantial personal or recreational aspects, may indicate an intention to derive a profit. A taxpayer's withdrawal from another occupa•
tion to devote most of his energies to the activity may also be evidence
that the activity is engaged in for profit. The fact that the taxpayer
devotes a limited amount of time to an activity does not necessarily
indicate a lack of profit motive where the taxpayer employs competent
and qualified persons to carry on such activity.2 41

The proposed regulations focused solely on the devotion of much
personal time and effort by the taxpayer in carrying on the
activity and his withdrawal from another occupation to devote
most of his energies to the activity.242 Both factors are widespread in the case law. Of course, the proposed regulations left
the impression that application of only limited time by the taxpayer himself was a negative factor. The :final regulations softened
this inference considerably by providing that devotion of a limited
amount of time to an activity by the taxpayer is not necessarily
an indication of a lack of a profit motive where he employs competent and qualified persons to carry on the activity. The examples
accompanying the regulations add little. In the second example,
the taxpayer engaged in extensive lecturing activity, advocating
and disseminating his ideas, but was nevertheless found not to
have engaged in the activity for profit. Conversely, the fourth
example, where the taxpayer could be found in the cautious language of the drafters to have engaged in the activity of farming
for profit, noted that he did much of the required labor around
the farm himself, such as :fixing fences and planting crops. Similarly, the sixth example illustrating an investor engaged in his
experimental activities for profit, provides that he conducted his
research on a regular, systematic basis.
Contrary to the tenor of the regulations the cases have fre240 See Duberstein v. Comm'r., 363 U.S. 278 (1960). Where evidence would support
either of two permissible ~onclusions, the Tax Court's choice is not clearly erroneous.
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949).
241 Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(3).
242Prop. Reg.§ 1.183-2(b)(6), 36 Fed. Reg. 16112 (Aug. 19, 1971).
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quently held for the ta.xpayer, particularly in the agricultural
area, where he devoted substantially less than much of his personal time and effort to carrying on the activity. Thus, ta..'\.-payers
have frequently prevailed where they spent only evenings and
weekends in the activity, with only occasional or no hired help.243
On the other hand, in nonfarm cases, devotion of considerable,
or even full time to the activity has frequently been of no avail.2' '
In fact, in nonagricultural activities, tllis criterion generally appears to be no more than a make weight factor, in that cases
holding against the taxpayer usually do not mention the amount
of time devoted, while those holding for the taxpayer usually
mention it only in passing.245 A unifying thread may lie in the
suggestion that devotion of personal effort evidences profit motive
only where the activity could not be considered recreational in
any sense.246 As discussed below, the farm loss cases appear to
assume that hard physical labor is not recreational.
As might be expected, older cases adopting a subjective approach and downplaying objective criteria ltave discounted the
devotion of effort by the ta.xpayer.247
The regulation's rather weak statement tltat devotion of a
limited amount of time by the taxpayer does not necessarily indicate a lack of profit motive where he employs competent, qualified persons to carry on such activity is too mild in view of the
prior case law. For very common factual patterns in early cases
finding a profit motive involved (1) little or no personal effort
by the taxpayer, but use of experienced personneJ as managers,248
or (2) devotion of personal time through close supervision of
such managers together with some part-time physical labor and
use of experienced employees.249 These results fully comport with
2!3 See, e.g., Theodore Sabelis, 37 T.C. 1058 (1962); Rex B. Foster, Jr., 32 T.C.Y.
No. 14 (1973); Herbert C. Sanderson, 23 T.C.1lr. 1723 (1964).
2HE.g., Porter v. C.()ntm'r, 437 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1970); White v. (:.()mm'r, 227 F.2d 779
(6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 939 (19ll6).
2!5 Compare, e.g., Lamont v. C.()ntm'r, 339 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1964), wit11, e.g., Thelma
C. Whitman, 19 T.C."llf. 456 (1960) and Charles D. Eggert, 16 T.C.M. 1010 (1957).
us RmENou&, FARM AND RANcH LossEs, BNA TAX MANAGE:UEN'l' PollTFOLIO No.
241-2d, A-26 (1973).
247Harry C. Fischer, 29 B.T.A. 1041 (1934), aff'd per curiam, 74 F.2d 1014 {2d Cir.
1935); accord, Alfred M. Cox, 24 T.C.M. 23 (1965), af!'d per curiam, 354 F.2d tiS9 {3d
Cir. 1966).
:Hs E.g., Patterson v. United States, 459 F.2d 487 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Whitney v. Comm'r,
73 F .2d 589 (3d Cir. 1934) ; Wright v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 508 (D. Nev. 19tiS);
Dean Babbitt, 23 T.C. 850 (1955); Walter P. Temple, 10 B.T.A. 1238 {1928); Jnmes
Otis, 7 B.T.A. 882 (1927).
:!4~ E.g., Irving C. Ackerman, 24 B.T.A. 512 (1931), af!'d, 71 F.2d SSG {9th Cir. 1934);
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the general principle that one can carry on a trade or business
through an agent. 250 The rationale is that an agent's acts are
imputed to his principal. 251 Nevertheless, the Service has, on occa~
sion, asserted that minimal time devoted by the taxpayers indiM
cated a lack of profit motivE>, d~:>spite the fact that experienced
trainers were used. 252 The Tax Court disagreed, pointing to the
great reliance on indPp~:>nd~:>nt trainers because of the taxpayer's
own inexperience and inability. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in
Mercer v. Commissioner,253 answered the government's reliance
on the fact that the taxpayer held a full-timE:' job and spent only
four months engaged in thE:> farming activity during the two years
in question as follows: ''It is reasonable to conclude that work
as a laborer was necessary to raise the funds required to support
his cattle operation. In any ev~:>nt, it is not a necessary prerequisite
that one devote himself completely to an E:>nterprise to qualify it
as a trade or business.'' Indeed, some cases have found the taxpayer's extensive use of professional employel's a decisive factor
and have not relied on the considerable time devoted by the tax~
payer to promotional activities. 254 ConvPrsely, other cases have
based a conclusion of lack of profit motive in part on the fact
that the taxpayer had no expert manager or regular employees. 2 G~
In short, the fact that the taxpayer devotes a limited amount of
time does not, rather than does not necessarily, indicate a lack
of profit motive wh(lre he employs competent and qualified persons
to carry on the activity.
The finding in the fourth example accompanying the regulaM
tions that the taxpayer did much of the required labor around the
farm himself is abundantly reflected in the case law. The courts
have been greatly impressed by physical labor by the taxpayer.
George B. Lester, 19 B.T.A. 549 (1930); Hamilton F. Kcan, 10 B.T.A. 97 (1028); O.J.
Anderson, 14 T.C.M. 148 (1955).
2so Comm'r v. Maple, 440 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 1971). But sec Young, Tire Role of
Motive in Evaluating Tax Sheltered Investments, 22 TAX LAWYER 2751 296 (1069),
251 Lee, "..l!ctive Conduct" Distinguished from "Conduct" of a Rental Real Estate Busi·
ness, 25 TAX LAWYER 317, 321 (1972).
252 Charles B. Pennington, 26 T.C.M. 520 (1964).
253 376 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1967) (footnote omitted).
254Lillie S. Wegeforth, 42 B.T.A. 633 (1940); Samuel Riker, Jr., 6 B.T.A. 890 (1027);
RO\ve B. Metcalf, 22 T.C.M. 1402 (1963). One commentator believes that uso of profcs·
sional employees is more significant than the taxpayer's own efforts. Sharpe, Wlwt tiro
Taxpayer Slrould Do to Have tire Courts Recognize His Farm as a Bu.siness, 28 J. TAXA·
TION 48, 51 (1968).
255 Edward J. Drew, 31 T.C.M. 799 (1972); Harold I. Snyder, 26 T.C.M. 1326 (1966);
Sterling Beckwith, 23 T.C.M. 1537 (1954).

1974]

SECTION

183

AND DEYOND

415

In Leland E. Rosemond,256 the Ta..x Court stated that the tax-

payer's physical labor by no means appeared to be recreation.
The same thought is reflected in Nonna Mathews La?.leru7 where
the court stated "[a] m~r~ dilettante, or hobbyist, would not in
our opinion, have applied himself so unstintingly, as did the petitioner to her horsebreeding activities.'' Indeed, analysis that it
would be hard to believe that the ta..xpayer, with his relatively
modest income, would make large expenditures and engage in
the physical labor required in the particular activity without
having the intention to make a profit, occurs with some regularity.258 It would appear that the courts have focused too much on
whether the activity had aspects of a hobby, i.e., recreation, and
not enough on whether there was a bona fide expectation of
profit.259 For it is quite conceivable that an activity with no
aspects of recreation or hobby could be carried on without a
profit motive.260 \Vhile there might be some question under the
presection 183 case law whether the expenses of such an activity
were deductible,261 there can be no question under new section
183 as to the limitation on deductibility of the expenses in such
circumstances.
The amount of time devoted to the enterprise, either by the
taxpayer personally or through employees, is unquestionably a
significant factor. Yet because of the possibility of personal interests which might be the source of extensive attention by the
taxpayer, courts sometimes evaluate it differently.2G2 As a commentator had earlier pointed out:
A taxpayer's devoting a considerable amount of time and energy to
the daily management of his venture, e.g., breeding race horses, may, in
fact, be more indicative of a hobby than the boarding of his horses on
a distant farm in the care of independent professional trainers. In the
latter case, the chances for success would be more or less the same
25610 T.C.M. 625 {1951).
257 20 T.C.M.. 1038 (1961).
258 Rex B. Foster, Jr., 32 T.C.M. No. 13 {1973); Jnmes S. Bishop, 31 T.C.M. 829
(1972); Alden B. Stnrr, 28 T.C.M. 167 (1969); Lilian Solomon, 26 T.C.M. 919 (1967).
259 See Sharpe, What the Taxpayer Shoulil Do to Hare t11o Courts Recognize His Farm
Business, 28 J. TAXATION 48, 51 (1968).
2eo See, e.g., Henry L. Sutherland, 27 T.C.M. 103 (1968).
261 See, e.g., Brydia v. Comm'r, 450 F.2d 954, 955 (3d Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion);
Cecil v. Comm'r, 100 F.2d 896, 899, 901 (4th Cir. 1939).
262 Compare W. Jane Luce, 29 T.C.!II. 894 {1970), tritl1 Joan F.W. Farris, 31 T.C.M.
821 (1972).
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irrespective of whether the taxpayer entertained a primary motive of
financial gain or was wholly indifferent to profit.263

In other respects as well, taxpayer effort can be a government
sword: One tribunal found it inconcE:'ivahle that a successful busi~
nessman could devote so much time to an activity and have so
little to show for it if he were engaged in it for profit. 264
Expectatio~ That Assets Used in Activity May
Appreciate in Value

The term "profit" encompasses appreciation in the value of assets,
such as land, used in the activity. Thus, the taxpayer may intend to
derive a profit from the operation of the activity, and may also intend
that, even if no profit from current operations is derived, an overall
profit will result when appreciation in the value of land used in the
activity is realized since income from the activity together with the
appreciation of land will exceed expenses of operation. See, however,
paragraph (d) of § 1.183-1 for definition of an activity in this con·
nection.265

Israel 0. Blake 266 appears to have been the first decision to dis~
cuss in any detail unrealized appreciation as a factor in profit
motivation. There the Board of Tax Appeals accepted the tax~
payer's contention that despite his long period of uninterrupted
farm losses the venture was not unprofitabl(', for ''he has a very
valuable collection of horses to show for his investment as well
as some real estate which has constantly increased in value during
the period of his holding.'' Blake was foreshadowed by .111arshall
Field 267 where the court found that the taxpayer's herd could
be sold at a profit over all losses and by Edwin S. George 268
where the taxpayer planted orchards to increase the value of his
property and because he thought that the proceeds from the
sale of fruit would help carry the land until it was sold. 11erbert
C. Sanderson 269 sets forth the theory of unrealized appreciation.
263 Sharpe, What the Taxpayer Should Do to Have the Courts Recognize His Farm as a
Business, 28 J. TAXATION 48, 51 (1968).
284 Donald A. McCormick, 28 T.C.M. 1337 (1969); accorcl, Marshall Fioltl, 26 B.T.A.
116, 125 (1932), aff'cl, 67 F.2<1 876 (2tl Cir. 1933) (dissenting opinion).
28S Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(4).
266 38 B.T.A. 1457 (1938). Sec Comment, Tlte Effect of Unrealized Appreciation ill De·
termining Profit Motive in Farming Enterprises, 16 KAN. L. REV. 529, 533 (1968).
267 26 B.T.A. 116, 124 (1932), aff'cl, 67 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1933),
268 Edwin S. George, 22 B.T.A. 189 (1931).
269 23 T.C.M. 1723 (1964) (footnote omittecl); accord, Lilian Solomon, 26 T.C.M. 91!1
(1967).
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Furthermore, all is not as black (or iu the red) with respect to this
venture as it may appear to be. The uncontradicted evidence indicates
that the value of the real estate acquired by petitioners for this venture
in 1957 has about tripled, and that the potential value of the horses
petitioner has on hand at the time of this trial was considerable. It
may well be that while petitioners have realized annual cash losses, they
may have unrealized appreciations in value which would at least equal
those realized losses. While profito; and losses must bt> computed on an
annual basis for tax purposes, this is not necessarily true in determining whether there was a bona fide profit motiYl' and a reasonable
expectation thereof in a busines.<; venture such as this.

Such increase in valu€>, accordingly, indieatcs the profit potential
present and bears on the tax1>ayer's professed intention to make
a profit.270
Furthermore, the factor of unrealized appreciation ltas b<>en
considered significant ev<>n wlwre it was not equal to the r<>alized
losses. For example, in Joan F.N. Fan-is,211 the value of the
herd in question at the tiltw of trial was $200,000; ltowe\·er, the
aggregate net losses in the y€'ars 1959 through 1970 were $412,326.
The court was nevertheless impressed with the factor of l.mrealized appreciation in this herd or inventory.
While in the agricultural context appreciation in land alone
may be sufficient, taxpayers usually rely upon appreciation in
both land and inventory, e.g., breeding herds or crops sueh as
tilnber. 272 And under section 162 courts have proven increasingly
willing to consider such unrealiz€'d apprPciation in dett•rmining
profitability.273 Outside this area, unrealized appreeiation ltas
seldom been available to taxpayers.274 Som<.' small success has,
however, been scor<'d by artists under the th<.'ory that successful
exhibits require large inventories of good paintings, and a lack
of sales attributable to creation of such an inYentory-:which
ilnplicitly contains unrealized appreciation-is no indication of
lack of bona fide profit €>Xpectation.275 Such contention is probably
limited to situations in which the art is salahlt• and the artist lms
an established reputation.276 As is the case with some of the other
5 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TA..,.ATION § 28.74 n.41.1.
31 T.C.M. 821, 824 (1972).
212 DuPont v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 681 (D. Del. 1964) ; George Thncllcr, 28
T.C.?II. 1433 (1969).
273 Sec Comment, The Effect of Unrealized .Azlprcciatiou in Dctcrmiuiuo Profit J!otit·o
in Farming Enterprises. 16 KAN. L. REV. li29, 538-39 (1968); RIDE~OUlt, Ft.nM A.'>D
RANCH LOSSES, BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 241-211, A-19, A-28 (1973).
274 See, e.g., Chaloner v. Helvcring, 69 F.2d 571, li72 (D.C. Cir. 193-1).
21s Sebastian de Grnzia, 21 T.C.M. 1572 (1962).
276 Louis H. Porter, 28 T.C.M. 1489, 1492 n.3 (1969), aff'd z1rr curiam, 431 F.2d 39
(2d Cir. 1971).
210
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factors, there has been a recent movement to apply this factor
as a sword. The principal example is Edward J. Drew 277 where
the court noted unfavorably that the taxpayer's horses did not
increase significantly in value as a result of the training received.
In summary, under prior law unrealized appreciation was becoming a significant factor in farm loss cases and seemed
destined in the current era of inflationary land values to become
even more so.278 Accordingly, prior to promulgation of the regulations one commentator on section 183 believed that this trend
would continue under that provision so "that a taxpayer might
obtain a deduction for losses incurred with respect to a farming
operation that would necessarily produce losses until ultimate sale
of the land at a gain.'' 279 The drafters of the regulation were
undoubtedly aware of this trend and commentary as well as the
potential it afforded for enjoying current ordinary losses with
future income being taxed as a capital gain. Consequently, while
the regulations explicitly acknowledge in the profit motivation
factors the effect of unrealized appreciation in farm land on
determining whether a farm activity is engaged in for profit,
they seek in the definition of the term "activity" to, in effect,
preclude reliance upon such appreciation in determining whether
a loss farm activity is engaged in for profit. As discussed above,
the regulations instead should have limited use of unrealized appreciation in noninventory assets to determining whether such
assets were held for the production of income.
Success of Taxpayer in Carrying on Other Similar or
Dissimilar Activities

The fact that the taxpayer has engaged in similar activities in the
past and converted them from unprofitable to profitable enterprises may
indicate that he is engaged in the present activity for profit, even
though the activity is presently unprofitable.2so

While the heading of this factor in the regulations refers to
success in both similar and dissimilar activities, the discussion
following it speaks only to conversion of similar activities from
T.C.M. 799 (1972).
Comment, Tltc Effect of Unrealized .tf.pprcciation in Dctermini11g Profit Motivo in a
Farming Enterprise, 16 KAN. L. REV. 529, 540 (1968); RIDENOUR, FARM AND RANOII
LOSSES, BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 241-2111 A-19 1 A-20 (1973),
270 DICKINSON, FARM AND RANCH LOSSES, BNA TA."C MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No, 241 1
A-23 (1970).
.
280 Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (5).
21131
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unprofitable to profitable status. The actual cases, on the other
hand, have considered experience in both types of activities, but
the aspect of conversion to profitable status lms played no discernible role. Farm loss decisions resting in part on tlte taxpayer's previous operation of other similar activities, without
indicating whether such activities were profitable, are illustrative.281 Even where the decisions expressly relied upon tlte fact
that prior farming activities were profitable, they have not considered whether they were initially unprofitable.282 Similarly, several fine arts decisions have }Jointed out tlmt tlte ta.xpayer's
prior financial success in his creative endeavors gave ltim grounds
for belief that he could again bl' successful in the field, but ltave
not discussed whether such prior success was preceded by a period
of losses.283
Courts have gone beyond the mere fact tlmt tlte ta.'\.-payer enjoyed success in other activitil's, similar or dissimilar. They have
considered whether similar risks and profit potential were involved and have compared the manner in which the activities were
conducted. For instance, the district court in Helis v. Usry,zs,c
stated that where tlte principal business of the taxpayer involves
high risk and a large investment, with a commensurate promise
of great profit, it is normal to expect ltim to engage in other
businesses with similar risks and prospects of profit.
In comparing the manner in which the ta.xpayer conducted a
profitable and a losing activity, courts have considered tlte type
and character of the records maintained in the two undertakings.285
Where the records in the qul'stioned activity are ltaphazard in
comparison with the records maintained in clearly profit motivated and successful activities, tlw conclusion is ahnost inescapable that the purpose in carrying on the former is other than
281 Walter P. Temple, 10 B.T.A. 1238 (1928); Hamilton F. Kean, 10 B.T.A. 97 (1928);
John S. Ellsworth, 21 T.C.!Ir. 145 (1962).
2s2 Jean A. Lowenthal, 27 T.C.!Ir. 387 (19GB); Eugene J. Dnvis, 2:.i T.C.l\L GIG (1966);
William L. Brueck, Sr., 23 T.C.M. 1228 (1964).
2sa Rood v. United Stntes, 184 F. Supp. 791 (D. :Minn. 1960) ; Thelma C. Whitman, 1!1
T.C.!Ir. 456 (1960); Cornelius Vnmlerbilt, Jr., 1G T.C.M. 1081 (1957).
284 71-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 9365 (E.D. La. 1971), rctlll 011 ot11er orou11cls, 464 F.2d 330 (5th
Cir. 1972) ; accorc1, Farish v. C{)nuu'r, 103 ~'.2<1 63, G5 (5tlt Cir. 1939) ("But we think
tile Board was psycllologically wrong in roncludiug tltnt tltc Fnrishe.s, as men of sound
business judgement, would not lta\"C engage<! in tlte ventures with uny expectntion of
profit. Botll arc actively cngagetl in the oil business. It is conuuon for n mnn in tlte oil
business, of sound jmlgement, to expentl tltousautls of dollars iu exploring tho land and
drilling for oil in 'wild eat' territory.'') ·
2ss Gross v. United States, 71-2 U.S.T.C. ~ 97Hi (N.D. Fin. 1971); Arthur H. Eppler,
58 T.C. 691 (1972).
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the purpose with respect to the latter. 286 Juries have also been
permitted to compare thE' sizE.' and charadN' of profitabl<' activities
and questioned activities as wt>ll as the time spt>nt on both,287
but the significance and scope of such comparisons is unclPar.
In addition to the negati,·e application of this factor to tlw
specific fact of haphazard records in a loss activity in contrast
to adequate records in succPssful activities, courts haw recently
begun to draw similar negatiw comparisons as to opN·ations in
general. In Donald A. i.licCormick 288 the court Plllphasized that tlw
taxpayer was an experienced and successful husint>ssman so that
his boat chartering actiYitiPs could not be justifit>d or Pxplainod
on the basis of lack of business expPriencP or naivett>-tht> activity
was not pursued in the systematic and Pnergetic uwthod that tlw
court would expect of such a pPrson.
Taxpayer's History of Income or Losses With Respect
to the Activity
A series of losses during the initial or start-up stage of an activity
may not necessarily be an indieation that the activity is not engaged
in for profit. However, where losses continue to bE.' sn~:~tained beyond
the period which customarily is necessary to bring thE.' operation to
profitable status such continued losses, if not explainablE.', u~:~ due to
customary business risks or reverses, mar be indicative that the activity
is not being engaged in for profit. If lossE.'s are sustained because of
unforesl'en or fortuitous circumstancl's wllich are be~·ond the control
of the taxpayer, such as drought, disease, fire, theft, weather dnmugt's,
other involuntary conversions, or depressed market eonditions, such
losses would not be an indication that the activity is not engugt'd in
for profit. A series of years in which net income wus realized would
of course be strong evidence that the activity is engaged in for profit. 2B0

In essencP, tlw genPral rulP that contimwd loss(>S may indicate
that an artivity is not PngagPd in for profits forms tlw keystone
of this factor, hut in tlw sa11w breath the provision l'<'cogniZ('S two
exceptions: (1) lossPs inrmTPd in tlw initial or start-up stago
of an actiYit~· and (2) losses ~:mstainPd hy unfort>set•n or fortuitous
circumstances.
Contimted Lm:::ws. 'l'lw case law ('arly estahlislwd that a <•on tinning lack of profih; constituted an important fa<'tor !waring on
2sa Anthony Imbesi, 23 T.C.l\I. 1678 (1964), 1·ev'ri uu other uruumls, 361 F.2d 640 (3<1
Cir. 1966).
2s; Hieks v. United St:1tes, 72-1 lT.S.T.C'. ~ 9383 (S.D. l\Iiss. 1972); Gross v. Unltt•d
States, 71-2 U.S.T.C. fJ 971.> (N.D. l<'ln. 1971).
2ss 28 T.C.l\r. 1337 (1969); aceord, \V, J:me Luel', 2!l T.C.l\[. 894 (1970).
2so Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(6).
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the taxpayer's true intention.290 The rationale is that an ordinary
businessman will abandon an undertaking if he <•ncount(lrs losses
after the period customary to bring it to a profitable statc.291
Frequently linked with the continUl•d loss factor ar(l losses which
·were disproportionate to receipts. 292 IndN•d, tlw corr<•sponding
factor in the proposed regulations contaim•d the following statement: "l\foreoYer, a high ratio of expenditun•s to recc.>ipts may
also be indicative of a laek of profit intPnt. A dc.>clining lo~s ratio
may, however, suggest that profitability is immin(lnt.'' 293 "1tilc.>
ample authority is available for both statements, 213 ~ the di~pro
portionate loss factor has lwPn largl'ly eount<•rhalancPd-at lc.>ast
in the agricultural context, which is both tlw motlwr lodt• from
which these factors wpre mined and tlw principal activity to which
they appear directed-or EWPn nullified by tltP start-up stage
concept.295
l\foreoYer, a completE• ahsPnee of gross rPc<•ipts is more important than continuPd lossPs. 296 One cmmtwntator surv<•ying tho
section 162 authoritiPs concluded that tlw great majority of courts
haYe abandoned primary reliancP on tlw eX})(lnclitur<•s-to-r<•c(lipts
ratio or tlw duration of the loss and now look to tlw ultimat<•
profitability of the PntPrprise, "on thP a!-isumption that !-iev<'ral
loss years must nPcPssarily accompany tlw building of a profitable
operation." 297 Ind<>ed, in summarizing the Hous<• propo~al~ in
the Tax Reform Act of 1969, tlw staff of tlw ,Joint CouunittN•
pointed out that an ohj<>ction to the Homw hohhy loss prm·ision,
·which contain<>d a JH"Psumption that an acti\·ity was not earri<•d
on with a reasonahl<• expPC.·tation of profit-tlw standard of
2oo Il!orton v. Comm'r, 174 F.211 302, 304 (211 Cir.}, c-crt. tlellictl, 338 U.R 828 (1949).
C-ecil v .. Commissioner, 100 F.211 896 (4th Cir. 193!1), wouhl ha\·c mn!le this nu illllC}It:Julent

test.
201 Proebstle v. Unitecl States, l!l6:i-2 U.S.T.C. ~ !14!17 (S.D. Tt>x. 1!lw). See fiCIICYally
Sharpe, What The Ta:qmyCI' Should Do to Jlat·c tilt· Courlt> ltcrtlfllli::C llis Farm as a
Business, 28 J . TAX..\TIOX 48 (l!l6S); Nott>, A11aly.~i.~ nf Sew Cotlc Sec-tion 183 aml Smuc
lla111ijications Fm· tltr Rr.wll't Hmur, 9 WILLAMETIE L.J. 117, 121 11.13 (19i3).
292 Schley v .. Comm'r, 37:> .P.2tl 747 (2<1 Cir. 19Gi); Artl1ur E. Eppler, :i3 T.C. li91
(1972).
203Prop .. Reg.§ 1.183-2(b)(1), 36 Fed. H~. 16112 (Aug. 1!1, 19il).
20-1 Disproportionate loss: Alfred !II. Cox, 2-l T.C.!If. 23, (1!1G:i), aff'tl llf'r c-urium, 3:.i4
F.2d 659 (3ll Cir.. 1966) .. Dcdining loss mtio: Ilt>nry Poltl.'r Russell, 193S B.T.A.ll.
~ 38,094. Sec genaally DICKIXSO!\, FARM .\!\D n.\:\('11 LOSSES, BNA TAX llA!':AG&ME:;'i'
PORTFOLIO No.. 241, A-28 (1970).
295 Sec, e..g., C-enae \'.. Unitecl Rt:1tes, 67-2 U.S.T.C. U 9:i7G (E.D. Ln. l!IGG); .Jmues S.
Bishop, 32 T.C..M. 829 (1972); Walter E. Eclge, Jr., 32 T.e.lt. 12!11 (l!li3}.
2oG Oliver B .. Kilroy, 32 T.C.ll. Xo .. 7 :at 30 (1!173).
297 DICKIXSOX, .PAR!-1 AXD RAXCil LOSSEl>, BX.\ TAX !lfA.'\.MlEME.'\T PO!l'UOLIO No. 241,
A-28 (1970).
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deductibility-if its losses were greater than $25,000 in three out
of five years, was that the bill failed "to recognize that farming
generally is a risky operation and that substantial losses are
frequently incurred in early years.'' 298
Historically, the courts were early to realize that although the
- relation of receipts to expenditures might give rise to a negative
inference in determining the taxpayer's intent, such inference
could be overcome by other factors, such as personal attention
and business-like operations. 299 Moreover, some early cases questioned whether continued losses (in one instance where average
losses were twice the amount of gross receipts) gave rise to an
inference that an activity was not undertaken for profit.300 In any
event, the courts began to adopt, almost as a counterweight to
the above rubric of continued, disproportionate losses, the catch
phrase that the mere fact that the taxpayer sustains losses from
year to year does not prove that an activity was not operated as
a business venture.301 The careful balancing of these rules perhaps reached its apex in the oft-cited Tax Court decision in Margit
Sigray Bessenyey:
[A] record o£ continued losses over a series o£ years or the unlikelihood o:f achieving a profitable operation may be an important factor
bearing on the taxpayer's true intention. . . . On the other hand, the
presence of losses in the formative years of a business, particularly one
involving the breeding of horses, is not inconsistent with an intention
to achieve a later profitable level of. operation, bearing in mind, however, that the goal must be to realize a profit on the entire operation,
which presupposes not only future net earnings but also sufficient net
earnings to recoup the losses which have meanwhile been sustained in
the intervening years. aoz

As the dominant trend in the farm loss cases manifests, the
initial or start-up stage exception has, however, virtually swallowed the continued loss rule.
Start-Up Losses. From the earliest hobby loss opinions to the
present, courts have been quite receptive to taxpayer contentions
298 STAFFS OF THE JOINT COI>U!lTTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATtON AND 'l'IIE COM•
MITTEE ON FINANCE, SUMMARY OF H. R. 132701 THE TAX REFORM AfYr OF 1969 (.AB
PASSED BY 'l'HE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES), 91ST CON0.1 1ST SESS, 43 (Comm. Print
1969).
299 Thomas F. Sheridan, 4 B.T.A. 1299, 1301 (1926).
3oo Rose P. Crane, 9 B.T.A. 437, 441 (1927); cf. Israel 0. Blake, 38 B.T.A. 14571 1460
(1938).
301 Hamilton F. Kean, 10 B.T.A. 97, 102 (1928).
302 45 T.C. 261, 274 (1965), (footnote omitted), 379 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.) 1 cert. denied,
389
931 (1967).
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that losses incurred in the initial stages of a farm operation were
not inconsistent with a profit motive. The cases rapidly progressed
from the simple justification that heavy initial e::-..'J)enses caused
the lack of profits to the more sophisticated rationale that the
taxpayer ''had to build up his business and the reputation of his
farm for producing desirable horses before a failure to realize
profits could be taken as a reasonably clear indication of failure,''
in the face of which latter failure a bona fide profit motive would
disappear if the venture were continued thereafter.303 Equally persuasive was the claim that the ta.xpayer l1ad not been engaged in
his breeding activities long enough to build up a herd of sufficient
stock from which to realize sales profits.304 Indeed, many authorities categorically state that it takes from five to ten years or
even longer to develop a profitable lh·estock herd.30s In Alden B.
8tarr,306 the government even acknowledged on brief to the Tax
Court that the taxpayers could not l1ave e::-..'J)ected to realize a
profit until they had horses of breeding age. The Commissioner
further acknowledged there that additional losses may be incurred
even after that event because it takes time to establish a reputation for breeding and raising quality horses. The Starr court
concluded that there was no doubt that during the tax years, the
fifth and sixth years of operations, the venture was still in its
"formative stage, during ·which losses incurred are not inconsistent with a declared intention to make a profit.''
One commentator, based upon information supplied by a state
extension service county farm agent, has succinctly set forth the
farm economics that dictate losses in the initial stage of a livestock breeding operation.
It usually takes a minimum of five years to begin the development of

any cattle breed, and probably longer to become profitable. A fnrmer
who wants to develop a herd will buy heifers at weaning age (above
seven months). He must then wait two years to breed them and it will
be nine months later before calves are born. Thus, for two years and
nine months there will be no income, but expenses ·will be continuous. When the first calves are born, approximately fifty percent will
303Lueien B:. Tyng, 36 B.T.A. 21, 35 (1937), rcv'd on other grounds, lOG F.!!d 55 (2d
Cir. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 308 U.S. 527 {1940); accord, Irving 0. Achennnn, 24
B.T.A. 512, 516 (1931), aff'd, 71 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1934).
30~ Henry Potter Russell, 1938 B.T.A.M. 11 38,094: at 163 {1938).
3os Farish v. Comm'r, 103 F.2d 63, 64 {5th Cir. 1939); DuPont v. United States, 234
F. Supp. 681, 686 (D. Del. 1964); Joan F.W. Farris, 31 T.C.M. S!ll (1972); Morris A.
Stoltzfus, 29 T.C.'M. 1610 (1970); Lilian Solomon, ::!6 T.O.M. 919 {1967); John S.
Ellsworth, 21 T.C.'M. 14:5 (1962).
3os 28 T.C.M. 167, 173 (1969).

424

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:

be heifers. Because the farmer is developing a breeding herd, he will
keep as many of these heifers as possible; in most instances, retaining
eighty percent of the heifers is not unusual. The farmer may also
keep the better bull ealves in some cases. Thus, less than sixty percent
of the calf crop will be sold, which will mmally result in a net loss
for the year. Following this procedure for another generation means
it will be another three years before a whole crop of calves from thl'
owner's hl'rd ean be sold. This is the earliest a breeder may begin to
profit. However, it will probably take longer to devl'lop a fine breeding
herd, which requires more experimentation. since the traits the breedl'l·
wants in his herd may not appear for several generations. 'fhis is
probably why it was stated in DuPont that it takes twenty-five years
to develop Santa Gertrudis cattle.307

Substantially similar facts have been found by the courts, and
used to support the conclusion that a developmental period during
which ex1Jenses would inevitably exceed income was necessary in
the venture. 308 The two out of seven years test for determining
whether the section 183( d) profit motive presumption applies to a
horse breeding opPration, addt>d by a Senate floor amendment, may
well have been prompted by the large numbPr of horse breeding
authorities indicating that a profit was not possible in the first
five years of a horse hrPeding activity.
A taxpayer may extPnd the normal start-tip l>Priod by gradual
entry into the activity, as by brePding a herd up to minimum
profitable number rather than initially purchasing that number. 309
More significant are thosP authoritiPs indicating that a taxpayer
by abandoning unprofitahl<> teelmicfUPS or specific activiti(>S may
have availahlP a seriPs of start-up 1wriods in which losses arC~
not sit,rnificant. 310 Similarly, the factor of unforeseen circumstanct~f;
may exh•nd tlw start-up stagP: DuPont v. United States 311 noh~d
that the disJwrsal of a breeding lwrd occasioned by dis(lase prolonged tlw initial stag<> of the venture.
Dewlopnwnt of a IivPstock ht>rd is not tlw only acc<•ptahle explanation for an initial period of loss<•s. For exampl<', where
consistent net losses an• attrihutablP to tlw r<•pair and buildup
of a badly rundown husint>ss facility, a nonprofit motiw cloPs not
necessarily follow from su('h lossPs. 312 Thus, farm loss nuthoriti<•s
Comment, The Effcc·t of U11rcalizet1 Appl·cciatioll iu Drtcrmi11i11g Ptofit .llotivr ill
E11tcrprisr.~, 16 KAN. L. REV. i)29, 538-39 (1!J68) (footnote cnnittctl).
3osSee, e.g., Lilinn Solomon, 26 T.C.M. 91!J (1967); JohnS. Ellsworth, 21 T.C.M. 14li
(l!J62).
30!> Joan l!'.W. Farris, 31 T.C.M. 821, 82:i {1972).
31o Rex B. Foster, 32 T.C.M. No. 13 (1973); Howl.' B. ~[t•h·:alf, 22 'f.C.l\1. 1·102 (1063),
an234 }'. Supp. 681 (D. Del. 1964).
a12 Hieks v. United St:atl.'s, 72-1 P.H.'f.C'. f, !J383 (S.D. nliss. l!J72); Cavcutlel' v. Uuitctl
307
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have strongly emphasized soil reclamation activities in determining profit motive.313 On the other hand, in acti\·ities other than
farming, taxpayers have found it more difficult to show acct•ptable
explanations for initial lossE:'s. Indeed, the Ta.x: Court in one farm
loss decision distinguished one of the lE:'ading nonfarm authorities
that lmd emphasized a long history of disprovortionate losses, on
the basis that no explanation was givt•n there for tht• initial period
of losses, whereas, in the case before it, tlu.• losst>s were incurred
during "a necessary dt>velopmental period of st•\·l•ral yl•ars during ·which expE:'nses would ine\"itably exceed income." 314 Consequently, it may be significant that in Artlnw H. Eppler,311:. wltc:>re
the Tax Court recently lwld that a long rt>eord of ]wavy expenditures without any real effort to curtail them or any offsetting
revenues indicated the actiYity was not conductc:>d for profit,
it noted that eats being raised (as many as 450) were not for sale,
did not produce any marketable product and ''they could not be
established as a breed."
Sebastian de Gmzia 316 stands as ont> of the ft•w examples of
successful use of the initial stage conc!:'pt outside tlu.• farm loss
area. The Tax Court rE:'cognized that profits may not h(:> immediately forthcoming in tlw fine arts. "Examples are legion of the
increase in Yalue of a paintE:'r's works aftN· he> recc>h·es public
acclaim. :Many artists havP to struggle in th!:'ir early years. This
does not mean that SE:'rious artists do not inh•nd to profit from
their activities. It only mPans that their lot is a difficult one." 317
More frequently, howevPr, the nonagricultural eases ltave turned
on a continued history of loss disproportionate to gross receipts.3111
If the Service attempts to extend section 183 to ownership of
nonowner occupied rental rE:'sidential real estate, the start-up
period concept may yet flower outside the farm loss area since a
profit from operations is !J-Ot possible prior to the turnarmmd.
States, 71-2 U.S.T.C. 1[ 9723 (S.D. W. Va. 1970); W. CL-lrk Wise, 113 T.C.M. 361 (19;j7),
aff'd per curiam, 2130 F.2cl 354 (13th Cir. 1958).
313 Mary Ellis Turner, 23 T.C.M. 11813 (1964); George M. Zengler, 17 T.c.~r. 454
(1958); cf. Lazonby , •. Tomlinson, 272 F. Supp. li58 (N.D. Fla. 1967); Norton L. Smith,
9 T.C. 1150 (1947).
3H Compare .Tolin S. Ellsworth, 21 T.C.M. 1-lli (1962), with White v. Commissioner, 227
F.2d 779 (6th Cir. l!lii:i), cert. deniccl, 3ii1 U.S. 939 (19liG).
315 58 T.C. 691, 698 (1972).
316 21 T.C.M. 1572 (1962).
317 Id. at 1577.
318 See, e.g., Porter v. C{)llllll'r, 437 F.2cl 39 (2d Cir. 1970) ; L:unont ,.. ('ouuu'r, 339
F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1964); White v. ('{)mm'r, 227 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. !9;j:i), tcrt. clelliecl,
351 u.s. 939 (1956).
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At least one decision has sought to make the start-up stage
subject to the disproportionate loss principle. In Robert Y.H.
Thomas 319 the Tax Court acknowledged that the early years of
a breeding enterprise may well show losses and it takes five to
seven years before such an operation can be expected to make a
profit, but it found no convincing evidence that the farm was
headed for profitable operations in that period. The court thought
it significant that losses were wholly disproportionate to receipts
and the small receipts were not attributablE' to br{•eding operations.
On the other hand, most other Tax Court decisions have recognized
that during the formative stages revenues from sale of livestock
are insubstantial, since sales of foundation stock prior to establishment of the herd would jeopardize or even sacrifice the goal
of the entire undertaking.320 Hence, losses are frequently disproportionate. Perhaps, therefore, it should not be surprising that
a district court found the taxpayer in Thomas had engaged in his
breeding operations for profit in the tax year immediately prior
to the years before the Tax Court.321
The Treasury, too, has sought to play down the importance of
the start-up stage. Apparently the drafters of the regulations
subtly intended to place more weight on the casualty exception
than on the initial stage exception in the general continued loss
principle. For they provided that losses sustained because of unforeseen or fortuitous circumstances would not be an indication
that the activity is not engaged in for profit, whereas, a series of
losses during the initial or start-up stage may not necessarily be
an indication the activity is not engaged in for profit. The reported
cases, to the contrary, emphasize the start-up stage exception over
that of unforeseen circumstances. As one commentator has stated:
[T]he most convincing evidence for the taxpayer in a case involving
a long loss period is customary to the industry in the process of building
a profitable enterprise. For instance, the taxpayer may be able to show
that building a breeding herd through the natural increase method
ordinarily requires seven to ten loss years, depending on the initial
herd size. However, the duration of the loss experience will often prove
decisive in indicating lack of profit intent if the losses continue to be
31D21 T.C.M. 382 (1962), vacated and remanded, 324 F.2d 798 (5th Clr. 1063).
a2oJohn E. Ellsworth, 21 T.C.M. 145 (1962); see Lucien H. Tyng1 36 B.T.A. 21 (1937) 1
rev'd on otlzer grounds, 106 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1939, reV'd on oilier oroun£1s, 308 U.S. u27
(1940); Rowe B. Metcalf, 22 T.C.M. 1402 (1963).
a21 Robert Y.H. Thomas v. United States, 62-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 9274 (S.D. Fln. 1962). In·
deed, the Fifth Circuit remanded the Tax Court decision be(':tuse it had seemingly glvon
no weight to this fact.
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sustained after the period that would ordinarily be necessary to bring
the operation to a profitable status.a22

Unforeseen or Fortuitous Circumstances. This exception to the
significance of continued losses, unlike the start-up stage exception, appears almost exclusively in the farm or kennel loss cases,
where it has been termed one of the most helpful factors in
establishing profit intent despite substantial losses.323 The recent
Tax Court decision in Thomas W. J ackso1z, 324-resting in part
on the conclusion that the vicissitudes of sea and weather conditions prevented profitability in the activity of chartering a yachtconstitutes a significant example outside that area.
In addition to the illustrations of fortuitous circumstances in
the nature of involuntary conversions provided for in the regulations, the cases also supply such examples as sterility in breeding livestock and injuries to livestock, particularly horses.3 ~ The
regulations speak 6f circumstances beyond the ta.'\:payer's control.
This may well .be a reflection of the argument presented by the
Joint Committee against the House proposal that the provision
"will result in farmers who experience losses (e.g., because of
crop failures) being harassed by revenue agents seeh."ing to apply
this provision." 326 While disease, weather, et cetera, fit this involuntary category and the authorities also demonstrate like situations such as forced dispersal of a herd at a loss because of
incapacity of a key employee,327 many decisions also have accepted
various adverse circumstances as causing the continued losses,
rather than a lack of profit motive, wltich are attributable to
322 DICKINSON, FARM AND RANCH LoSSES, BNA TAX ?l!ANAOE~E!~T PO:lTFOLlO No. 241,
A-29 (1970) (footnote omitted).
323 Id. at A-30.
324 59 T.C. 3121 317 (1972), acq., 1973-21 I.R.B. 5.
325 Patterson v. United States, 459 F.2d 487 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Wonell v. United Stnt€!3,
254 F. Supp. 992 (S.D. Tex. 1966) ; Wright v. United Stutes, 249 F. Supp. GOB (D. Nov.
1965); Hamilton F. Kean, 10 B.T.A. 97 (1928). A list of such factors is contained in
RIDENOUR, FARM AND RANCH LossEs, BNA TAX MANME~E!~T Po:rrroLtO No. 241-2d
A-24 (1973).
326 STAFFS OF THE JOINT CoMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TA.XATION Ah'D TIIE COll•
MITTEE ON FINANCE, SUMMARY OF H.R. 13270, THE TAX REF03M Ar:r OF l1JG9 (AS
PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES), 91ST C0:\'0., 1ST SESS. 43 (Comm. Print
1969). Section 270's treatment of "specially treated <le<luctions" wns baaed on n policy
decision "to remove from the potential application of tile 'bobby loss• provision tho~e
deductible items whll'!b might occur by reason of C\'ents beyond Ute tnxpayer's control or
whll'!b might occur in an uunsunlly risky business.'' Comment, Section 183, Wor1; Horse or
Hobby Loss, 20 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 716, 720 (1971).
327 Theron D. Stay, 17 T.C.M. 861 (1958).
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taxpayer's actions, thus, are arguably within his control.328 In
short, to date the courts by and large have not distinguished
between fortuitous circumstances on the basis of whether they
were within the taxpayer's control as the regulations do. But to
the extent that cases begin to accept such a distinction, Robert
E. Ourrie 329 may prove prophetic in treating injury to livestock,
universally a favorable factor in other cases, as showing, in
effect, a lack of profit motive origin for losses, i.e., a negative
factor. Currie included in factors indicating a lack of profit motive:
"what seems to us· to be petitioner's failure to exercise sufficient
care to protect the first foal which was dead at birth, as well as
the second foal which was killed by petitioner's rottweilN'S and
the second mare whirh was killed by an automobile." 330 Under
this approach, some fortuitous circumstances accPpted in the past
by courts as explaining continued losses might, on second lool\,
have been dlw to lark of taxpayer advance. planning or attention,
which other factors in the regulations and recent cases apply
as negative factors.
In summary, the Treasury's formulation of this factor fairly
restates the current case law. Unfortunately, revenue agents in
applying it will undoubtedly focus on the continued losses with
scant regard for the start-up stage and the unforseen circumstances exceptions. The courts may be expected to rely heavily on
these exc<:>ptions, particularly in the farm loss area. Although
the formative p<:>riod concept has appeared determinative in
many recent decisions, the proper perspective is that results are
secondary to objectiv<:> steps taken to achieve profit in ascertaining
motivation for an activity. 331 It is only because the government
has overemphasized results, i.e., losses, that the accepted explanations not inconsistent with profit motivation have played such a
predominant role in the cases.
Amount of Occasional Profits, If Any, Which
Are Earned

The amount of profits in relation to the amount of losses incurred, and
in relation to the amount of the taxpayer's investment and the value
of the assets used in the activity, may provide useful criteria in detertrtin328 Woodrow L. Wroblewski, 32 T.C.1\f. No. 37 (1973); Jenn A. Lowcnthnl, 27 T.O.M.
387 (1968); Harvey S. Farrow, 16 T.C.M. 836 (1957).
329 28 T.C.M. 12 (1969).
a3o Id. at 21.
331 Harold I. Snyder, 25 T.C.}f. 1326 (1966).

... . .
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ing the taxpayer's intent. An occasional small profit from an activity
generating large losses, or from an activity in which the taxpayer has
made a large investment, would not generally be determinative that
the activity is engaged in for profit. However, substantial profit, though
only occasional, would generally be indicative that an activity is engaged
in for profit, where the investment or losses are comparatively small.
:Moreover, an opportunity to earn a substantial ultimate profit in a
highly speculative venture is ordinarily sufficient to indicate that the
activity is engaged in for profit even though losses or only occasional small
profits are actually generated.332

The negative application of this factor is eov<.•n•d by the sixth
factor of history of income or losses. The first question is the
weight to be accorded actual profits. The Treasury has drawn a
distinction between small and substantial, occasional profits in
answering it-only substantial, oceasional profits are generally
indicative that the acti\'ity is Pngaged in for profit. This distinction is not supported by thr majority of casrs. For most authorities in which a net profit was earned prior, or occasionally subsequent, to the ta.x: year hav<' merely favorably noted that there
was such a profit without indicating its size,333 or at most ]mve
stated the taxpayer was previously quite succl•ssful in the activity or earned at lE>ast E>nough to support llis family. 334 :Moreover, in many decisions in which exist<•nce of a prior profit
impressed the court, that profit was clearly small, particularly
in relationship to the amount of losses incurred and the investments.335 Indeed, in N onmm C. Demler the Ta.x: Court recognized,
but appE>ars to hav<.> d<.>precated, the fact that the loss was small:
''It is noteworthy that in fiscal 1965 the Corporation realized a
profit-albeit small-from a fourth-place finish." 33 u There are,
however, a few eXC(>ptions to this trend. For example, a recent
decision . concluded that where a small profit is n•alized only
after audit l1as co1mnenc<>d and arises from a sharp reduction in
claimed deductions, it is entitled to little weight.337 This conclusion may l>ortend the likelihood of the Commissioner overReg. § 1.183-2(b)(7).
Brooks v. Conuu'r, 274 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1959); Rood \", United States, 184 F. Supp.
791 (D. Minn. 1960); James Clark, 24 B.T.A. 123:> (1931).
334 Thelma C. Whitman, 19 T.C.'M. 4.'16 (1960) (quite successful); Cornelius Vanderbilt,
Jr., 16 T.C.M. 1081 (1957) (support family).
33a Dean Babbitt, 23 T.C. 850 (1955); Marshall Field, 26 B.T.A. llG (19321 afl'd, 67
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1933).
336 25 T.C.M. 620, 626 (1966).
337 Leonard F. BarC'us, 32 T.C.M. No. 138 (1973), aff'd 11cr curiam, 7-l-1 U.S.T.C. U fl28S
(2d Cir. 1974); see R.C. Coffey, 1 T.C. 579, 589-90 (1943) 1 af/'tl, 141 F.2tl 204 (5th Cir.
1944); Lamont v. C{)mm'r, 339 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1964).
332

333
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coming the section 183 (d) or (e) presumption where the two
profit years are achieved after audit and by juggling deductions
or income.
In addition to actual profit, this factor of the regulations con~
siders the possibility of future profit-again with emphasis on
a substantial profit. The regulation states that the possibility of
earning a substantial profit in a highly speculative venture
ordinarily suffices to show a profit motive, although losses or only
occasional small profits are actually generated. The liberal pro~
viso is actually dictated by legislative history mandating that the
focus be on whether the activity was engaged in for profit, rather
than whether the expectation of a profit was reasonable. For the
Senate Committee on Finance illustrated this focus with the ex~
amples of a bona fide inventor and the investor in a wildcat
oilwell, to whom section 183 was to apply, although it might be
argued that neither had a reasonable expectation of profit. 338
The committee also described these two situations as activities
in which ''there was a small chance of a large profit.''
The regulations touch on the subject of a large, speculative
profit in three places: (1) in this factor, (2) in tl1e introduction
to the definition of an activity not engaged in for profit ("it
may be sufficient that there is a small chance of making a large
profit," illustrated by an investor in a wildcat oilwell) and (3)
in two of the examples accompanying the nine factors, involving
an independent oil and gas operator and driller and a research
chemist.339
Activities in which there is a small chance of a spectacular
profit are not limited to oil investments and inventing. Indeed,
livestock breeding has been explicitly compared to wildcat oil
drilling.34° Furthermore, racing horses or automobiles are out~
standing examples of such an activity. 341 Apparently, however,
when the chance for a profit moves from speculative to a pure
gamble, the profit motive test is not met.342 In addition, some non~
S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 103-04 (1969).
Reg. § 1.183-2(a) and 1.183-2(c) Exs. 5 and 6.
340 Helis v. Usry, 71-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 9365 (E.D. La. 1971), rev'd on other grounc1s, 464
F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972).
341 Comm'r v. Widener, 33 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1929); Norman C. Demler, 25 T.O.M. 620
(1966).
342 See Mitchell v. United States, 70-1 U.S.T.C. U 9129 (W.D. Tenn. 1969) (nppcnrs to
rely on reasonable expectation of profit requirement); James T. Shiosnki, 30 'l'.C.M. 110
(1971), aff'd, 475 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1973). It is possible that Slliosaki coul<l hnvo roached
the same result (disallowance of losses from gambling at craps) under tho theory that
section 165 (d) was intended to restrict the deductibility of wagering trausnction losses nud
338
33D
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agricultural loss authorities indicate that the cltance for a spectacular profit must haYe some foundation in fact, but this comes
close to a reasonable ex11ectation of profit requirement.343
Earlier authorities which had ado}Jh•d the good faith intention
test, just as does section 183, ratlwr than the reasonableness of the
taxpayer's belief that a profit will bt> realized, of course, were
nevertheless favorably impressed by a rt>asonable expectation of
profit.344 Consequently, this factor should also coYer a reasonable
chance of a more moderate profit. Yt>t r('V('nut> agents in application of this factor may be t>xpccted to h•nd to disregard cltances
for a moderate profit and actual small profits-contrary to case
law. Furthermore, they may h•nd to apply it as a negativt> factor
where no profit is present, despite tlw fact that tht> sLxth factor
covers this aspect and carefully st>ts out the exc('ptions to continued losses as a negatiw factor. For th£>s£> reasons the seventh
factor, as presently worded, would haw hN•n better omitted, leaving the small chance of a large profit aspPct to the introduction
and the accompanying examples. HopPfully courts \\ill quickly
place this factor in its prop(>r bed of prior case law in order to
retard these tendencies.
Financial Status of the Taxpayer

The fact that the taxpayer does not have substantial income or capital
from sources other than the activity may indicate that an activity is
engaged in for profit. Substantial income from sources other than the
activity (particularly if the losses from the activity generate substantial
tax benefits) may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit
especially if there are personal or recreational elements involved.34 G

111odest Income. The thrust of the first prong of this factor is
that a lack of substantial income or capital from sources other
than the activity favors the taX}Jayer's case. Indeed, the fourth
example accompanying these regulations, which invoh•es a marattendant expenses to the amount of wagering income. Sec GILJU!J, LossES-T11Ei'l'1
WAGERING, WAR, AND CQNFISCATION, BNA TA.x :MANMEm:~T PORTFOLio No. ~781 A-21
(1973).
343 Charles A. Nemish, 29 T.C.?II. 1249 (1970), aff'tl per curiam, 452 F.:'!d 611 (9th Cir.
1972). The taxpayer's glowing tenus of the profit potential of his nowls-"if and when
I :finally sell this first novel, then I know that sooner or Inter I am going to nmkc a !tilling
-it will be tremendous, these days a novel will go for hardly less than one hundred
thousand dollars"-did not indicate to the Ta.x Court n bona fide profit motive.
344 Worrell v. United States, 2.'>4 F. Supp. 992 (S.D. Tex. 1965); Joan F.W. Farris,
31 T.C.M. 821 (1972).
345 Reg. § 1.183-2 (b) (8).
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ginal farm operated by a taxpayer employed full-time as a
skilled machine operator in a nearby factory at an annual wago
of $8,500 per year, concludes that he may be engaged in the activity
for profit. This example appears to be the fleshing out of one of
the Senate Committee on Finance's mustrations of an activity
engaged in for profit, although arguably not carried on with a
reasonable expectation of profit: ''a poor person engaged in
what appears to be an inefficient farming Operation." 346 rf}1p
cases, too, have been favorably disposed towards taxpayers of
modest means, reasoning that the taxpayer could not afford to
indulge in an extravagant or full-time hobby. 347 Use of savings or
earnings of other family members is also indicative of a profit
motive.348 ·while these cases frequently contrast the taxpayer's
situation with that of ''a high bracket taxpayer seeking to have
the Federal fisc subsidize his hobby" or a wealthy man indulg~
ing his hobby/ 49 the decisions a~tually involving such high bracket
taxpayers by and large do not find independent wealth a very
significant factor.
S1.tbstantial Income. In the second prong of this factor, the
Service attempts to apply the reverse of the modest income factor.
The regulation asserts that substantial outside income, particn~
larly if coupled with substantial deductible losses from tlte activ~
ity, may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit.
Although the modest outside income as a positive factor docs
not appear to have been a part of the Service's presection 183
repertoire, it strongly pursued the substantial income principle
under section 162, but to little avail. As one commentator has
concluded:
Frequently, the Commissioner has argued that if the taxpayer has independent wealth or a substantial income unrelated to farming, this should
be considered as some evidence that the farm is not operated for profit.
Apparently the premise is that a wealthy man can more readily afford
a "hobby farm." Most courts have not been receptive to this argument
and have been willing to allow farm losses to persons with substantial
nonfarm resources or income where profit intent is adequately established by other factors.aso
S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Coug., 1st Sess. 103 (1969).
Harold III. Clark, 28 T.C.M. 1260 (1969); George Thacker, 28 T.C.~I. 1433 (1969);
Benjamin E. Adams, 25 T.C.M. 1239 (1966); Hedi Katz, 13 T.C.M. 188 (1954).
348 Woodrow L. Wroblewski, 32 T.C.l\1. No. 37 (1973).
340 Harold M. Clark, 28 T.C.M. 1260, 1262 (1969); accord, Whitman v. Uuitccl Stutes,
248 F. Supp. 845 (W.D. La. 1965).
350 DICKINSON, FARM AND RANCH LOSSES, BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PoRTFOLIO No. 241,
A-34 (1970) (footnote omitted).
346
341
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In one of the best reasoned decisions in the area, the judge belie,·ed
that substantial ta..xable income from som·cl's other than the activity was relevant only as offering a possible alternath·e moth·ation for continuing to establish a profitabll' activit)·, but as such
would not accord it much weight.351 He could see no reason to
accord business status to a marginal dirt farnwr while reaching
a contrary result merely because the ta.xpayer could afford, i.e.,
pay from outside income or capital, tlu.• losses incurred while the
farm was being developed.
A few of the early authorities reli(ld upon the ta.xpayer's independent wealth, apparently influ(lnced in part by the fact that
he therefore was not depend(lnt upon the actiYity for his livelihood, but courts soon acc(lpted taxpayer contentions that although not dependent on the activity's success for a livelihood,
the taxpayer could not afford to suffpr losses indefinitely.352 This
is as it should be, since the Supreme Court source of the liveliltood
definition of a trade or busim•ss us<.•d this term and the term
"profit" disjunctiwly.353 ThP other basis, as indicated, is that
such a taxpayer could more rPadily afford a hobby. Significantly,
cases finding that the acti\"ity was profit moth·ated have held that
although the taxpayers \n•re Wl•althy Pnough to afford activity
with discouraging loss(ls, th(ly wPrl' not utterly indifferent to
whether there was gain or loss.354 A recent decision, -Joan F.W.
Farris,355 joined these two tlwmes rpasoning that "Although the
lmowledge that she would not have to look to the operation for a
livelihood may have been an inducenwnt to Jletitioner for entering the industry, we cannot say on thl' facts of this cas(> that her
intentions were less business-like for that reason. \Ye are disinclined therefore to draw the infert>nce from the presenc€.' of
losses in every year that petitioner was indiffc>r(>nt to making a
profit.''
Even more significant has hPPn thP growing judicial recognition
that independent income or capital is a prerc>quisite for entry
into a venture requiring a start-up stagl' in which losses may be
Wright v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 508, 514 (D. Ne\·. 1965).
Compare Doggett v. Burnet, 65 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1933), Thnclu:Jr Y. Lowe, 28S
F. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) ancl Georges Simenon, 44 T.C. 820, 847 (1965), u:it11 Margaret
E. Amory, 22 B.T.A. 1398 (1931).
353 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 171 (1911); arcorcl, Chnloner ,•• Heh·ering,
69 F.2d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
354 Wicleuer v. Comm'r, 33 F.2d 833 (3!1 Cir. 1929) ; John S. Ellswortla, 21 T.C.M. 145
(1962).
355 31 T.C.III. 821, 825 (1972).
351
352
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expected or into a risky activity with heavy initial capital demands.356 For instance, the Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's reliance on the factor of independent income in John S.
Ellsworth 357 on the grounds that substantial nonfarm income or
sources of capital were a necessary basis for embarking on a
cattle breeding operation becaus(' of anticipated lossl:'s in the
earlier years. The court countered a similar contention in Norman
a. Demler 358 with the conclusion that thP taxpayer's proceeds
from a sale of land (approximately $465,000) provided him "with
the necessary capital funds to makP his entry into the auto
racing business meaningful.''
In addition to an overemphasis on inde}Hmdent wealth, the regulation's formulation of this factor is deficient in not (1) distinguishing between substantial inconw and substantial capital,
(2) considering the pffect of horrowNl capital and (3) providing
guidelines as to the uwaning of substantial inconw. 'Plw distinction between using substantial inconw and using capital to carry
on a venture currently gPncrating losses is best drawn hy the
opinion in Rou·e B. Metcalf. 359 There tlw court count<'rhalanc<'d tho
taxpayer's ability to absorb farm losses hy offsetting tlwm against
his sizabh~ taxable incouw to produce a tax savings, with the fact
that in later years he was forced to invade his capital to a considerable extent to .absorb the losses. The illetcalf court thought
it more logical that a succPssful businessman would invade capital
in hopes of recouping his lossps owr tlw long haul than that ho
would indulge in that manner a costly hobby with no intention
of making it pay. 360 Other dPcisions too have relied upon the taxpayer's sale of income-producing assets or tlw utilization of othN·
means of dipping into capital to obtain operating funds for the
activity.361
The authorities are also favorably impn,ssed by the taxpayer's
borrowing of funds to carry on an activity. 362 Indeed, the SPrvice
Sharpe, What The Taxpayer Should Do to Have The Courts Rccog11izc llis Farm
TAXATION 48, 50 (1968).
357 21 T.C.:M. 145 (1962).
358 25 T.C.M. 620, 627 (1966).
35o 22 T.C.l\I. 1402 (1963) .
•3so See Rex B. Foster, 32 T.C.M. No. 13 at 47 (1973) (in the sh01·t 1'1111 it nppcnrctl
doubtful that taxpayer would recoup amounts already invested but n successful conversion
of horse herd would enable them "to adequately manage the then bleak situutiou in their
investment "ith the chance for overall profit in the long I"Ull").
361 Mary Ellis Turner, 23 T.C.l\f. 1186 (1964) ; Benjamin E. Adams, 25 T.C.l\I. 1231>
(1966).
362 Thomas W. Jackson, 59 T.C. No. 31 (1972), acq., 1973-21 I.R.B. 5 (if primnry in·
356

as a Business, 28 J.
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has on occasion argued that a failure to borrow in ord~r to carry
on activity on an expanded scale is inconsistent "ith a profit
motive.363 Borrowing may also be significant as a concomitant
of the extent of the taxpayer's investment in the activity in relation to the taxpayer's total resources: If he spends the great majority of Iris income from sources other than the activity, this is
strong evidence the activity is engaged in for profit.36~
The regulation speaks of substantial income from sources other
than the activity and one may infer from the fourth example
accompanying these factors that income of $8,500 per year is not
substantial.365 Beyond this the regulations do not go. Although the
decisions really do not define substantial income,366 they do indicate that a taxpayer with dividend incoml' of oYer $35,000 is by
no means a wealthy man who can afford to sit back and allow
losses in the activity to continue.367 Indl'ed, income in this range
has been termed by one farm loss casl' ''relatively modest.'' scs
The court pointed out that the ta."payer's annual income ranged
from a low of approximately $18,000 to a high of almost $45,000,
with considerable Yariation from year to year. In such circumstances, the court found it "difficult to imagint>" that a. person would make large expenditures and ('ngage in the physical
labor required to breed and show l10rses without an intention
to make a profit.369 In still another recl'nt decision the court was
impressed by the taxpayer's relatin~ly modl'st income of $25,000.370
The importance the drafters of tl1e section 183 regulations atterest is in tax benefits, no benefit from loaliS for working rapitnl. This is to be distin·
guished from non-recourse mortgages which create le1·ernge without economie loSJ-when
operating funds are expended there is an economic loss) ; Harvey S. Farro1~·, 16 T.C.M.
836 (1957); Leland E. Rosemond 10 T.C.'M. 625 (1951).
363 Charles B. Pennington, 26 T.C.M. 520 (1967). Com·ersely, if the taxpayi.'r doeJ tnalto
substantial investments in depreciable improvements, the go1·ernmeut is wont to arguo that
the activity is unprofitable (iueluding depreciation deductions) beenuse it is over capitalized. Patterson v. United States, 459 F.2d 487 (Ct. Cl. 197!!).
364 See Woodrow L. Wroblewski, 32 T.C.IIr. No. 37 (1973). See generally RmE::oun,
FARM AND RANCH LOSSES, BNA TA.;: MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. !l-11-!ld, A-!!7 (1973).
365 Comparison of the Treasury proposals, NLxon proposals nnd eeetion 1!liil f(.Wt:nls
that the line for substantial nonfarm income is difficult to draw: $15,000, $.:i,OOO and
$25,000 were tl1e respective cutoff marks under the above propos.'!ls and finn! statute.
3G6 Compare Wright v. Unitecl States, 249 F. Supp. 508 (D. Nev. 19ti;j) 1 u:itl1 G(!Qrgo
Thacker, 28 T.C.M. 1433 (1969).
367 Jean A. Lowenthal, 27 T.C.!If. 387, 393 (1968).
368 James S. Bishop, 31 T.C.M. 829, 831 (1972).
,
369 Identical analysis is contained in Re.x B. Foster, 3!! T.C.~£. No. 1-1 (1973); Alden B.
Starr, 28 T.C.!If. 167 (1969); Lilian Solomon, 26 T.C.M. 919 (1967); and Hcrbl!tt C.
Sanderson, 23 T.C.M. 1723 (1964).
370 Thomas W. Jaekson, 59 T.C. No. 31 (1972), acq., 1973-21 I.R.B. 5.
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tached to significant income from sources other than the questioned activity is obvious. The first three examples accompanying
the nine factors, which were derived from actual cases, all carefully state that the taxpayers havE' substantial, sizable or large
income from such sources. Yet a careful reading of the three
cases-Ellen R. Schley, 371 Corliss Lamont,372 and Anthony
Imbesi 373-reYeals that in none did the trier of fact rely upon
this factor. ·while the review courts in Schley and Lamont did
consider the taxpayer's financial status in affirming the Tax Court,
both appellate opinions run counter to the weight of authority and
clearly preferred the now prohibited subjective approach over
reliance on objective factors.
In summary, the Service may be expected to emphasize heavily
the factor of substantial nonactivity income wherever present:
"[I]t is the taxpayer of inde}Jendent means or who is otherwise
profitably engaged who is likely to be challenged." 374 Undoubtedly
the legislative history of the farm tax reforms of the Tax Reform
Act of ·1969, which focused on the abuse of farm tax accounting
rules by taxpayers with substantial nonfarm income plays no
small part in such emphasis. NewrtlwlPss, if the prior C'ase lawthe only source for factors which can validly bP no mon• than an
administrative codification of tho Pxisting sea of authorities,
weighted by the legislatiYe rejection of tlw reasonable expectation of profit and subjective approach-is proporly presented in
litigation, the courts will continue to accord a cold recoption to this
argument.
Elements of Personal Pleasure or Recreation

The presence of personal motives in [the] carrying on of un activity
may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit, especially
where there are recreational or personal elements involved. On the
other hand, a profit motivation may be indicated where an activity luclts
any appeal other than profit. It is not, however, necessary thut an
37124 T.C.M. 588 (1965), aff'<l, 375 F.2<1 747 (2<1 Cir. 1967) (n<ljusted gross income
from other sources of $94,000).
372 23 T.C.1\I. 3 (1964), aff'cl, 339 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1964) (income from othur sources
ranged from $94,000 to $289,000).
373 23 T.C.M. 1678 (1964), rev'cl on other issue, 361 F.2d 640 (3tl Cir. 1966) ( othor
source income from $fi7,000 to $97,000).
374 Oshins, Proposed Regulations Provide New Rules For Hobby Loss Game, 31i J. 'rAXA·
'IION 214, 216 (1971). It woulcl nppenr, however, that this fnctor curries less weight.
Joseph W. Johnson, Jr., 59 T.C. No. 78 (1973) ("Other factors to be considored, though
not of themselves controlling, nrc the financial status of the petitioners uml the stundnr(l
of living to whi('h they arc :t('customed.").
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activity be engaged in with the exclusive intention of deriving a profit
or with the intention of maximizing profits. For example, the availability of other investments which would yield a higher return, or
which would be more likely to be profitable, is not evidence that nn
activity is not engaged in for profit. An activity will not be treated as
not engaged in for profit merely because the ta."{payer has purposes or
motivations other than solely to make a profit. Also, the fact that the
taxpayer derives personal pleasure from engaging in the activity is
not sufficient to cause the activity to be classified as not engaged in
for profit if the activity is in fact engaged in for profit as evidenced by
other factors whether or not listed in this paragraph.37G

This factor first sets forth the two general principles that (1)
personal motives, particularly where recreational or personal elements are involved, may indicate a lack of profit intent and (2)
a limited converse, a lack of any appeal other than profit, may
indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit. In addition, it
in effect provides that a taxpayer may have mi.xed motives and
derive personal pleasure from it and still be engaged in the
activity for profit so long as other factors evidence such profit
motivation.
Personal llfotives. The authorities do hold that the objective
factors of significant recreational facilities or substantial recreational use, for example, of a farm are strong e\·idence that an
activity is not engaged in for profit.316 For instance, wltere a farm
contained a private residence, barbecue shelter, swimming pool,
boathouse, tennis court and deer shelter for deer purchased for
the enjoyment of children of the ta.xpayer's dominant sltareholder,
the court easily concluded that the farm was opt>rated as a hobby
and not as a trade or business.377 Nevertheless, entertainment use
or even maintenance of a personal residence on a farm is not
fatal, particularly where the personal expenses and farm expenses
are carefully segregated.318 As a leading commentator has stated:
In many cases in which the ta."{payer has maintained his home on the
premises, the Commissioner has argued that the farm was primarily
personal rather than business in character. The Commic;sioner has generally had little success with this contention, except where substantial
recreational facilities accompanied the home, or the farming activities
Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(9).
316See generally RIDE..'<OUR, FARM A!';D RANCH LOSSES, BNA TAX MANAG&m.-.T PO:lT·
FOLIO No. 241-2d, A-27 (1973); Sharpe, What The Taxpayer Should Do to Hare Tile
Courts Ilecagnize His Farm as a Business, 28 J. TAXATION 48, 51 (19GS).
377 V.H. Monette & Co., 45 T.C. 15 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 374 F.:2d 116 (4th Cir.
1967).
378 See, e.g., Jolm S. Ellsworth, 21 T.C.M. 145 {1962).
37s

438

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:

were clearly incidental to occupancy of the house. However, in cases
in which the taxpayer has not segregated the farm expenses from the
home expenses or has regarded his agricultural activities as merely an
adjunct to his residence, losses have ordinarily been disallowed. Also,
where the farm is viewed primarily as a restful place of retirement for
the taxpayer, the Commissioner has been successful.3711

If the courts follow this lead and consider the taxpayer's subjective intent and l>Prsonal satisfaction, then we may expect to
see the Service advocate with force for aeeeptancP of the approaeh
taken in Robert E. Cttrrie. 380 'l'lwre tht> 'Pax Court found that tlw
taxpayer had a lift>long intt>rt>st in both dogs and horses and
derived considt>rahlP plt>asurp from both. It reasoned that this
factor alone did not preclude businPss status:
But we believe that the history of petitioner's enjoyment from these
animals raises a presumption under the circumstance of this case that
he was not in the trade or business of raising them. That is, a greater
amount of proof is required than would be necessary if he had not
previously enjoyed these animals as pets....
While not inconsistent with a profit motive, the presence of personal
satisfaction requires counterbalancing evidence that this satisfaction
was not the primary motive for embarking on this venture.

District court opinions fre(llwntly raise a similar rebuttable inference of lack of profit motiw if both PlPments of personal pleasurt~
and continm•d lossPs arP im·olnd. 381
Just as prior plPmmre may lw an unfavorahl<' factor, conversion of an activity from admitted hobby status to business status
has oftpn proven difficult, particularly if there are no changes of
method of operation, but is not impossihlP.382 In areas other than
37U DICKINSON, FAR:II AND HANCII LOSSES, BNA TAX MANAGEMENT POI\TFOLIO NO, 2•11 1
A-35 (1970) (footnotes omitted). Tlms, the fm·t that the taxpayer in Exnmplo 1 of section
1.183-2(c) of the regulations (the Sc·hley rnse) lived on an nren of the fnrm set nsido
exclusively for living purposes should not be a negative fm·to1·. Sec, e.u., C.J. Anllm·son,
14 T.C.M. 148 (19.iii). The drafters, however, woulcl appear to have (mistnkenly) boliovc<l
otherwise, sin('e the thircl ex:unple emphasizl's the prescm·e of the tuxpuyer's rcsi<lem•o on
the property "'here his clog ancl horse r:lising m·tivitics were eontluctc!l. Yet tho nctunl
bnbesi decisions only briefly mentioned that during the tux years the tnxpnyer purchnsc<l
a country residen('e, to whid1 he moved his dog kennels nn<l nppnrently his horse breeding
activities as well. The resiclem•e itself :nul rec·reational netivitie3 were not <lcscrlbc<l in
these derisions in ('Ontrnst to the regulation example bused upon thelll.
3so 28 T.C.:M. 12, 19, 21 (1969).
3Rt See, e.o., Hic·ks v. United States, 72-1 U.S.T.C. IT 9383 (S.D. Miss. 1972); Gross
v. Unitecl Stutes, 71-2 U.S.T.C. f1 9715 (N.D. Fla. 1971).
382 Compm·e Robe1t E. Currie, 28 T.C.l\I. 12 (1969) ancl Georgo •r. McLcnn, 19 T.C.l\f.
673 (1960), aff'd per <'Uriam, 283 F.2cl 756 (4th Cir. 1961), with Liilio S. Wcgoforth, 42
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farm losses, however, special rules have developed as to conversion of property held for personal use to property held for
production of income. Courts early established that where property was previously dedicated to personal use, there must be some
unmistakable subsequent conduct manifesting its appropriation to
income producing purposes.383 For losses under section 165(c)
abandonment of personal use of property, such as a residence or
a yacht, followed by a listing of the property with a real estate
agent is not a sufficient appropriation.384 The underlying policy
was that the ta.~payer could too easily put unrented property
back in personal use. 385 The actual rental requirement of a transaction entered into for profit of section 165(c) was not imported
into section 212 or section 162 and, instead, a number of factors
are considered in ascertaining whether the requisite conversion has
occurred.386
Where the taxpayer lias not originally held the property for
personal purpose, howeYer, he has a much easier task in establishing that the property is used in his trade or business or is
held for the production of income.387 Furthermore, the Tax Court
in Marjorie lJI.P. May 388 indicated that conversion from a property use in a mere hobby to pro1Jerty held for production of income
is more difficult to show than conversion from residential property. It may sincE' have disavowed that stance.389
The in1plications of tlw May case as well as the Ta.~ Court's
apparent doubts in Carkhuff as to the possibility of a recurring
pattern of conversion to business use and reconversion to personal
use indicate that where pro1lerty is used for business and personal
uses the taxpayer should not attempt to argue that. two activities
are involved. Rather he should follow the Car1clmfl example in
the regulations to the effect that a single acth·ity is invoh•ed,
B.T.A. 633 (1940), Everell E. Fisher, 27 T.C.'M. 1048 (1968), and Normnn C. Demler, 25
T.C.'M. 620 (1966).
383 See generally Swanson, Loss on tltc Sale of Residential Property, 33 TAXES iiS9
(1955).
384 Gevirtz v. Conun'r, 123 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1941).
385 Rumsey v. C-ouuu'r, 82 F.2d 158 (2d Cir.), cert. cleniccl, :199 U.S. 552 (103G);
Morgan v. Comm'r, 76 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. cleuifcl, 29G U.S. 601 (1935).
386 William C. Horrmann, 17 T.C. 903 (1951); Mnry Lnugltlin Robinson, 2 T.C. 30:i,
307 (1943). These factors are set fortl1 in Frunk A. Newcombe, 54 T.C. 1!198, 1300-01
(1970).
387 Estelle G. Mnrx, 5 T.C. 173 (1945) (seetion 162); Herman Sclmevitz, 30 T.C.'M. 823
(1971) (section 212).
38s 35 T.C. 865, 874-75 (1961), af/'d, 299 F .2d 725 (4tll Cir. 1962).
389 Compare Frank A. Newcombe, 54 T.C. 1298, 1301 (1970), v:itl1 Walter E. Becltjord,
32 T.C.'M. No. 123 (1973).
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but argue that it is engaged in for·profit. Carefully segrE'gating
and not deducting the personal portion of the expenses of the
activity will strengthen his case. 390
It may be noted that the Tax Court has traditionally found tradl~
or business status more readily in tllP context of rental real estate
where the property was acquired hy inlwritancc, as contrasted with
converted from prior personal use. 'T'lw rational(' is that the
acquisition by inheritance is neutral and tht•rpfore does not 1'<'~
quire an affirmative change of intPntion as it clops when the
property is initially ac<tuirPd for }H'nmnal purposes.391 'Phis may
also be the casP in farm lossc>s, hut not wlwr<> tlw inlwritanco is
from a S}Jouse. 392 Probably tlw unartieulated but practical cause
is a covert recognition of lnu;hand and wifP aH a singl<> economic
unit. 393 This developuwnt and <'Xc<>ption ap}war rPflPch•d in the
first and fourth examph•s accompanying this portion of the regn~
lations.
Lack of Appeal Other Tlzan Profit. 'J1he difficulty inher<•nt in so
elusive a test as motiw has l'<'HUlt<'d in the SParch for ohj<1ctivo
guideposts. 394 This sparch should he intPnHifi<>d hy tlw congr<>ssional
mandate that section 1H3 employ tlw ohjPctiw approach. In the
context of the factor of Pl<'llH'nts of }H'rHonal pleasurP or recrea~
tion, a significant and certainly tlw most fr<•qtwntly r<>li<'d upon objective indicium has heen wlwther tlw facilitiPs used in tlw activit~·
were equipped for or usPd as a placP of PntPrtainnwnt or reerPntion. A recurring theuw in tlw ohjedin• search for profit moti\'e
in this area has been the conclusion that a farm, for Pxmnpl<',
was never usPd as a placP of PntPrtainnwnt and waH in no sem;o
a show place. 395 Not infr<><ltwntly, tJw eourts in rca<·hing this
conclusion have· focnsPd on tlw following ohjcctiw crit<>ria: (1)
3uo In Joseph W. Johnson, Jr., 59 T.C. Ko. 78 (1973), when• the activity wns clctl'l'llliuccl
not to be engaged in for profit, the eourt notccl that the taxpnyl•r did not scgregnto Ol'
allocate expenses between pcrs011:1l nnd rental usc.
301 Estelle G. Marx, 5 'r.C. 173, 174 (194'i).
392 Compare Aliee D. Worcester, 21 T.C.M. 1138 (1!)62), with Bcrtlm R. Conyuglunu,
23 T.C.M. 1179 (1964).
303 Cf. Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 26!l, 278, 285 (1962) (Douglns J., dissenting
to dismissal of eertiomri as improvidently granted).
394 Imbcsi v. Comm'r, 361 l!'.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1966).
3DG Not usecl for re<'rention: Dean Babbitt, 23 'r.C. 3;;0 (1!J;j'i); Norton L. Smith, !l 'l'.C.
1150 (1947); 1I:trshall Field, 26 B.T.A. 116 (1932), ajJ'tl, 67 P.2!l 876 (211 Cit•. 1933) l
Thomas P. Sheridan, 4 B.T.A. 1299 (1926). Not n showpla<'e: Herbert C. Snndorsou, 23
T.C.M. 1723 (1964); Rowe B. Metcalf, 22 T.C.M. 1402 (1903); Gcorgo M. Zcngh•r, 17
T.M.M. 454 (19:i8); Theron D. Stay, 17 T.C.:\1. 861 (19.i8). Ser UCIU1"al/y Shnrpc, What
The Taxpayer Should Do to Have Tile Courts Recognize llis Farm as a Businrss, 28 J.
TAXATIOX 48, 51 (1968).
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utilitarian appearance; (2) lack of luxury items, such as golf
courses, race tracks, greenhousE's, tennis courts, or ftow<>r gardens; and (3) business-like operation::; in contrast to social or
recreational use.396 Indeed, th<:> last crih•rion ha::; been <•xpr<>ssed
as an absolute rule: "\Ylwre th<' overation i::; conduct<.'d on a
business-like basis and th<:>re is no <'Vidence of it::; usl• for social,
pleasure or show purposes, lossPs tlwrpfrom ar<• deduetihl<• as
business eA.IJenses." 397 Of cours<', a showing of a lack of any
recreational or aesthetic ft>aturP alom• is not <>nough, the ta.xpay<>r
must also prove the PlPment of husin<>ss-lik<> opt•ratiom;.398 As the
Currie court stated, it is not nPcessary to dt•eid<• that the ta.xpayer's activities constitutE:> a recreation or a hobby, ratlwr, tlw hurd<>n
of proof is on the ta.xpayer to show that hi::; activitit•::; wt•rt• conducted as a trade or lmsiness.399 However, sueh faetors, by indicating a lack of hobby motive, may l>Par indin•ctly on profit moth·ation.4oo
The regulation's statement that a profit moti\'ation may be indicated by a lack of any appeal other than profit in tht• acth·ity is
strongly reflected in two lines .of cases: (1) authoriti<.'s r<'lying on
hard work demanded by the activity coupl<>d with tht> ta.xpayer's
background,401 and (2) decisions turning on the seale of operations.402 In a number of farm loss controv<•rsies, wht>n• the ta.xpayer had modest income or was just bPginning his main career
after a long period of strain<.'d eireumstanc<>s, typically a doctor,
the Tax Court lms r<:>ason<.'d that it is hard to lwlievc.> that a
taxpayer with such a background and at a stagt• of lif<> with increasing responsibilities and E:>XpPnditures would embark on a
hobby entailing large costs and much physical labor.403 A disst>nt,
3DG Utilitarian appe:tranee: Lilian Solomon, 2G T.C.~t. 919 (1!167); Theron D. Stny, 17
T.C.M. 861 (1958). Lack of luxury items: Hamilton !<'. Ke:m, 10 B.T.A. 97 {1928); Rose
P. Crane, 9 B.T.A. 437 {1927). Business-like oper:ttions: Lueien II. Tyng, 3G B.T.A. 21
{1937), rev'd on other grounds, lOG F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1939), rcv'd 011 ot11rr orouzuls, 30S
u.s. 527 (1940).
3orHelis v. Usry, 71-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 93GJ (E.D. La. 1971) (footnote omitted), rct:'tl on
other grounils, 464 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972).
aos Frank M. Austin, 28 T.C.'M. 27, 31 (1969); src Louise Clteucy, 22 B.T•.\. Gi2 (1031).
3DD Robert E. Currie, 28 T.c.~r. 12, 18 (1969).
40o Re.."'.: B. Foster, Jr., 32 T.C.:M. No. 14 (1973).
401 Lilian Solomon, 2G T.C.~I. 919 (1967); Herbert C. Snnllerson, 23 T.(.'.~[. 1723
(1964); Leland E. Rosemond, 10 T.C.:\1. 625 (1951).
402 Samuel Riker, Jr., G B.T.A. 890 (1927); Uex B. FI!Ster, 32 T.C.lt. No. 13 (1973);
Joan F.W. Farris, 31 T.C.M. 821 (1972); Robert E. Currie, 28 T.C.l[. 12 (1969). Sec
generally DICKINSON, FARM AND RA!\Cil LOSSES, BNA TAX :!\{ANAG~El'T PO:lTIOLIO
No. 241, A-33 (1970).
403 Rex B. Foster, 32 T.C.'M. No. 13 (1973); Jnmes S. Bishop, 31 T.C.~t. 829 {1972).
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however, to this generally followed approach may be seen in
Robert E. Currie 404 where the court focused on the fact that a
breeding operation does not produce immediate income and is
speculative and, indeed, becomes profitable if at all only when
the young professional would be cashing in on his training. The
court rather cogently reasoned that a prudent man in financial
need-the taxpayer argued that he engaged in these activities since
he believed that his income from his medical profession was insufficient-would- not make expenditures on speculative ventures
that could at best yield only a long-term profit unless he derived
personal satisfaction from such expenditures. This rationale ignores however, the common profit motivated goal of offsetting
current ordinary income with farm losses with the expectation of
a long-range capital gain-a goal only moderately circumscribed
by section 1251 of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
Currie also illustrates the effect of the scale of operations on
the question whether the activity lacks any appeal other than
profit. In the presence of the taxpayer never owning more than
two or three ponies and a like number of dogs, the court held
that while a small scale operation is not necessarily indicative that
an activity is not engaged in for profit, it is a factor to consider.
The court exposed its underlying premise by contrasting the
taxpayer's operation of a ten acre orchard with approximately
800 apple trees. "The very magnitude of this operation seems to
suggest a business operation for . . . there is nothing aesthetic
or pleasant about thousands of decaying apples on a 10-am·e
farm." 405 Rex B. Foster, Jr. 406 suggests that this factor only
indicates the activity is not engaged in primarily for pleasure
or recreation, hence, it does not bear directly on the taxpayer's
business motives.
In contrast to the effect of large scale operations on the determination of profit motivation, there is considerable disagreement among the courts as to the effect of a smaller scale of operations. For instance, the Ninth Circuit in 1lfercer v. Commissioner 407 expressed some reservation as to the weight to be given
the size of the operation, but concluded that in any event this test
is necessarily relative to and limited by the particular taxpayer's
404 28 T.C.M. 12, 19 (1969); accord, Joan F.W. Farris, 31 T.O.M. 8211 825 (1972).
See Norton L. Smith, 9 T.C. 1150 (1947).
405 Robert E. Currie, 28 T.C.M. 12, 21 (1969).
406 32 T.C.M. No. 14 (1973).
4o1 376 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1967).
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resources. Where, however, the expenses of the acth~ty are of a
recurririg type and the scale of activity is such that sales proceeds could not exceed such expenditures, yet the taxpayer is
not in this position and does not intend to inerease the sizl' of
operations, this constitutes evidence that he lacks the requisite
intent to realize a profit even eventually.408
Mixed lllotives. The conclusions of the regulations that an activity need not be exclusiwly engagt>d in for profit and that a
mixture of profit and personal motiv<.>s will not alone eausc.> an
activity to be treated as not engaged in for profit find abundant
precedents in the case law.409 As the Ta.x Court rpcently stated
in Thomas W. Jackson.: 410 " [A] business will not be turned into
a hobby merely because the owner finds it pleasurahlt•; suffering
has never been made a prerequisite to deductibility. 'Success in
business is largely obtained by pleasurable interest therein.' "
The statement in the regulations that the availability of other
investments with a greater rate of return or better prosp~.>ets of
profitability for profit is not evidence the acth·ity is not <•ngaged
in for profit is probably directed more to the mixt>d motin:s of
profit and tax reduction. For one presPction 183 romnwntator
analyzed this situation as follows:
The effect of tax avoidance as a motive becomes more complex if it
is assumed that the operation would be, strictly speaking, economically
profitable, but not reasonably so without adding on the tax benefits.
Suppose the taxpayer could e..xpect to make a small economic profit
on his total investment, but not as much ns he could mnke by investing
his money elsewhere. .Assume that this expected profit represents only
a two or three percent return on his investment while a higher rate of
return would be more reas_onable when viewed strictly from an investment standpoint. The two or three percent return would be unacceptable,
but the total return on the investment might approach a more reasonable
level if tax savings resulting from the deduction of tax losses from
other income are included in the calculation. Although allO\\ing deduction of the tax losses in this situation will also encourage tran&tetions
which might not take place if the tax savings were not available, the
reasoning of Goldstein would not prevent the deduction. The most that
can be said is that the taxpayer has mixed motives for the itwestment,
one of which is saving some taxes. But the tax avoidance motive cannot,
by itself, preclude a finding that a business purpose exists so long
as some economic profit, however small, can be expected. A fortiori,
40s

Billy V. Wann, 27 T.C.M. 1301, 1306 (1968).

4o9 DuPont v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 681, 685 (D. Del. 196-1) ; ~rnry Ellis Turner,

23 T.C.M. 1186 (1964); Willinm L. Brueck, Sr., ::!3 T.C.M. 12::!8 (196-1); John S. EUs·
worth, 21 T.C.M. 145 (1962).
no 59 T.C. No. 31 (1972) (footnote omitted).
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the taxpayer who can expect to realize a reasonable return on his
investment without tax savings could be engaged in a trade 01\ business
even though the tax benefits gained by deducting farm losses will give
him an even greater total return. 411

The regulations implicitly reach the same conclusion.
OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS

The regulations state "it is not intended that only the factors
described in this paragraph [section 1.183-2(b)] are to be taken
into account." The most significant factor not so described is that
of advertising. Accordingly, it is considered first. In addition,
there are a handful of other unlisted factors discussed in the
succeeding section. The most important of these last is the presence of a specific plan for improving profitability.
Advertising

The third example accompanying the nine regulation factors
stated that the taxpayer-who it concluded could be determined
not to be engaged in the activity of raising and selling dogs for
profit-did not advertise his dogs for sale and displayed them
only infrequently. The sixth example, on the other hand, in
reaching the opposite conclusion as to experimental activities,
noted that the taxpayer made extensive efforts to market l1is
developments.
In some early decisions, advertising was mentioned only in the
facts, sometimes with the opinion merely stating that the activity
was business-like in every way. 412 Soon, more recognition was
given to this factor, but since some forms of advertising may
exhibit personal elements, the Service has on occasion attempted
to utilize such advertising as a factor in its favor. 413 As in other
areas, judicial support for the latter tack is, for the most part,
to be found only in dicta. 414 Ironically, where prize winning products were raised, the courts typically have found that exhibiting the
Allington, Farming as a Tax Shelter, 14 S.D.L. REV. 181, 196-97 (1969).
Israel 0. Blake, 38 B.T.A. 1457 (1938); Lillie S. Wegeforth, 42 B.T.A. 633 (1940);
Lucien H. Tyng, 36 B.T.A. 21 (1937), rev'd on other grounds, 106 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1939),
rev'cl on otlzer grounds, 308 U.S. 527 (1940); Leland E. Rosemond, 10 'f.C.M. 625 (1951).
413 Rowe B. Metcalf, 22 T.C.M. 1402 (1963); Norma Mathews Lauer, 20 T.C.M. 1038
(1961).
U4 Dean Babbitt, 23 T.C. 850 (1955); see Farish v. Comm'r, 103 F.2d 63 (5th Clr.
1939).
<lll
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products at shows was an effective means of promotion:m; Indeed,
in Charles B. Pennington,416 where the Commissioner placed great
weight on the taxpayer's having entered some of his horses in

shows and having spent relatively large sums for costumes used
in them, the Tax Court concluded th(;' ta.xpay(;'r was not sho\\ing
the horses as a hobby; instead, they constituted advertising both
of the horse shows and of the taxpayer's trade name. On the other
hand, if such advertising is continued without concrete results
or in conjunction with objective manifestations of a lack of }lrofit
motive, it is not entitled to any positive W(;'ight in the ta.xpayer's
favor. Furthermore, in these circumstances such adn•rtising may
actually be counted as a fact in the government's favor as indicating a personal motive for engaging in th(;' acth·ity.417
Recent cases illustrate business-like methods with advt>rtising
in journals and enhancing the reputation of one's products through
shows.418 Conversely, although the overwhelming majority of
decisions make no reference to advertising, a few cases have
characterized an absence of advertising as a failure to follow the
ordinary steps a business organization takes toward making a
profit.419 In the farm loss context, the absence of a stable or farm
name has recently been considered as e\·idence of unbusiness-like
operations.420 In summary, advertising has become increasingly
important as an objective indicium of business-like opE>rations.
Miscellaneous Factors

Plans. A nUlllber of district court farm loss decisions, in testing for profit motive, lmve considered whether the ta.xpayer had
any specific plan or design for increasing the profitability of the
activity and what action was taken pursuant to such plan:421 The
See, e.g., Lillie S. Wcgeforth, 42 B.T.A. 633 (1940).
26 T.C.M. 520 (1967).
417 Donald A. Me Connick, 28 T.G.M. 1337 (1969).
418 See, e.g., Rex B. Foster, Jr., 32 T.C.M. No. 14 (1973); Jnmes S. Bishop, 31 T.C.M.
829 (1972).
419 American Properties, Inc., 28 T.C. 1100 (1957), aff'tl zu>r c-uriam, 262 F.2d lZO
(9th Cir. 1958) ; Robert E. Currie, 28 T.C.M. 12 (1969) ; IInroltl I. Snyder, 2.1 T.C.M.
1326 (1966).
420 W. Jane Luce, 29 T.C.M. 894 (1970); Robert E. Currie, 28 T.C.~r. 12 (19G9).
421 Cavender v. United States, 71-2 U.S.T.C. 1! 9723 (S.D. W.Vn. 1971); Grn\·es Y.
United States, 67-1 U.S.T.C. II 9192 (D. C()l. 1967); Cc1111c: \·. United Stntes, G7-2
U.S.T.C. II 9576 (E.D. La. 1966) ; Bennet Y. United Stntcs, 65-2 U.S.T.C. ~ 9701 (E.D.
Va. 1965); O'Neill v. Pnttcrson, 65-1 U.S.T.C. II 9436 (N.D. Ala. 19tH). Sec also
Curtis C. Smith, 26 T.C.M. 1219 (1967); Jnmes E. Ashe, 26 T.C.~r. 791 (1967).
415

416
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significance of this factor lies in part in its use to offset the
factor of continued losses, since it indicates an intention to
derive an ultimate net profit over all prior losses. Frequently this
factor is inextricably bound with the formative or initial stage
concept.422 Indeed, in Bertha R. Conyugham,423 where no such plan
existed, the Tax Court reasoned that despite the fact it takes a
number of years to develop a brePding herd, the taxpayer did not
formulate any long-range plans for such development. llarolcl I.
Snyder 424 carried this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion:
Absence of well defined plans indicates an activity is more in the
nature of preparing to enter a business than the conduct of a
business. Furthermore, a lack of plans may result in the activity
being engaged in so sporadically that it is not sufficiently continuous and regular to qualify as a business or, at best, indicates
very unbusiness-like operations. 425 In conclusion, this factor for
the most part complements other factors or doctrines.
Third-Party Financial Stake. A number of the farm loss decisions have favorably noted that the· manager participated in a
profit sharing arrangl:'ment. 426 The apparent rationale is that
such an arrangement indicates third party expectation that the
activity will be profitable which serves to corroborate the taxpayer's intention to make a profit. 427 A closely related factor is
the promotion of the taxpayer's products by a third party at his
own expense in return for a sales commission, such as an art
dealer who advertises the taxpayer's works of art. 428 Although
such a promoter earns his commission regardless of whether the
taxpayer makes a profit, it is in the former's financial interest
to obtain as high a sales price as possible, which increases the
taxpayer's prospects of a net profit. Similarly in a highly speculative venture or in the formative period during which there can
422 See Wright v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 508, 513 (D. Nov. 1965); Joan F.W.
Farris, 31 T.C.M. 821 (1972).
423 23 T.C.M. 1179 (1964).
424 25 T.C.M. 1326 (1966).
425 Donald A. McCormick, 28 T.C.M. 1337, 1342 (1969).
426 Marshall Field, 26 B.T.A. 116, 118 (1932), af!'cl, 67 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1033);
Rowe B. Metcalf, 22 T.C.M. 1402 (1963); George M. Zeagler, 17 T.O.M. 454 (1058),
But see Morton v. Comm'r, 174 F.2(1 302, 303 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 828
(1949) (tenant farmer, still not profit motivated).
427 Of. John S. Ellsworth, 21 T.C.M. 145 (1962). For an analogous instance in which
benefit to the employer is consi(lered in determining if an expenditure by nn employee
is "necessary" in the latter's business, see Lee, Command Pe1·formance: Tile Tax Treat·
ment of Employer Mandatccl Expenses, 7 RICHMOND L. REV. 1, 90-91 (1972).
428 Rood v. United States, 184 F. Supp. 791 (D. Minn. 1960).
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be no profits to be shared, sharing in gross receipts by a third
party may constitute an objective indication that the acth·ity is
engaged in for profit.
Time at Which Profit lllotive Is Detennined. A few early farm
loss authorities held that the determination of whether an activity was engaged in for profit was to be made as of the commencement of the activity. 429 An early inroad into this doctrine
can be found in the decisions finding that the taxpayer converted a hobby into a profit motivated activity.430 More recent
cases have concluded that the purposes for which an activity is
conducted can change from year to year. 431 To the extent tltat a
conflict still existed among these authorities the Senate Co1mnittee
on Finance appears to have resolved it as to section 183 with
the following statement: '' [A]lthough a reasonable expectation
of profit is not to be required, the facts and circumstances (without regard to the taxpayer's subjecth·e intent) would have to
indicate that the taxpayer ente1·ed the activity, or continued tlze
activity, with the objective of making a profit.'' 432
Alternatives to Section 183
Col\Il\ION-LAw APPROACHES

As indicated in the introduction and particularly in the discussion of the term ''profit,'' the government undoubtedly will
attempt to apply section 183 to two distinct are.as: (1) activities
engaged in primarily for personal reasons rather tltan for a
profit and (2) activities engaged in for ta.x shelter. Section 183
and the profit motive test clearly apply to and are suited for
the former. The latter is a more com1Jlex problem. If the taxpayer's goal is no more than deferral of ta.xes-enjoyment of current ordinary losses with expectation of realization of future income
in no greater amount, possibly ta.X(>d as capital gain-section 183
429 Tatt v. Conun'r, 166 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1948); Farish \', C<lnun'r, 103 F.2d 1011
(5th Cir. 1939).
430 See Robert E. Currie, 28 T.C.M. 12 (1969); E\·crell E. Fisher, !:!7 T.C.M. 1048
(1968); Norman C. Demler, 25 T.C.M. 620 (1966); George T. McClean, 19 T.C.M.
673 (1960), aff'clzler curiam, 285 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1961); Lillie S. Wegefortb, 42 B.T.A.
633 (1940).
431 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 449 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971). Sec generally
Sharpe, New "Hobby Los$' Rule Is Tougl1er But "E11gaged iu far Profit" Dilemma
Remains, 32 J. TAXATION 289, 291 (1970).
432 S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (19G9) (Clllllhasis added).
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applies here as well. Mere reduction in taxes, the most that would
occur in such a transaction, does not constitute a profit for section
183.433 If, however, the goal of the tax shelter consists of ultimate
realization of taxable income and true economic gain in excess.
of the early losses in addition to tax deferral, section 183 and
its judicially fashioned profit motive predecessor are inapplicable.
Matching the deductions with their corresponding income offers
a sim1Jle solution. But because no statutory provision or commonlaw doctrine currently precludes the deduction of ordinary and
necessary section 162 or 212 expenses simply because the activity
is yielding no current income,434 or requires deferral of such
deductions until related income is realized, 435 the Service has
attempted to rely on a number of other doctrines derived with
varying degrees of judicial acceptance from the term ''trade or
business'' in hopes of achieving roughly the same results. These
doctrines are the trade or business glosses of (1) continuity, (2)
holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of
goods or services and (3) activity which must be an existing,
operating business rather than preparatory to engaging in a
trade or business. ·where courts have applied these doctrines the
expenditures are ca1)italized and deductible, if at all, through
depreciation or amortization over a period of years. 436
The continuity approach is usually considered an independent
criterion, less frequently an element of the profit motive prerequisite to deductibility under section 162.437 In any event it plays
a significant role only in the hobby loss area. The holding one's
self out doctrine, while displaying this same duality, possesses
precedents in both the hobby loss and tax shelter areas. The
analysis of tax shelter abuse as a mismatching of expenses and
~33
434

See the text accompanying note I l l supra.
See, e.g., Mercer v. Comm'r, 376 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1967); Frault .A. Nowcombo,

54 T.C. 1298, 1301 (1970) (property held only for sale and not for rout, i.e., current
income, held for production of income).
43S E.H. Sheldon & Co. v. Comm'r, 214 F.2d 655, 658-59 (6th Vir. 1954); accorcl, .A.
Finkeuberg's Sons, Inc., 17 T.V. 9731 982-83 (1951).
436 In order for tlie cost of an intangible capital asset to bo amo1·tizablo1 its useful
life must be capable of estimation with reasonable accuracy. Reg. § I.176(u)-3. No do·
duction is allowable for goodwill. Often preopening expenses are added to tho cost or
basis of assets without a determinable life. See Uichmond Television Corp. v. United
States, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965).
437 Independent criterion: Stanton v. Comm'r, 399 :r'.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1968); Korns
Wright, 31 T.C. 1264 (1959), af/'<1 per curiam, 274 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1060); Hamilton D.
Hill, 30 T.C.M:. 534 (1971). Element of profit motive: Percy S. Winfield, 25 •r.c.M.
305 (1966), aff'cl, 67-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 0268 (7th Cir.) 1 ccrt. cleniecl, 380 U.S. 851 (1067);
Martin C. McGowan, 23 T.C.l\f. 1439 (1064), aff'cl, 347 F.2d 728 (7th Cir. 1065).
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deductions underlies the preparatory to engaging in a. trade or
business concept, which has been applied to hobby losses and
tax deferral (i.e., tax shelter), but primarily the latter.
Because the term "trade or business" is not design(>d to deal
with the problem of mismatching of income and d<.•ductions, the
Service has obtained only irregular, unpredictable and sometimes
unfortunate results und!:'r th(>se three doctrines. Furthermore, the
courts' common application in the same case of one or another
of these principles together with the profit motiw requirement
without overt consideration whether ta.x slwlt<.•r or hobby loss
motives or a mixture of both were im·olved has generated considerable confusion and blurring of tlw meaning of trade or
business.438 Aberrational decisions und<.•r st•ction 162 have resulted
from the usually unarticulated desire to avoid mismatching of
deductions and related incouw. Section 183 may suffer the same
fate unless the courts isolate and analyze tlu• elements tl1c government attacks or the Service is satisfied with the other statutory remedies at hand or presently acth·el~· contemplated by
Congress which deal with tax deferral. The current spate of
activity under the presection 183 profit motive test as to dual
use beach houses and condominium units, which display botlt personal or hobby loss and tax shelt<>r aspects,m suggl'sts how<.•\·er
that the Sen·ic<> is current}~· attt>mpting to creat<.• prect>d<.•nts tltere
for later use under st>ction 183 against ta.x shelters without any
personal elements. Indt>!:'d, failure of this developnwnt to critically
analyze the questions im·oh·ed has already r<>sult<>d in qu(lstionahle
conclusions.440
Continuity

Kenzs W1·iglzt 441 is th!:' l<>ading d<>cision requiring continuous or
repeated activity coupl!:'d with an CXllt•ctation of making a profit to
qualify an acti\·ity as a trade or busim•ss und<>r section 162. A
taxpayer can satisfy this rN1uirenwnt hy demonstrating devotion of a substantial portion of his tiuw to the activities at
438 John F. Koons, 3!) T.C. 1092 (1901); Ilnroltl I. Snyder, 2ii T.C.~f. 13~G (1960};
Edward R. Godfrey, 22 T.C.)[. 1 (1903), a[f'tl 011 other grouruls, 33:i F.2d 82 (Gth
Cir. 190-!), ccrt. clcuictl, 379 U.S. 900 (190ii) (uffirmetl on 11rofit motin.> ground ouly).
439 E.g., Kanter \". i!nitecl Rt:ttcs, 73-1 U.S.T.C'. U !1311 (E.D. Yn. 1!173), af/'d per
curiam, 74--1 U.S.T.C.,; 9182 (4th Cir. 1974); William K Coors, 60 T.C. No. 44 (1973);
Joseph W. Johnson, Jr., !)9 T.C. No. 78 (1!173).
440 See tc.'l:t :t<'companyiug notes 125 through 130 .supra.
44131 T.C. 1264 (I!lii9), aD"'tl per curiam, 27-l F.2tl 8S3 (6th Cir. 1960); Gcorges
Simenon, 44 T.C. 820 (1965).
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issue or that there has been extensive or repeated activity over
substantial periods of time. 442
The continuity approach offers the advantage that the objec~
tive fact of sporadic conduct is easier to establish than a lack of
profit motive, which may necessitate examination of often con~
flicting objective as well as subjective factors. Moreover, the two
approaches often overlap since sporadic activities commonly do
not result in a profit.443 They are not, however, coextensive since
many activities are regularly and extensively performed without
a profit motive.
One limitation on the continuity doctrine has been its less than
universal judicial acceptance. For instance, J.l! ercer v. Oommis~
sioner 444 reversed a Tax Court decision resting in part on this
concept (as well as upon the reasonable expectation of profit and
the preparatory to engaging in business doctrines), holding that
it is not necessary to ·devote oneself extensively to an enterprise
to qualify it as a trade or business: ''The taxpayer expended his
effort and capital to the limit of his available time and resources.
There can be no conclusion other than that the taxpayer's ven~
ture, though small in results, was a trade or business." 44 G
Clearly Me·rcer and Kerns Wright conflict. The proper resolu~
tion may lie in Celeste B. Smith 446 which balanced the holding
of Mercer, without directly citing it, that small scale and a limited
amount of time do not preclude trade or business status, with
a reading of Kerns Wright that the amount of time is a factor
to be considered rather than determinative, as Wright actually
held. It is submitted that Smith strikes the proper balance, for
most of the Wright progeny and parallel decisions, as well as
Wright itself, could have been decided on traditional profit mo~
tivation grounds, or on the ordinary and necessary require~
ments of section 162.447 Furthermore, many farm loss authorities
442

Stanton v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1968).

443

Cf. Percy S. Winfield, 25 T.C.M. 305 (1966), atf'il, 67-1 U.S.T.C. U 9268 (7th Cir.),

cert. denied, 389 U.S. 851 (1967).
376 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1967).
Mercer v. Comm'r, 376 F.2d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 1967).
446 30 T.C.M. 516 (1971). Judge Scott, the trier of fact in Smit11, soveml years
earlier distinguished the taxpayer's reliance on Mercer for the proposition that scalo
of operation was irrelevant to profit motive on the theory that Mercer was speaking
to the preparatory to a trade or business issue ( <liscussed in text a~compnnying notes
463 through 533 infra). Mildred Van Cleve, 27 T.C.M. 1213 (1968). It is submitted,
however, that Mercer was speaking to both questions.
447 Profit Motive: See, e.g., Imlustrial Research Proclucts, Inc., 40 T.O. 578, GOO
(1963); Charles H. Schafer, 23 T.C.M. 927 (1964). But sec Stanton v. Comm'r, 399
F. 2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1968).
444
445
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demonstrate that devotion of a limited amount of time does not
preclude trade or business status.
In any event, even if continuity and regularity are properly
prerequisites to trade or business status, they are not the sine
qua non of profit motivation, although they are factors in some
cases. Accordingly, the second limitation on the continuity doctrine is that noncontinuous but profit motivated activities which
do not constitute carrying on a trade or business under section
162 may nevertheless be conducted for the production of income
under section 212.448 Undoubtedly, this factor underlies a recent
decision in which an unsuccessful writer with a bona fide profit
motive, as in Kerns Wright, was denied a deduction under section 162 because she was not engaged in the business of being an
author, but was permitted a deduction und<.>r section 212 because
the ·writing and printing of her two books were related to a
profit seeking purpose.449 Probably for these reasons the extensive
activity tack has not been widely utilized in the farm loss arca,450
although it has enjoyed some success in the fields of research and
development ("R & D") expenditures under section 174 and
rental real estate losses.451 An unarticulated factor in the R & D
cases may be that section 174 incorporates only the trade or
business standard of section 162 and not the production of income
standard of section 212. In addition, the capital gain precedents
as to sales of real estate and patents had no little effect here.452
Kerns Wrigl1t was clearly concerned with abuse of tlse ordinary and neceE31UJ requirement-"we are not convinced that the tri11 would lum! been made for tho solo
objecti>e of making a profit on the sale of the book. We think petitioners ";ere also
motivated by a desire to see their son, his new wife, and her family, and n desire
to travel and see tlse many interesting plnces where they stoppetl, nnd tlsnt the trip
actually served tl1e joint purpose of satisfying these desires nml gathering material
for the book." 31 T.C. 1267. However, cases such ns Charles A. Nemisb, ::!9 T.C.M.
1249, 1251 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 452 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1971), indicate that tho
requirement that a business expeuse be necessary is sufficiently bro:td to curb most, if not
all, potential abuses here.
448 Cf. Ditmars v. Comm'r, 302 F.2d 481, 486 (2m1 Cir. 196:1). But compare Young,
The Role of Motive in Et·aluating To.z Sheltered Im:eshnents, ::!2 TAX LAWi'"En 275, ::!97
(1969).
449 Marian :B.S. Crymes, 31 T.C.M. 4 (1972).
450 Hamilton D. Hill, 30 T.C.M. 534 (1971) I aml c~leste B. Smith, 30 T.O.M. 516
(1971), are the principal exceptions.
451 Stanton v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 326 (5tlt Cir. 1968); Industrial Rese3l'Ch Prods.,
Inc., 40 T.C. 578 (1963); Georges Simenon, 41 T.C. 820 (19G.J~; James E. Austin,
35 T.C. 221 (1960), aff'd, 298 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1962); Kerns Wright, 31 T.C. 1264
(1959), aff'd pc1· curiam, 274 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1960); Clsnrles H. SchatYer, ::!3 T.C.M.
927 (1964).
452 Compare Falls v. Crawford, 161 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1947); tritl1 Loy D. Mercer,
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Holding One's Self Out to Others as Selling
Goods or Services

A concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter in Deputy v.
DuPont 453 forms the genesis of the doctrine that carrying on a
trade or business ''involves holding one's self out to others as
engaged in the selling of goods or services." Just as is the
case with the element of continuity, this approach is also simpler
to apply than the profit motive test, being limited to a single
objective factor, but is narrower since, for example, a taxpayer
can advertise without a profit motive. More importantly, it too
appears limited to section 162. For in Deputy v. Du.Pont Justice
Frankfurter preceded the above quotation with the observation
that expenditures incurred in active concern over one's financial
interest, i.e., investments, did not suffice for deduction under the
predecessor to section 162-the expenditures were of the type
later made deductible by section 212. Accordingly, the holding
one's self out doctrine would appear peculiar to the trade or
business prerequisite of section 162 and other provisions and not
extend to the production of income standard of section 212. More·
over, a subsequent oft-cit('d decision, TrC'nt -v. Commissioner,
clearly so limits the concept.
Throughout the Internal Revenue Code there runs a distinction between
those expenses and losses incident to the endeavor to earn a livelihood
by ''holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods
or services," Deputy v. DuPont ... , those incident to other activities
that are pecuniarily motivated, Higgins v. C.I.R., 1941, 312 U.S. 212
... , and those incident to activities that are not.454

Section 212 was enacted to permit deductibility of the second
category of nonbusiness but pecuniarily motivated expenditures
which Hig,qins had held did not come within the trade or business
requirement of section 162, the first category. 455 However, section
212 is not available to corporations, and section 174 limits the
deduction to R & D expenditures paid in connection with the
taxpayer's trade or business without a section 212 analogue.
Therefore, in these two areas, thP holding one's self out doctrine
has the potentiality of being detprminative. Section 183 as well
25 T.C.M. 467 (1966), 1·cv'd, 376 F.2cl 708 (9th Cir. 1967). Compare Harold T. Avery,
(1940), 47 B.T.A. 538 (1942), with Charles H. Schaffer, 23 T.C.M. 927 (1964).
453 308 U.S. 488, 499 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
m 291 F.2d 669, 670-71 (2d Cir. 1961).
455 Sec Me Donald v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1944).
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does not extend to regular corporations and its interrelationship ·with section 174 is very unclear.
With the significant exception of research and development
cases, the doctrine has not enjoyed wide use in the hobby loss
cases. Thus, while many of the district court farm loss cases
illustrate the term ''trade or business'' by declaring tltat generally
the person engaged in such activities holds himself out as selling
either goods or services,456 such broad statements ltave not proved
adequate in resolving the variety of factual situations presented
to the courts.457 Consequently, courts lmn• turn<.>d to a number
of other objective criteria. In the Ta."'( Court th<' doctrine has
played only a minor role in farm loss and, surprisingly, rental
property decisions, where failure to advertise or r<.>nt to the general public would usually be inconsistent with a profit motive. 4Gs
In these latter areas failure to hold one's self out has frequently
been used merely as a factor in ascertaining whether profit motivation was present and not as independent criterion.4G9 Failure
to hold one's self out has been the primary d<.>cisive factor in
section 174 cases, but even there decisions concluding that the
taxpayer did not hold himself out to others as an inventor or
did not attempt to manufacture any invention or sell others patent
rights 460 by and large appear to meld the holding one's self out
requirement into some other requirement: (1) profit motive,
(2) regularity and continuity or (3) preliminary to engaging in
a trade or business.461 Moreover, most, but not all, of the R & D
45G Hicks v. United States, 72-1 U.S.T.C. U 9383 (S.D. Miss. 1972); C~\·en!ler v.
United States, 71-2 U.S.T.C. 11 9723 (S.D. W.Va. 1970); Gross \". United States, 71-2
U.S.T.C. 11 9715 (N.D. Fla. 1971).
-157 Martin C. McGowan, 23 T.C.M. 1349 (1964), u.ff'cl, 347 F.2d 728 (7th Cir. 1965).
-158 Compare James E. Austin, 35 T.C. 221 (1960), aff'cl, 298 F.2d :iS3 (2d Cir. 1062),
with C. Fink Fischer, 50 T.C. 164 (1968) aud Hofuumn Bros. Realty Corp., 22 T.C.'M.
1678 (1963).
45n See, e.g., Joseph V. Curran, 29 T.C.M. 696 (1970).
4Go Edwin S. Snow, 58 T.C. 585 (1972), af!'cl, 73-2 U.S.T.C. U 9559 (6th Cir. 1973),
cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3382 (U.S. J:m. 7, 1974) (failure to hol!l one's self out);
William Tiffin Dowus, 49 T.C. 533 (1968) (failure to mauufucture or sell); Charles H.
Scl1affer, 23 T.C.~I. 927 (196!) (failure to hold one's self out).
461 Profit IIIotiv~: Charles H. Schaffer, 23 T.C.M. 927 (196!). Regulnrity and Continuity: Stanton v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1968). But see :Myron Edwin
Cherry, 26 T.C.li. 557 (1967) (profit moti\'e and engaged in as business eeparotc
requirements: latter cvi<lenced by (1) de\'otion of subst:mtial time, (2) repmtcd or
a-tensive activity, (3) holding one's self out as engaged in ncth·ity and (4) business·
like conduct of all aspects of acti'rity related to 11rofit). Preliminary to Engaging in
a Tra<le or Business: Edwin S. Snow, 58 T.C. 585 (1972), aff'tl, 73-2 U.S.T.C. fl 9559
(6th Cir. 1973), cat. gmntccl, 42 U.S.L.W. 3382 (U.S. Jun. 7, 1974); William Tiffin
Dowus, 49 T.C. 533 (1968).
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cases under section 174 could havE.' been decided on continuity
and regularity or profit motive criteria alone. 462
PREPARATORY TO ENGAGING IN A TRADE OR BusiNESS:

NONAGRICULTURAL

Ironically, the primary significance of the holding om~ 's sHlf
out doctrine lies not in the doctrine itsE.'lf, but rather in its utilization as a conceptual und€'rpinning for the prE'paratory to engaging in a trade or businE'ss approach, which appears to be more
frequently applied to tax shelter (deferral) situations than to
hobby losses. Cleoplms L. J( emzedy best illustrates this point:
Ordinarily, carrying on a trade or business "invol~es holding one's
self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services." Deputy
v. DuPont 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940).
[E]ven though a taxpayer has made a firm decision to l'nter into
business and over a considerable period of time spent money in
preparation for entering that business, ht> still has not '' en~a~ed in
carrying on any trade or busint>ss" within the intendment of section 162 (a) until such time as the business has begun to function
as a goin~ concern and performed those activities for which it was
organized. [Footnote omitted.]
R1"chmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F. 2d 901, 907 (C.A.
4, 1965), vacated and remanded on other grounds 382 U.S. 68 (1965)
(see also the cases cited therein).
Riverside did not begin to function as a ~oing concern until tlu• clnh•
it first opened its doors to the public-Septt>mber 12, 1969. Albeit
Mr. Kennedy was legally capable of filling prescriptions at un em•lier
date because of having acquired the requisite licenses, the ubility to
transact business does not satisfy the "carrying on'' requirement of
the statute. Therefore, we hold that none of the phnrmacy-relutecl expenditures made prior to opening on September 12, 1960, is deductible
by petitioners under section 162(a).
Mr. Kennt>cly's preo1wnin~ expenditures were incurred in creating 11
business which would ultimately produce incomp taxable to Riverside
after incorporation. 463
4G2 See, e.g., Stanton v. Comm'r, 3!l!l ~'.2<1 326 (5th Cir. 1!l68); Oliver B. Kill'Oy, 32
T.C.M. No. 7 nt 2!l (1!l73) ("It is dear that Kchoy's isolnt(.'d rcselll"(.'b effort l'oUitl
not by itself t·onstitutc a trade or business. ).[:u·tin ;'l[ayrath, 41 'f.C. G82, GSO (1004),
aff'cl, 357 F.2d 200 (C.A. 5, 1966), John }'. Koons, 3;; T.C. 10!12, 1100 (1061)").
But sec Edwin S. Snow, JS T.C. 58;) (1072), aff'tl, 73-2 U.KT.<.J. ~ !J55!l (6th Clr.
1!l73).
4Ga 32 T.C.l\L 52, ;;;; (l!l73); see Snow v. Conun'r, 73-2 U.S.'l'.C. ~ !l.iGO (6th Cir.
1073), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3382 (U.S. Jan. 7, 1!l74). Tho conelusiou in li.clmccly
that ability to transm·t businl.'ss docs not satisfy the cmTying on requirement should bo
conb11stcd with C'cl"il H:uulolph Ihnulll'y, Jr., 48 T.C. 33!l, 348 (1!l07).
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Early Development

Many of the preopening expense decisions do not elt>arly articulate any rationale to support the conclusion that preopening.
preparatory or start-up costs are not incurred in carrying on a
trade or business. The issue arose in report<.•d decisions as early
as 1929 when the majority of th<.> then Board of Ta.'\: AppC'als held
in Harrisb'urg Hospital, Inc., that " 'operation of a tradt> or
business regularly carried on hy tlw taxpayer' " for tltt:> purpose of the net operating loss proYisions of tlw R<.•vem1o Act of
1925 '''as not satisfied wlwre the taxpayer was not actually t:>ngaged
in carrying on a trade or husin<.>ss, hut was "nwn•ly making
pre1Jarations to carry on its husin<'SS and was in tlw process of
erecting a hospital for that purpose.'' 46' :Xo furtlwr t•xplanation
was offf:'red, but tlw facts disc lost> that during the 1wriod in question
the hospital was in the process of construction and arrangt•nu.•nts
were being JWrfected for its O!Jl'ration, no inconll' was n•ceived
until the construction was comvleh•d and opN·ation of the hospital was begun in a subsequent year.
The Board subsequently followed llm-rislmrtl Hospital in
379 lJiadison .A:ve1zue, Inc. 465 There, in 1922 the taxpayer lt•ased
land, commenced construction of an office building, st•cured t<>nants
and incurrPd rental agt>nt commissions. The taxpayt•r maintained
its business was carri<.>d on from thl• mom<.•nt it acquirl'd the ll•asehold and connuenc<.>d construction sincP it wa~ authorized to do
so by its chartPr, hence, such activitiC's constituted part of its
businf:'ss. Tlw Board of Tax Ap1wals disagrl•t•d, n•asoning that a
preliminary lleriod of pn•paration-of gPtting rt•ady to earry on
a businPss-did not constitutP operating a tradt• or husim•ss. In
the eyes of the Board all of tlw tax}Ja)"l'l' 's aeth·itit•s wt•rt• pros}ll'Ctive. Tlw Second Circuit rt•vprscd tlw lowt•r court.
Certainly the corporation was "carrying on business" within the ordinary meaning of that phrase, and within its meanin:r in section 1000
of the R-evenue Act of 1921 imposing a special excise tax with respect to
"carrying on or doing business." 42 Stat. 294. See R<'~- 64, arts. 11,
12; Associated Furniture Corp 'n v. United States (Ct. t'l.) 4-1 F.
2d) 78. Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy· C'o., 220 H. S. lOS. 171, 31 H. C't.
342, 55 L. Ed. 389, Ann. C'as. 1912B, 1312. We St:"e nu rt:'asnn why
4G415 B.T.A. 1014, 1018 (1929). It has been argued tlmt su~h e:.peuses slloultl be
treate<l :ts organizational C.'I:}Jeulliturcs :nuortiz:tblc umlcr ~·timt :HS. Currutlwrs, How
to Treat the Erpe11.~es of Organization, Reorganization aml Liqui!latitJII1 2-1 X.Y.L".
INST. 105Zi, 1062 (1966). See generally Comment, Tire J)rtlurtibilit!l 11/ Prc-lztrtiTJIOra·
tion Erpe11ses, 20 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 4631 473-76 (1970).
4Gs 23 B.T.A. 29 (1931), J"CV'!l, GO F.2d GS (2d ('ir. 1932).
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in section 204 a similar meaning should not be ascribed to the phrase
"business regularly carried on," provided the corporate activities have
continuity and are of normal character. So much is implied by the
word "regularly"; it excludes isolated or unusual transactions. See
Auburn & Alton Coal Co. v. United States, 61 Ct. Cl. 438, 444; Bedell
v. Commissioner, 30 F. (2d) 622, 625 (C.C.A.2). In the case at bar,
the corporation was continuously engaged in 1922 in carrying on the
business for which it was chartered. It not only acquired a leasehold
and prosecuted the erection of its building, but it employed real estate
brokers, made leases of space to prospective tenants, and collected nearly
$50,000 of rentals paid in advance. In improving its real estate, ncgo·
tiat~ng leases, and incurring the expenses which it seeks to deduct, it
was prosecuting its normal activities and was regularly carrying on
its business even though that business was not yet at full flower. We
think the claimed net loss deductions should have been allowcd. 4G6

Mter this brief development the preliminary to carrying on
a trade or business issue remained relatively dormant for a
decade and a half until George G. Westervelt. 461 There the Tax
Court using preparatory language concluded that a trade or business did not exist at the stage (actually in advance of the start-up
or preopening period) where the taxpayer incurred expense prior
to and for the purpose of reaching a decision whether to establish a business. The decade of the fifties saw considerable litigation concerning such investigatory expenses, and it now appears
well established that they must be capitalized under the theory
that they are not incurred in an existing trade or business.
Overlooking the earlier Harrisb'ttrg Hospital and 379 Madison
Avenue development, in the early 1960's the Tax Court extended
the investigatory cases to the start-up stage in two areas : R & D
expenditures under section 174 and farm losses. 468 The latter de4oo 379 Madison Ave., Inc. v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 68, 69 (2d Cir 1932). Tho Supremo
Court in Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212 (1941), bold that the Flint v. Stolle Trclct/lino of
cases (the articulated basis for decision in Mac1ison Avenue) was not precedent for whnt
constituted a trade or business for purposes of section 162. However, tho issue in
Higgins was whether tho activities in question constituted a trade or business in con·
trast to investment activities. Arguably, therefore, Higgins docs render reliance upon
Madison Avenue risky in determining when a trade or business commences. While cqunt·
ing business with corporate purposes, a premise of Madison Avenue, mny bo erroneous
under more recent decisions such ns Adirondnck League Club, 55 T.O. 7961 817 (11171) 1
aff'cl, 458 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion), the snme concurring opinion
read Flint v. Stone Tracy as enunciating a profit motive test. 55 T.C. nt 816.
4G7 8 T.C. 1248 (1947). Sec generally Fleischer, Tile Tax Treat111cnt of Expenses In·
curred in Investigation for a Business or Capital Investment, 14 TAX L. REv. 567 (1950).
4os In T.R. Ewart, 25 T.C.M. 96 (1966), apparently the only reported decision in this
area in which the taxpayer chose to rely upon .Jlaclison Avenue, tho Tnx Court brushed
such reliance aside without analysis under the unconvincing rubric thnt tho fncts before
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velopment is considered separately because of its significance and
the impact of different ta.-x: accounting rules applicable to farmer
taxpayers. In John F. Koons 469 the Ta.-x: Court reasoned that
the reference in section 174 to trade or business by virtue of the
committee report citation to section 162 dictated that the "concept was not intended to encompass all activities engaged in for
profit, but was used in the realistic and practical sense of a
going trade or business.'' 470 The ta.-x:payer lmd purchased an invention that was in a prelinlinary laboratory state and ltad entered
into a development contract with a research laboratory to bring
the invention to maturity as a practical device. The ta.xpayer
sought to deduct the amounts paid for such development services
under section 174. The Koons court coneluded that the development activity was preliminary to the coming into existence of a
business. "Expenditures made in investigating a potential new
trade or business, or preparatory to entering into such business,
do not, in our opinion, qualify for the application of section
174(a)(1)." 471 • Neither Koons nor its progeny in the R & D
area considered the distinction between investigatory and developmental or start-up expenses. :Moreover, most if not all such
decisions could have been decided under the existing profit motive,
continuity or holding one's self out authorities under section 162.
Richmond Television Corp.

The leading preopening expenses decision, Richmond Television
Corp. v. United States,472 was neither a farm loss nor a R & D
case, although influenced to some degree by the latter trend. At
issue was the deductibility of preopening eA--penses incurred prior
to receipt of a FCC license and initiation of commercial broadcasting in training a staff to operate a television broadcasting
station. The Fourth Circuit viewed the question as the deductibility of preopening expenses incurred between the decision to
establish a business and actual beginning of business operations,
noting that investigatory expenses were indisputably capital expenditures. It acknowledged that prior decisions contained "little
it were quite different from those in Jladison .o~h:enue and found Ute expellEeS in qucs·
tion to be nondeductible investigntory e.-..11cnses.
46~ 35 T.C. 1092 (1961).
470 .John F. Koons, 35 T.C. 1092, 1100 (1961).
471 I d. at 1101.
472 345 F.2d 901, 905-07 (4th Cir.), 1:acatcd and remanded per curiam on otheT
grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965).
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discussion of the question of when, in point of time, a trade or
business actually begins.'' 473
The government in fact had not argued this issue in its brief
to the Fourth Circuit, rather, it had asserted that (1) the training of the staff created a capital asset in the form of a reservoir
of skills with continuing benefits over a period of years and
(2) charging against the first year's income of the business
through net operating loss deductions the large outlays required
to enter into it would produce a gross distortion of the taxable
income for that year. 474 The taxpayer responded in its brief
that there was no legal requirement that expenses must produce
income in the year that they are incurred and the expense of
training employees was traditionally an ordinary and necessary
expense. It further attempted to distinguish Petersb~trg Television
Corp., one of the decisions cited by the Department of Justice
on appeal but not discussed in a preopening context, on the
grounds that (1) the taxpayer there conceded it was not E:>ngaged
in business prior to granting of the FCC license and (2) the prebusiness authorities relied upon therein involved investigatory
expenses. 475
V\TJ1ile the Richmond Television court accepted the government's
acquisition of staff theory as an alternative holding, it first proceeded to survey several investigatory and preopening decisions
concluding that:
The uniform teaching of these several cases is that, even though a
taxpayer has made a firm decision to enter into business and over ll
considerable period of time spent money for preparation for entering
that business, he still has not ''engaged in carrying on any trade or
business" within the intendment of section 162(a) until such time as
the business has begun to function as a going concern and performed
those activities for which it is organized.476.
Riclnnond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 9011 905 (4th Cir. 1965),
Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Richmond Television Corp. v. United Stutes, 345 F.2d
901 (4th Cir.), vacated ancl remamled per curiam 011 other groumls, 382 U.S. OS (1965).
The government reiterated this argument before the Supreme Court, and Snow v.
Comm'r, 73-2 U.S.T.C. 'II 9559 (6th Cir. 1973), analyzed the preparatory to engaging
in a trade or business concept (which it bottomed on the holding one's sol£ out doctrine
in the context of preventing the use of section 174 to effect "unintended tnx shelters11 ),
475 Brief for Appellee at 9-12, Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345
F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68
(1965).
47G 345 F.2d at 907. With one exception these cases were either investigatory cnscs
or the probusiness holding was superfluous since the expenditures were clearly capitnl
under traditional criteria (the television license decisions). That exception, Cohn v,
473

474
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In requesting that the Supreme Court grant a writ of certiorari
ta.~payer asserted that the decision
presented an important unsettled ta.~ question: "\Vlten hns a
corporation's business commenced so that admittedly ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred in starting up are deductible
as expenses and are not capital." 477 The government, in opposition to the granting of the writ, primarily justified the Fourth
Circuit's result on the alternative staff training ground, citing
numerous cases and other authorities to support thnt rationale.
It reiterated that permitting the (NOL) deduction would result
in a gross distortion of income. As to the preopening concept of
the Fourth Circuit, the Solicitor General stated:

in Richmond Television the

Petitioner relies upon § 162 of the Code as authorizing the instant
deductions. In line with the requirement that pre-operating expenditures must be capitalized, that provision allows a deduction for only
those expenses "paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or busi1~ess." The court of appeals correctly held that
petitioner did not carry on any trade or business duling the years
1953-1955 and that the costs here in question were thus nondeductible
capital expenditures.478

Of course, the requirement for which no authority was cited by
the government had been virtually resurrected by the Fourth Circuit in Richmond Television, so that the government was indulging
in a bootstrap argument. Despite the government's rather passive
role in the formulation of the preopening expense doctrine by
the Richnwnd Television court, it immediately relied upon the
decision in farm loss controversies (to little avail) and more
recently has begun to rely upon it in the area of corporate preopening expenses.479
The Supreme Court did not address the preopening issue in
Richmond Television, consequently, it remains unsettled ..cso For
United States, 57-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 9457 (W.D. Tenn. 1957) is partinlly finwt:d by heavy
reliance on the erroneous definition of capital expenditures as nonrecurring expenditures.
477 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 51 Richmond Television Corp. v. United State:'!,
382

u.s.

68 (1965).

Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 3, Richmond Television Corp. Y.
United States, 382 U.S. 68 (1965) (emphasis added).
479 Compare Worrell v. United States, 254 F. Snpp. 99~ (S.D. Tex. 19GG) and
Whitman v. United States, 248 F. Snpp. 845 (W.D. La. 19w), tritll Clropbll!3 L.
Kennedy, 32 T.C.M. No. 15 _(1973).
480 The Supreme C.onrt did not address the preopening expense issue but merely
remanded for consideration of whether the taxpayer was entitled to amortization deductions for ~-penses not derived from the NOL carry forwurds (which had been the
focus of the lower court controversy). Interestingly on that remand the Fourth Cir·
478
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despite the Fourth Circuit's opinion there is ample authority in
various provisions in the regulations that a corporation commences
business as soon as its activities have advanced to the extent
necessary to establish the nature of its business operations. ''For
example, the acquisition of operating assets which are necessary
to the type of business contemplated may constitute the beginning
of business.'' 481 ·while it might be argued that beginning a
business, here for purposes of section 248, as well as of section
1.1371-l(a)(2) of the regulations, is not the same as carrying
on a trade or business, the same approach is used in determining when a corporation commences the active conduct of any trade
or business under sections 955(c) and 1372(e) (5). Thus, the active
conduct, for instance, of a restaurant business can commence in
the taxable year in which construction of the restaurant facility is
undertaken or real property is purchased or leased for such
use. 482 Indeed, the Service has ruled that developmental planning,
negotiating for financing and readying property for construction
constitutes being engaged in the active conduct of a trade or
business. 483 Furthermore, the Administration Proposals for Tax
Change (Tax Reform Bill of 1973) implicitly acknowledge that
cuit's restatement of its earlier holding omitted the preopening rationale ancl instead
mentioned only its alternative capitalization holding. Richmond Television Corp. v. United
States, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965).
481 Reg. § 1.248-1(a)(3); accorcl, Reg. § 1.1371-1 (c) (2) (ii). Sec, Mamlell, Declue·
tibility of Pre-Operating Expense: Successful and Unsuccessful Pcnturcs, 25 N.Y.U.
INST. 1235 (1967); Note, Federal Income Tax Treatment of BusiMss aml Employment
Investigatory Expenses, 56 1\fiNN. L. REV. 1157, 1164 n.28 (1972), The district court
iu Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 66-2 U.S.T.C. ~ 9589 (E.D. Vn. 1963),
clearly relied upon these regulations in giving the jury instructions as to when a
business commences. Unfortunately, before the Fourth Circuit tho taxpayer merely rolled
upon the section 248 regulations for the somewhat attenuated argument that sinco start·up
costs were not mentioned in such regulations as chargeable to caiJital account they wore
not required to be capitalized. Brief for Appellee at 15, Richmond Television Corp. v.
United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated aml remanded per curiam on oilier
grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965). Ironically, while many commentators have suggested that
the section 248 strongly supports the argument that trmle or business status can attach
prior to full grown operations, its first explicit presentation to a court after Ricl1moncl
Television was an individual hobby loss case, rather than a prcoperntiug expense caso.
Justin A. McNamara, 32 T.C.:.\f. 11, 16 (1973). Instead of pointing out that tho ace·
tion 248 regulations speak only to when a business conuucnces nml not to whether the
requisite profit motive is present, the Tax Court broaclly announced: 110ur attention bas
not been called to, nor have we found any case which hol!ls or oven implies that tho
test set forth in section 1.248-1(a) (3) has any applicability to cleterminiug whether an
enterprise in other than corporate form was actually entered into n traclo or business for
purposes of section 162(a)."
482 Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (5) (ii) (b); accord, Reg. § 1.9S5-5(a) (3).
483 Rev. Rul. 72-220, 1972-1 C.B. 365.
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construction period or preopening expenses in the context of rental
real estate are currently deductible.484
RATIONALEs FOR START-UP CosTs

In addition to the state of hopeless confusion as to when a
business begins, the various rationales for capitalization of
start-up costs that can be gleaned from case law-(1) increase in
earning power or providing benefits to future years, (2) integral
part of constructed asset and (3) the requirement of holding one's
self out-all carry with them their own contrary precedents and
attendant confusion.
Increase in Earning Power

In llfid-State Prod'ucts Co.485 the Ta.x Court concluded that
expenses-which the taxpayer had originally capitalized on its
books as "Deferred Development and Preoperating E::>..1Jense" and
had then offset against related income earned in future tax
years, but at trial maintained in the alternative should have been
deducted when incurred-:were capital items although of a type
ordinarily deductible currently as ordinary and necessary expenses. "Here the expenditures were designed and intended to
in.crease the earning capacity of petitioner beyond that of the
shell egg business, for which it was organized and in which it was
engaged, by setting up and establishing a new and additional
business, namely, that of producing and selling dried eggs in
which operations actually began in the next succeeding year." 486
Nevertheless, otherwise deductible expenditures that expand the
capacity of an existing business or a new business related to an
existing business are currently deductible. 487 For example, it has
484 TAX REFORM BILL OF 1973, ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS FOR TAX CHA!\GE 'WJTli
TREASURY EXPLANATION, 93D CoNG., 1ST SESS. 99 (Comm. Print 1973). The commit·
tee print speaks of "otherwise deductible construction period or 'pre-opening' costs which
by their nature precede the income to which they relate," including interest, tnxC3 nnd
costs deductible under section 162 or 212 such ns "mrumgcment, brokerngc nnd legal
fees, insurance, advertising, and transfer nnd recording fees." While UEC of "othenrua
deductible" indicates a surface neutrality ns to whether preopening expenses nrc deductible,
the enumerated deductible section 162 or 212 preopening expenses would not be deductible
if .Richmond Television were applicable to construction period expCDEe3. See Hnmovit,
Construction Period Expenses, 29 N.Y.U. INST. 1075, 1079 (1971). Cf. Dean, Taz Con·
siderations and Problems of tlze Developer-Builder, 26 N.Y.U. INST. 2091 !!10 (1968).
485 21 T.C. 696 (1954).
486 Mid·State Products Co., 21 T.C. 696, 714 (1954).
487 See, e.g•• York v. C<~mm'r, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958); Best Uni\"ercal Lilclt
Co., 45 T.C. 1 (1965); Kenneth Reiner, 24 T.C.M. 1005 (1965).
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been held in a number of cases that advertising expenses, even
though incurred heavily in a certain year with resulting benefits
over future years, are currently deductible in the year in which
expended.488 Thus, increase in earning power or benefit to future
years is not alone sufficient, otherwise all ordinary and necessary
business expenditures resulting in greater profit would have to
be capitalized, which is not the law. It might be argued that
deductibility should not obtain if the preopening trade or busiM
ness is properly viewed as essentially a separate and distinct
additional asset. An answer may be that as soon as the business
commences, any further start-up expenditures are expanding the
earning capacity of an existing business and do not create or
enhance an additional asset-with a business commencing as
soon as its activities establish the nature of operations. In any
event in this area of intangible contributions (advertising, start-up
costs) to an intangible asset (a company's position in the market
or its earning capacity) "the rulings and decisions are in a state
of hopeless confusion.'' 489
Integral Part of Construction

Some decisions have allocated preopening expenses, such as
cleaning up a construction site, to the basis of the taxpayer's
newly constructed principal assets on the theory that such expenditures are an integral part of the total cost of such assets. 400
A distinction is drawn, however, in this context between payments
for services performed in carrying on the business of the taxpayer and for the acquisition of something of permanent use
or value in that business.491 In essence preopening or startMup
costs consist of expenditures of the same nature as deductible expenses the taxpayer will incur in carrying on his trade or business
after it comes into full flower, but which are made prior to that
488 See, e.g., E.H. Sheldon & Co. v. Comm'r, 214 F.2d 655, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1054).
While the Tax Court recently concluded from the same precedents relied upon in
E.H. Sheldon that advertising, albeit ordinarily deductible, is capital where mnde fer
the cultivation of business the benefits of which will be realized in future yeura, it
was reversed by the Second Circuit. Briarcliff Candy Corp., 31 T.C.M. 171 (1972) 1 rcv'd,
73-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 9288 (2d Cir. 1973).
489 Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm'r, 73-1 U.S.'l'.C. ~ 9288 (2d Cir. 1973),
490 Herbert Shainberg, 33 T.C. 241 (1959); see Ben Perlmutter, 44 T.O. 382 (1956),
aff'd, 373 F.2d 45 (lOth Cir. 1967). Of. Acer Realty Co., 45 B.T.A. 3331 337 (1941) 1 aff'c1,
132 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1942).
491 Suckow Borax Mines Consol., Inc., 12 T.C.M. 786 (1953). See Accr Realty v. Comm'r,
132 F.2d 512, 514 (8th Cir. 1942).
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time. Accordingly, preopening <:>xpenses should be viewed as more
in the nature of exp<:>nses incurred in carrying on the business
rather than for acquisition of a capital asset, particularly since
the business has already couunenced, and are therefore
deductible.492
Holding One's Self Out

The holding one's self out doctrine was alluded to by the Fourth
Circuit in Riclzmond Television. and clt>arly n•lit>d upon in Cleoplws
Kennedy as supporting nondeductibility under st>etion 162 of
preopening exp<:>nses. There appPars to lw no direct prPeCd(.>nt contrary to this doctrine. Rath<:>r, a numlwr of hobby loss decisions
hold for the taxpay<:>r without discussion of this doctrine on facts
disclosing no sales or advertising, so that the ta.xpaycr could
hardly have been holding hims(•lf out as selling goods or servic('S.
A more fundamental obj<:>ction is that in Deputu t'. DuPont this
hallmark of trade or business was intended to t•xcludt• from that
term investment activities, wher<:> the ta.xpayer ne\·er can provide
goods or services to others. By contrast thP ta.xpayer in th(• preopening business will ultimately providt• goods or sPn"ices to
others. In short, the test was dPsigned to distinguish between
trade or business and investuwnt activities and not to determine
·when a trade or business has commenced. :Moreover, e\·en if this
doctrine is applicable to preop<:>ning ent<>rprises, it does not extc:>nd
to section 212 so that individuals (hut not corporations, to which
section 212 is unavailable) would be abl<> to deduct their preopening expenses under that pro\"ision.493 Such potential dis492 Sec Colorado Springs Nation.'ll Bank v. United States, 73-2 U.S.T.('. 11 9795 (D. Col.
1973); cf. DL-rie Frostecl Foocls Ine., 6 T.C.!If. !iSG (19-!7) (wbere sen·i~es perfomu:tl in
carrying on regular business of employer :nul not extmortlirmry rompelts.'ltiou, tbey ar~
not to be eapitalize<l). See Ellentuck, Taz Asz1ccts or Oroani.:-ino antl O[leratino Hotels
and Motels, 29 N.Y.U. IxsT. 887, 900 (1971) {preopening ex1lenses of recurring nature
should be cousiclered section 16:?. expenses). The Colorado Sprinos National Banl; court
analyzed the deductibility of tbe "start-up t·osts'' of n Muster Charge ~urd operation, a
new type of business not just :m extension of the lemliug fielrl, cf. York \'. Comm'r, !:!Gl
F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958), ou the basis of the tr:tditiotUII orrlilmry versus cnpitnl factors.
The court thougltt that it w:ts faced with :1 case of first illlllressiou nltltouglt it noted thnt
several start-up costs cases were pemliug in the Tax Court.
493 It should be noted, however, tlmt the Tax Court in p11rlmps the leading im·estigntory
decision, :Morton Fmnk, 20 T.C. 511, :>14 (19.53), helrl that the predecessor to Ecrtion 212
was not applicable to preparatory expenses bcl'ause that pro\•isiou wns limited to expenses
of "producing or collecting income in wbicb one has :m existent interest or rigbt.11 In·
vestigatory c..xpeuses were viewed as ell.-penscs incurrecl in :m uttempt to obtain income by
the creation of some new interest, which might in the future pro\·e protlnl'th·e of income.
This existing interest requirement has long :md soumlly been criticized by commentatora.
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crimination between similarly situated different classes of tax~
payers has recently strongly influenced the Second Circuit to
reverse a Tax Court decision which held that items such as
advertising which would ordinarily b€' currently deductible may
be capital in nature when they are made for the cultivation or
development of business, the benefits of which will be realized in
future years. 494
MATCHING INCOMB AND DEDUCTIONS

The government's arguments on brief to the Fourth Circuit
and the Supreme Court in Richmond Television clearly expose
that its goal in the preopening expense area is to match start~up
deductions with the related income ultimately produced. This conclusion is corroborated by the Limitation on Artificial Accounting
Losses (LAL) currently proposed by the administration. Th(;1
LAL is designed to preclude tax shelters that arise from the
deduction of artificial tax losses from an activity against unrelated
income. The LAL 's remedy is to defer deduction of such accelerated deductions, i.e., deductions clearly related to some future
expected profit, until such related profit or income is generated,
at which time the deferred losses are deducted against such income. The Treasury views the LAL as a framework of a reasonable matching of income and expense.
Among other items artificial tax losses include otherwise deductible construction period preopening costs (which are illustrated
by a number of expenses stated to be deductible under section
162 or section 212 as well as other provisions) that by their nature
precede the income to which they relate 495-obviously the Treasury places little faith in the Richmond Television preopening expense doctrine despite considerable speculation by commentators
See, e.g., "\Vilberding, An Inclit:itlual's Business Investigation Expenses: .A11 Argument
Supporting Deductibility, 26 TAX LAWYER 219, 230-32 (1973). Note, Investigation Costs:
An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 TEMPLE L.Q. 81, 90-95 (1967). Regnrdless of tho vnlidlty
of investigatory authorities, a strong cuse ~an be mmlc thnt they nrc not npplicnblo to
start-up costs. Sec Solomon, Tax Treatment of Pre-Opening Expenses, 46 TA..,a:s li21
(1968); Erbacher, Start-Up Costs: Arc Tiley De(luctiblr: by a Corporation for Fcclcrccl
Income Tax Purposes, 48 TAXES 488 (1970). '!'he preexisting interest rule woul<l nppenr
particularly subject to this argument since the taxpayer hus tho interest, it moroly is uot
yet income producing. "Expenses paid or incurred in managing, conserving, or mniutalnlug
property held for investment mny be clcductiblc under section 212 even though tho property
is not currently productive . . . ." Reg. § 1.212-(b).
494 Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm'r, 73-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 9288 (2d Cir. 1973).
495 See note 484 supra.
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of its effect on the deductibility of start-up costs incurred in the
construction of rental real estate.
PREPARATORY TO ENGAGI~G I~ A TRADE OR

BusiNESS : FARM LossEs

.Another accelerated deduction in Treasury's eyes consists of
expenses relative to crops or livestock which would not produce
income until a future time and it belie\·es would be capitalized or
inventoried in a business other than farming. 496 Indeed, the recapture provisions of section 1251 are inapplicable if a farmer
elects to capitalize such expenditures.497 The legislative history to
that provision describes the tax treatnwnt of such exp€'nses as
follows:
In most businesses, the cost of constructing an asset (including maintenance of the asset prior to its being used in the business) is a capital
expenditure which may not be deducted as incurred but may be recovered only by depreciation over the useful life of the asset. In this
manner, the cost of the asset is matched with the income earned by
the asset. Farmers, however, have been permitted to deduct some admittedly capital costs as they are incurred. For example, a citrus grove
may not bear a commercial crop until 6 or 7 years after it has been
planted. Yet, the farmer may elect to deduct as incurred all costs of
raising the grove to a producing state e\•en though such expenditures
are capital in nature. Similarly, the capital nature of expenditures associated with the raising of livestock held for breeding may be ignored,
and the expenditures may be deducted currcntly.49B
496

See notes 549 through 550

i11/ra

and accompanying text.

m I.R.C. § 1251(b) (4) (A).
498 S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. l!i3 (1969). The premiw of this entire
analysis is that farm development ~osts arc capital t>xpcmditurcs which the go\·emment
has given farmers the option to capitalize. This premise may, hO\\'l'\'l'r, be wiously questioned. First, wltile the regulations ha\·e proville1l since 19~2 Umt "[n]mounts expended
in the development of f:mns, orchards, aml randtes prior to the time wheu the producti'l'e
state is reached may be regar<led as investments of capital," nrtirlc 110 of reculation G2
(1922) (which the Treasury interprctt>1l in I.T. 1610, II-1 C.B. Sa (19!!3), liS gh·iug the
taxpayer the option of treating sm·h amounts :ts expenses or capitalizing them), in Mimeo·
graph 6030, 19·!6-2 C.B. 45, dcclarccl obsolete in Revenue Ruling 67-1~3, 1967-1 C.B. 383,
386, the Service took the position that the eorrt>et interpretation of this prodsion of the
regulations was that the taxpayer has the option only to cnpitalizc otherwise ordinary nud
necessary current expenses <luring the <levt>lopmt>nt llcrio!l, but l":tnnot treat capitnl iteDIS
as ordinary and necessary expenses. Tn short, it is submittt>d thnt the spceial fnrm true
accounting rules permit capitalization of ordinary aucl necessary l'Xpen&>s, not ~pcnsing of
capital costs. But see Welder v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Tex. 1971), a[f'd
per curiam, 72-2 U.S.T.C. 1f 9628 (5th Cir. 1972).
The validity of Mimeograph 6030 wns accepted by the Tax Court in Thomrson & Folger
Co., 17 T.C. 722, 728 (1951); nml in Richard R. Wilbur, 43 T.C. 322 (1964), the court
elaborated that Ulllcss the expenditure wns clearly cll'ductible or fell within tho groy nrca
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The parallelisms between this understanding of the nature of
farm expenses and rationales used to support the preparatory to
engaging in a trade or business doctrine are obvious and, not sur·
prisingly, the first decision after Mid-State Prod~ccts to extend the
investigatory expense development to start-up costs was a farm
loss deCision, Edu·in H. Miner. 499 The taxpayer there clearly had
gone beyond the investigatory stage presented in Westervelt. He
had chosen to build up his herd to a profitable size-a process in his
case lasting seven to eight years, which would not be completed
until at least three years beyond the tax years at issue-by the
natural increase method rather than initially purchasing the
requisite number of cattle. The Tax Court held:
[T]he most that can be said of petitioner's beef-raising activities during the taxable years here involved (as well as before and after them)
is, that he was endeavoring to build up a herd of animals which would
enable him to engage in a cattle business, that might prove profitable
at some future time. The expenses incident to such a herd build-up
were, accordingly, of a capital nature, and hence not currently de·
ductible. They wc1·e analogous to the amassing of the capital assets srtoh
as the plant and machinery of a manufacturing business, prcpamtory
to the actual beginning of business operations.Goo

It is clear that the liiiner court was applying what it believed
to be the general accounting rules for acquisition of an asset used
in a taxpayer's trade or business to the activity of raising cattle.
"The Supreme Court in U1tited States v. Gatto pointed out, however, that the general accounting rules (capitalization) applicable
to the costs incurred in the development of assets used in a
trade or business, the basis for the Miner holding, contain an
exception for farmers. 501
(aspects of expense in current maintenance of an existing but nonproducing nssot nnd of
capital costs in acquisition of a future productive asset), no option was nvnilublc--thcy
must be capitalized. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit recently pointed out in Mnplo v. Com·
missioner, 440 F.2d 1055 n.3 (9th Cir. 1971), that were not devolopmentul expenses cur·
rently deductible under the pre-Tax Reform Act law, thoro would lmvo been little need
for new section 278 which requires capitalization of expenses incurred in tho fh'st four
years of developing :t citrus grove. In addition, IRS, U.S. TREASURY DEP''l', l'UULtcNrtoN
No. 225, :b'ARMER's TA.\: GUIDE 27 (1973), has 1·eturned to this unnlysis in 1008 nnd subso·
qucnt editions: "Pre· productive period. When your land is in this period, you huvo un
option of deducting or capitalizing your expenditures that arc current ordinary ancl 11COCS•
sary business cxpc11scs. For example, this option would apply to amounts spent for upkeep
expenses, taxes, interest, and other carrying charges, wnter for irrigation, fertilizer, cultl·
vating and SIJrayiug trees.''
4DD 21 T.C.M. 1173 (1962).
5oo Edwin II. 1\liner, 21 T.C.M. 1173, 1177 (1902) (emphasis added).
501 384 U.S. 102, 106 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Farm tax accounting rules traditionally divide the life of a
farm into three states: preparatory, developmental and productive.502 Preparatory expenses are those incurred prior to the raising
of agricultural commodities or products in order that the farmer
may begin the growing process.603 Such expenses (typically clearing land, leveling and conditioning land, planting trees and building irrigation systems) may not be deducted under section 162,
but must be capitalized.604 Developmental expenditures are incurred by the taxpayer so that the growing process, once commenced, may continue in the desired manner.605 These eJ\-penses
correspond to start-up costs in other areas. Such expenditures
are said to have both capital and business or ordinary natures:
they are ordinary in that they are similar to the eJ\-penses required to maintain or keep up the agricultural items (e.g., trees
or livestock) once they become productive; at the same time they
might be considered as part of, and directly related to, the cost
of acquiring a producing agricultural item, and as such display
the characteristics of capital outlays.606 Because of this dual nature,
the Service has long permitted taxpayers the option of currently
deducting or capitalizing such developmental expenditures 507purely capital expenditures cannot be deducted during the developmental period and after the productive stage is reached,
such upkeep or maintenance expenditures must be currently deducted.508 The policy supporting an election during the developmental period is apparently to enable farmers who have no outside income to capitalize such expenses rather titan creating net
operating losses which might expire prior to earning offsetable
taxable income.509 The productive state is reached when the farm
becomes a full-fledged operating business-generally when crops
502 See DICKINSON, FARM AND RANCH EXPENSES AND CREDITS, BNA TAX MAN'AO&!!E:lT
PoRTFOLio No. 208, A-8 (1969); Comment, Deductible Dct:elopment and Consen:ation Ez·
penditures for Farmers, 7 HousTON L. RE:V. 277, 236 (1969).
so3 Robert L. Maple, 27 T.C.M. 944, 950 (1968), a[f'd, 440 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1971).
In Maple the Commissioner argued that preparatory expenses are "initial nonrecurring,
basic, one-shot ell.-penses or an expense that is capital in nature or is n component of the
cost of acquiring a complete capital asset.''
so4 Mim. 6030, 1946-2 C.B. 45, 46, declared obsolete in Rev. Rul. 67-1!!3, 1967-1 o.B.
383, 386; IRS, u.s. TREAsuRY DEP'T, PuBLICATION No. 225 FA~WER's T~ GtnD& 27
(1973).
sos Robert :G. Maple, 27 T.C.M. 944 (1968).
sos Maple v. Comm'r, 440 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1971) ; Richard R. Wilbur, 43
T.C. 322, 328 (1964).
so1 See Reg. § 1.162-12; Maple v. Comm'r, 440 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1971).
sos Whitman v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 845, 852 (W.D. La. 19G5).
so~ Ashworth v. United States, 71-2 U.S.T.C. 1[ 9710, at 87,757 (S.D. DI. 1971).
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are sold in commercial quantities or in the case of livestock when
the herd has reached the size considered minimal for profit, regardless of whether a profit is actually realized.tao Expenses
identical with developmental expenditures must be expensed in this
stage, the option to capitalize is lost.
The Farmer's Tax G~dde, a publication of the Internal Revenue
Service, abandoned the above long-standing nomenclature in 1968
and now refers to the preproductive, a combination of the preparatory and developmental stages, and productive periods, and
denominates former ''preparatory costs'' as ''preparatory and
development costs.'' 511 The Guide continues to provide that in
the preproductive period ordinary and necessary business expenses, such as upkeep expenses, irrigation, fertilizer and cultivation of trees, may at the option of the taxpayer be deducted or
capitalized. In short, expenses formerly described as developmental expenses still can be currently deducted or capitalized
prior to commencement of the productive period. 612
Because Miner's "preparatory to actual beginning of business
operations" phraseology was virtually identical with the pre-1967
farm accounting term ''preparatory state,'' some courts and commentators thought they were synonymous. 513 This conclusion was
erroneous.
The Ninth Circuit. in Maple v. Commissioner 514 rejected the
very analogy drawn in Miner on the basis of these farm tax
accounting principles. There the Commissioner leveled the following capitalization argument:
Expenses incurred prior to production are capital in nature i£ they
are necessary to make productive the item involved. 'fhe Commissioner
suggests that if a man wishes to produce shoes, he can buy a shoe
factory or he can build one. The cost of getting ready to begin the
51o Compare Whitman v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 845 (W.D. Ln. 1965), witll Com·
ment, Deductible Development and Conservation Expenditures for Farmers, 7 HoUSTON L.
REV. 227, 236-37 (1969).
511 DICKINSON, FARM AND RANCH EXPENSES, AND 0REDI1'S1 BNA TAX 1\I:ANAOEMEN'l'
PoRT.POLIO No. 208, A-9 (1969) ; 1973 IRS, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, PUDLIOATION No. 225
FARMER'S TAX GUIDE 27 (1973).
512 On!l commentator has questioned whether these changes signify tho abumlonmont of
the case law "preparatory period.'' DICKINSON, note 511 supra at A-10. It is moro likely
that the changes were intended to circumvent the defenses to such <loctriuo which luul bcon
raised by cases such as Whitman.
513 See Whitman v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 845, 854 (W.D. La. 1065); Cenno v.
United States, 67-2 U.S.T.C. ~ 9576 (E.D. La. 1966). Sec generally Young, The llolo of
Motive in Evaluating Tax Sheltered Investments, 22 TAX LAWYEit 275, 298 (1960);
Allington, Farming as a Tax Shelter 14 S.D. L. REv. 181, 205 (196!.1).
514 440 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1971).
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manufacture of shoes, however, must be capitalized whether that cost
is embodied in the cost of building a factory or in the price paid for
one that is already built.515

In short, the government argued that under the amassing of
capital assets theory, a farmer, or in that particular case an
orchard grower, has to capitalize his costs in acquiring his ultimately income producing assets. lllaple rejected tlrls argument,
earlier adopted by i1Iine1·.
The Commissioner is right about shoemakers. But shoemakers ancl
farmers are not treated in pamllel ways by the code a11d by the regulations. The cost of developing orchards, [a1·nzs, or ra1zches, even prior
to the time when they are productive, may often be dedttctecl rather
than capitalized, even though mzalogous development costs in other
industries would have to be capitalized (Sec Income Tax Regulations
§ 1.162-12; Estate of Richard R. Wilbur (1964:) 43 T.C. 22.) In the
field of agriculture the manner in which the expense was incurred
will often determine whether it is a capital expenditure or a business
expense. If a dairy farmer buys his cows fully mature, he must capitalize their purchase price; if he buys them as calves, he may deduct
the cost of raising them to maturity, even though that e:q>ense is as
much a cost of obtaining an income-producing business as is the purchase of the mature cows. We must analyze tlte precise path the ta.xpayerfarmer actually took and we must ask whether the expense in question
was purely capital in nature or fell within what the Tax Court bas
termed the "band of grey" between capital and business e}..-penses that
exists only in agriculture. (Estate of Richard R. Wilbur, s!lpra at 328.)
The band of grey exists because many of the costs of r1mning a
producing farm are identical to the costs of crcati11g a produci11g farm.
A farmer feeds his mature cows to obtain continued milk production;
he gives the same feed to his calves to bring them to maturity. A
strictly logical distinction can, of course, be drawn behveen these two
expenditures based upon difference in their purposes, but the tax law
does not distinguish them. Expenses of maintaini11g agriculture items
in the preproductive state are deductible 1J they are sufficiet~tly similar
to the expenses that will be required to maintain tltcnt once they are
product·ive. (See Estate of Richard R. Wilbur, supra.) lilt:i

Thus, the conceptual underpinning of llliner and its progeny is
in error. Furthermore, since expenses such as feed and depreciation incurred in building up a lterd by the natural increase
method are identical to those which will be incurred when the
herd reaches the projected size at which it is expected to be
profitable, they qualify as developmental expenditures currently
deductible at the taxpayer's option. It should be no surprise,
515
516

Maple v. Comm'r, 440 F.2d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1056-57 (emphasis added).
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therefore, that when the government subsequently relied upon
the Miner amassing of capital assets rationale in Whitman v.
United States,617 which carefully considered the farm accounting
rules, the district court noted that while it felt that the con~
elusion in llliner remained open to debate, the taxpayer's beef
raising activities had passed the preparatory stage and "were
firmly entrenched in the development stage." The taxpayer in
Whitman clearly utilized in large part the natural increase method:
he began ·with six cows in 1959, had 55 cattle at trial in 1965 and
intended to build the herd up to 120 to 160 head by 1967 or 1968.
The Tax Court again in Loy D. Mercer 518 held that the taxpayer, who owned six head of cattle and estimated that a herd
of 150 was necessary for profit, was at most preparing to go
into the beef raising business if and when he obtained land of
his own and capital for improvements. The Ninth Circuit, which
subsequently decided Maple, did not agree.
It seems clear from a reading of the opinion of the Tax Court thnt
its decision was in essence a conclusion that the taxpayer's venture wns
not aimed at profit because a reasonable man would not expect n
profit from such a venture, and that while he might in the future get
into such a business, he had not yet done so in the years in question ....
Here the taxpayer entered into a venture with a good faith expectation of profit. Whether that expectation was foolhardy or shrewd is of
no moment. The taxpayer expended his effort and capital to the limit
of his available time and resources. There can be no conclusion other
than that the taxpayer's venture, though small in results, was a trade
or ousiness. . . .519

Miner also contained a theme that some decisions treated as
part of the profit motivation requirement and others as part
of the preparatory to beginning a trade or business requirement.
The Tax Court found that the taxpayer had no profit motivt~,
because he was "fully awarP that he could not, conceivably have
realized a profit from those beef-raising activities in which he
was actually engaged. Nor could he have had even an (•xpectation
of a profit for at least 3 years after the last of the taxable year.'' 620
The unarticulated premise was that activities must be directed
towards making a profit in the reasonably near future to be profit
motivated.
517 248 F. Supp. 845, S54 (W.D. La. 1965).
51825 T.C.M. 467 (1966), rev'1l, 376 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1967).
51u Mercer v. Comru'r, 376 F.2<1 708, 710-11 (9th Cir, 1967).
s2oEdwin H. Miner, 21 T.C.M. 1173, 1177 (1962).
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Tills premise was clearly exposed in Harold I. Snycler/"z1 a
subsequent hobby loss preparatory decision. Snycle1· acknowledged
that the ta..xpayer's intent to carry on the activity with the hope
and expectation of making a profit is of prime importance, but
added that the ta-xpayer's effort must be directed toward the
accomplishment of that pur1Jose in the reasonably near future.
While the court did not ex1)ect livestock breeding to show a
profit overnight, it thought that "there must be some eA-pectation at the time the operation is commenced that the business
will produce a profit in the not too remote future.'' The conclusion reached was that the ta..xpayer lacked a profit motive and
the operations at best were more in the nature of preparing to
enter a business rather than the conduct of a business.
The district court in Riddle v. United States li2Z also clearly
viewed this approach as an element of the preparatory to engaging in a trade or business concept: "whether [the ta.xpayer]
was primarily or predominantly concerned with making a profit
during the immediate ta..x year or making a profit at some time in
the future, is the ultimate issue." If the latter, then the activity
would constitute mere preparation for engaging anew in or for
resuming a trade or business.
Judge Pierce, the trier of fact in llline1·, later elaborated in
Charles .A. Dun Leave]f 523 on the other l1and that the requisite
present intention to earn a profit is not satisfied by a mere Jwpe
that at some indefinite time in the future the activity will yield
a profit. The court found it perfectly evident that the ta.xpayer
in the tax year had no present intention, l10pe or expectation
to realize a profit in that year.
Thus, the requirement that a profit not be too remote, or in its
extreme form that a profit must be expected in the tax year, is
tied into the preparatory theory in some eases and into profit
intention in others. It is submitted that this requirement is in
error in both instances. As the court pointed out in Cenac v.
United States,524 as long as a farm is in the preparatory stage
it is not a business even though being prepared primarily to be
an activity for profit. Once it has been prepared for operation
and is in the developmental stage it may be considered a busi52125 T.C.l\I. 1326 (1966). See generally DICKINSON, FARM AND llA.">CII LosSES, BNA
TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 241, A-23 (1970).
522 205 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Colo. 1962).
523 24 T.C.l\I. 865 (1965).
524 67-2 U.S.T.C. 1[ 9576, :lt 84,875 (E.D. La. 1966).
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ness, although not yet productive. The expectation of profit, however, indeed can be only an ''expectation of making a profit out
of [the] activities once they ... reach the productive period."
Similarly, the widespread recognition of the formative 01~
start-up period, which may last 10 to 15 years in a livestock breeding operation, as an exception to tlw factor of continued loss~s in
determining profit motivation {'ffectively limits or even negates
any requirement that profit must be obtained in the reasonably
near future. Furthermore, the belief that a mere hope for a
profit in the indefinite future is not sufficient is clearly based on
a reasonable expectation of profit approach, precluded in the
application of section 183. For instance, in Hicks v. United
States,S 25 the gon~rmuent requested that the jury be charged:
"The plaintiff's expectation of profit must have been reasonable.
A vain hope that on some r<>mote day a profit will rPsult is not
enough to make the operation of a farm a business." The judge
refused to give the instruction because he was of the opinion that
"it is a question of good faith and a bona fide expectation of
making a profit that is controlling." 526
It may be noted that llliner and many of its. progeny could
easily have been d<~cided on traditional profit motivation grounds.
This is clearly evidenced, for <'Xample, by Edu·ard B. Godfrey,U 21
decided several months after Miner by the same judg<~ on virtually identical facts and with almost word for word reasoning.
After going through a preparatory for future entry into a cattlo
raising business analysis, the Tax Court concludod that the taxpayer's primary purpose in buying tho farm as a wholP was not
to establish a profitable business, but ratlwr ''to gratify his dosire
to establish a substantial country estate." 628 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed on precisely this ground.
In summary, once a farm activity reaches the stage that its
expenses arc of tlw sanw character as thos<> currently d<•ductiblo
when the farm is productive and profitabl<~-elassic start-up costs
-the Commissioner cannot in the face of existing farm tux accounting rules successfully capitalize such Pxpenditures as pr<•parn525 72-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 9383, at 84,324-325 (S.D. Miss. 1972); accortl, Brooks v. Comm'r,
274 F.2d 96, 99 (9th Cir. 1959) (Tax Court ruled testimony of prospective monotnry gniu
was "hope" and not based on fact; Ninth Circuit reversed been usc propel' test ls goocl
faith purpose or belief of making a profit).
s2o Hicks v. United States, 72-1 U.S.T.C. 11 9383, nt 84,324 (S.D. Miss. 1972),
527 22 T.C.M. 1 (1963), aff'cl on other grounds, 335 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1964) 1 ccrt. c1cuicil1
379 u.s. 966 (1965).
s2sEdward R. Godfrey, 22 T.C.M. 1, 5 (1963).
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tory to engaging in the business of farming. The Yirtual im·itation
to the taxpayer in the section 1.183-2(b) of the n•gulations factor
of history of income or losses to rely upon a start-up period defense 529 may pose an almost irresistible t<>mptation to the Commissioner to dust off and apply .Jline1· and its prog<•ny wh<•n that
defense is utilized.530 A commentator earlier sugg<•sted, however,
that in view of the "increasing disC:'nchantment among the courts
with ·what are essentially inaccurate methods of cl<'t<'rmining
income for farmers" the Treasury might "tighten up" tlte regulations permitting the deduction of the costs of rah;ing breeding
livestock.531 It has not done so and, instead, with thl' failure of
529

Moreover, the natural increase metho!l has expressly been sauctionetl by the courts.

E.g., Joan F.W. Farris, 31 T.C.M. 821 (1972). In several dceisions, Juttural increase

\'o'ZIS

not explicitly cousidered as a factor although the facts imlicatc that the lin'sto~k luml had
increased primarily through that method. Whitman v. Uuitetl Stutes, 24S F. Supp. 84G1 847
(W.D. La. 1965); Mary Ellis Turner, 23 T.C.:M. 1186 (1964); Rowe B. 1\tetcnlf, :!:1 T.C.M.
1402 (1963).
53o Indeed, the writer has encountered just such reliance by u revenue agent on G01l{rey
in an audit initially involving only section 183 in which the taxpayer utilized in large
part the initial stage factor of tlte regulations to e.xplain substantial lossa It E{'Cmetl
obvious that the agent had been ad\·ised to rely on the preparatory to engaging in n trade
or business concept. The agent cited only Gotlfrey in the face of a tnxp:tyer memorandum
setting forth many of the farm loss decisious cited pre,·ionsly in tltis arti~le.
531 Allington, Farming as a Tax Shelter, 14 S.D.L. REv. 181, 202 (19G9). The conclu·
sion of judicial "disenchantment" was derived from (1) the Supreme Court's statement
in United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102, 115 n.23 (1966), that it tlid not lutve to detennina
the correctness of the Treasury's interpretation of the legislath·e history of tl1e prcde·
eessor to section 1231 (b) (3) as prerlmling amendment of the regulutions to require Mfih·
basis ranchers to capitalize the costs of raising breetling lh·estol!k; nnd (!:!) the Tax
Court's observation in George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688 (1968), aff'cl, 420 F.2d 490 (3d
Cir. 1970), that despite the fact that the Commissioner might lJn\'e ll:tintetl himself into
a corner in pennitting rash basis :1griculturists to expense the costs of raising farm commodities even though they may be entitled to capital gains on their sale, it would not put
him in the same position in other areas where the underlying consitlcmtions were different.
These eases were viewe!l as an invit.'ltion to tighten up the regulntions.
In Schultz the taxpayer purelmsetl raw whiskey in bulk to bold for the nonnnl aging
period (four years). The divided Tax Court found that his purpose wns to purl.'hase four
year old bourbon antl, therefore, the insurance ami storag!.' rosts over tbe four year old
whiskey. Accordingly, one comm!.'ntator has re:tsoned thnt Schultz lends support to the
capitalization of expenses of developing a breeding herd: "the expenses nrc being im:urretl
to obtain a different asset (breeding animals) tlmu tit!.' original property (immature
animals)." Allington, Farmi11g as a Tax Shelter, 14 S.D.L. REV. 181, 203 (19G9). Indeed,
the district court in Ashworth v. Unitetl States, 71-2 U.S.T.C. ~ 9710 (S.D. Dl. 1971),
followed essentially this tack, reasoning that the l'Xpeuscs incurred in order to bt>gin gron··
ing orange trees are not development expenses inrurrerl in orrlt:>r to begin growing oranges
so that the costs of raising a seedling to thl' point where it ran be tmusplnnted to the
orchard must be capitalized. However, ~fnplc v. Conun'r, 440 F.2tl 10:-,r, (9th Cir. 1071),
holds to the contrary. Furthermore, in Daniel D. Kinley, 51 T.C. 1000, 1004 (1DJ9) 1
aff'd, 70-2 U.S.T.C. ~ 9462 (2d Cir. 1970), the Tax Court rejected the CommiESioncr's
argument that the taxpayer grew pine trees which \\'ere con,·ertcd into marketable Cltrist·
mas trees which, through proper care during their growth, matured into marketnble trees.
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case law to consistently achieve matching of such deductions and
future related income, has turned to legislative remedies. The
first tack taken, recapture of farm losses under section 1251, is
similar to the approach earlier provided for recapture of accelerated depreciation with respect to real estate but only deals
with the distortion arising from allowance of ordinary deductions offset only by capital gain income and not with the deferral
aspect. 532 Yet the deferral aspect alone has been described m;
the essence of a tax shelter: ''the deferral or postponement of
tax on current income ... by accelerating future deductions into
the current tax year.'' 533 The interest free loan from the government in the form of the deferred taxes may be viewed as the
investment in the activity generating the tax shelter, so that in
many instances the taxpayer is in effect investing the government's tax dollars rather than his own money. This inherent
defect in any recapture approach plus the numerous exceptions
to section 1251 and the other recapture provisions as well as
the ingenuity of taxpayers and their tax and investment advisors
in finding shelters, and the recent boom in such shelters, undoubtedly underlies the administration's LAL proposals.
STATUTORY APPROACHES: SECTION

1251

Section 1251 recaptures as ordinary income gain realized upon
the disposition of "farm recapture property" to the extent of the
balance in a taxpayer farmer's "excess deduction account"
(EDA), but does not affect the current deductibility of farm
losses.534 Every farmer must maintain such an account unless he
elects to use inventories and charge to capital account all expenses
properly chargeable thereto, essentially development costs.m The
policy underlying the election is that section 1251 is directed
against combining (1) a current ordinary loss for various farm expenditures the Treasury believed were capital in nature, e.g., development expenditures, and (2) capital gain treatment on the sale of
the asset to which the expenditure relates. 636 Capitalization of such
532

Davenport, I!'arm Losses Under the Tax Reform .Act of 1969: Kecpin' 'Em Happy

Down on the Farm, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 3191 325 (1971).
533 TAX REFORM BILL OF 1973, ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS )'OR TAX ClHANOE WITH
TREASURY EXPLANATION, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS. 95 (Comm. Print 1973),
mi.R.C. §§ 125l(b), 125l(c), and 125l(e)(l). See H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1) 1
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1969).
535 I.R.C. § 1251(b) (4); Prop. Reg. § 1.1251-2(d) (3) (iii), 36 Fed. Reg. 25015 (Dec.
28, 1971).
536 H.R. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1969).
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expenditures would more nearly match these deductions with their
related income and preclude a current ordinary deduction.
Each farmer requirl'd to maintain an NDA must increase it
each year by an amount l'qual to his farm net loss; subtractions
are made for farm net income, amounts recaptured under section 1251 and deductions from which the farmer did not obtain
any tax benefit.537 Derived from a more modest l'Xception designed
to exclude from the application of farm loss recapture bona fide
farmers who supplementl'd thl'ir farm income with part-time
or off-season l'mployml'nt, additions are made to the EDA of an
individual and certain subchapter S corporations only if the ta."(payer has nonfarm adjustl'd gross income in t•xcess of $50,000 and
then only to the extl'nt that his farm n(>t loss t•xcc>eds $25,000.r;3s
In a literal sense Sl'ctions 1251 and 183 cannot overlap since (1)
section 1251 does not affect the current d(>ductibility of farm losses
and (2) section 183 is (>qually inapplicable to deductions incurred in a trade or business because that term presupposes a
profit motive and farm nl't loss, without which no additions are
made to EDA, and is defined as the amount by which deductions
allowed or allowable that are "directly connected with the carrying on of the trade or business of farming" exceed the gross
income derived from such trade or business.'i39 In a practical
sense, however, due to tlw libl'ral nonfarm adjusted income and
farm net loss floors, the Sl'n·ict• may seek to apply section 183 in
many circumstances in which it would have been satisfied \\ith
recapture under section 1251 Jmd it been applicable.r;co Of course,
running the section 183 gauntlet offers no protection against farm
loss recapture where these floors are t•xct>eded. Application of section 183 ·will yield similar but not idc>ntical economic results to
recapture under section 1251 in limited circumstanc(>s. ·where tier
3 section 183 deductions arl' disallowed, the net effect is to reduce
the gain which would have bl'en rt•alized upon disposition of
property used in the activity had the deduction been allowed, in
which case the basis of the asst•t would have been reduced, thereby
I.R.C. § 1251(b).
I.R.C. § 1251 (b )(2)(B). See Tax Reform Proposals contuiued in the m~ge from
the President of April 21, 1969, and presented by Represcntath·es of the Trensury De·
partment, 9lst Coug., 1st Sess. 52 (Connn. Print 1969). These floors render section 12a'"l
highly ineffectual. See Davenport, Farm Losses Umler tl1a Tar I:eform ~d of l!J6fJ:
Keepin' 'E_m Happy Down on the Farm, 12 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 319, 348 (1971).
539 I.R.C. § 1251(e)(2).
540 Sang, Cattle ana Hobby Fanning, Summer Rentals ancl Yacllis as Slu:ltcrs, 31 N.Y.U.
Inst. (Part 1) 801, 831l (1973).
531

538
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increasing the gain realized by an equivalent amount. But for
the deferral aspect of section 1251, this is the same as allowing
an ordinary loss, making a basis adjustment and then later recapturing the amount of gain arising from the basis adjustment
as ordinary income. Since tier 2 deductions ordinarily would not
be added to basis if disallowed, the similarity breaks down there.
A further instance of the uneven results of the various approaches
applied to curb or prevent tax shelters, for example, from farming operations, is that successful application of the preparatory
to engaging in a trade or business rationale would result in the
equivalent of capitalization of what would be tier 2 deductions
under section 183, thereby creating rough symmetry with section 1251 but asymmetry with section 183. Section 1251 at best
precludes enjoyment of current ordinary deduction with future
related income being entitled to capital gains treatment; it does
not affect the tax swing arising from deferral of taxes. The LAL
does.
LAL

PROPOSALS

The LAL is designed to eliminate tax shelters which, through
deferral of taxes (possibly equaling or exceeding the amount of
the taxpayer's investment), may enable the taxpayer to purchase
his investment through an interest free loan of the government's
tax dollars. Underlying the LAL is the assumption that matching income with expenses to arrive at a reasonable reflection of
annual net income is fundamental to the federal income tax system. Under this view, a current expense is deductible in the taxable year paid or incurred because it is necessary to produce that
year's income and is usually consumed in the process. On the
other hand, capital expenditures preceding the receipt of the income which they produce over a number of years can properly
in this model be deducted in the future as the income comes in
and the original im·estment is gradually consnmt•d. 641 Of cotu'S£•,
this model is not faithful in all circumstances to the current
definition of capital expenditures. 542 The 'rreasury would have
been more forthright, although possibly with less appeal to Congress, to admit that present law do!'s not require matching deductions with related income, hut that a new rule so providing is
541 TAX REFORM BILL OF 1973, ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS FOR '!'AX CIIANOE WlTU
TREASURY EXPLANATION, 93D CONO., 1ST SESS. 95 (Conun. Print 1973).
542 Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm'r, 475 F.2<1 775 (2<1 Cir. 1973).
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necessary to eliminate ta..-..: deferral. The Treasury hinted at this
conclusion in its statement that only with tl1e benefit of hindsight in advance would it be possible to determine wltether some
costs should be deductible in the current year or in later years,
and that such hindsight is not aYailable under the annual accounting principle so that current law provides some degree of flexibility in the timing of deductions. 543
Unlike section 183 which disallows the deductions to which it
applies, section 1251 which recaptures deductions, and the preparatory to engaging in a trade or business concept under which
deductions are capitalized, the LAL defers deductions of indh·iduals and subchapter S coqJorations. Certainly from the ta-xpayer's
standpoint deferral is preferable to disallowance or capitalization,
but not to recapture. 544 Under the LAL an "artificial accounting
loss'' is not deductible currently but is suspt>nded through addition of an amount equal to such loss in a "Deferred Loss Account"
(DLA). Suspended losses are subtracted from the DLA and taken
as deductions in succeeding ta..xable years against the first net
related income (in excess of such year's accelerated deductions)
or taken into account upon the sale or other dis}Josition of tl1e
property to which the deferred loss is attributable.c;~:; In the ease
of a sale or other disposition of such property in wltich tlu.• proceeds do not constitute related income, as would be the case with
capital gain, the net balance in the DLA attributable to such property is subtracted from it and added to the adjusted basis of the
property.546 Such addition would balance out for example earlier
negative basis adjustments made with respect to depreciation
deductions which were deferred.
An artificial accounting loss is the amount by which accl'lerated
deductions for the taxable year exceed associated net related income for that year.547 The former is the heart of the LAL, but
the latter determines the severity of its impact on various classes
of investments.548 An accelerah>d deduction is broadly dl>fincd as
5~3 TAX REFORM BILL OF 1973, ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS FOR TA.X C11A."'0E Wlm
TREASURY EXPLA.'\'ATION, 93n CoNo., 1ST SESS. 96 (Comm. Print 1973).
5H Feinschreiber, 1978 Taz Reform: The .J.dmiuistration's Proposals, :n TA.'O!S 398, 399
(1973).
545 TAX REFORM BILL OF 1973, ADMIXISTRATION'S PROPOSALS FOil TAX CUA!'O& WITH
TREASURY EXPLANATION, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS. 97 (Couuu. Print 1973).
54G I d. at 97, 102.
547 Id. at 96-97.
5~8 Feinschreiber, 1978 Taz Reform: Tile .ddministratioll's PrOJIOsals, al TA.'rnS 398, 399
(1973). The LAL has been 1leseribed as too lenient in this coute:~t ns to tnxpuyers en·
gaged full time in acth·ities for which special tux preferences have been pro\idcd. Me·
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one that clearly relates to some future expected profit and ltas
little or no relationship to income r(;'ported in the current yearthe similarity to preparatory expenses is obvious. 'Phe Treasury
has provided illustrations of accel(;'rated deductions and others
are to be specifically identified from time to time in the regulations:
(1) Intangible drilling and dev(;'lopment costs,
(2) Accelerated depreciation or amortization in excess of
straight line in the case of n('t l(;'ased personal property, e.g.,
equipment leasing shelters,
(3) Accelerated depreciation in excess of straight line iri the
case of improved real estate h(;'ld for rental or sale and, similarly, amortization in excess of straight line in the case of
rehabilitation housing,
(4) Construction period preopening costs as to improved real
estate held for rental or sale, and
(5) In the area of farm losses, prepaid feed and expenditures
traditionally denominated development costs-to avoid this
terminology the Treasury awkwardly describes this category
as expenses relative to crops or livestock that will not produce
income until a future time, which are annually recurring and
often in the nature of inventorics.649
Under the dubious rationale that only the net increase in accelerated deductions can create a loss distortion, an exception is
carved out purportedly for the ordinary farmer-the analogue of
the section 1251 floors-by proYiding that the LAL is applicable
to farm losses only if there has hepn an increase in the level of
operations or investments in the nature of inventories, i.e., development expenditures. Thus, farming substantially tlw same
acreage without a major change in the nature of the operation
is ordinarily to be accepted on audit as evidence that any losses
are not artificial. However, an abnormally large and material
expenditure in the nature of an accelerated deduction is treated
as an exception to the no increase exception, but with a safe
haven for development costs up to a 20 per cent variation from
the prior year's expenditures of the same nature, and greater
variations may be justified by the facts and circumstances. 660
Daniel, Tax Reform and the Revenue Act of 1971: Lesions, Lagniappes and Lcsso11s, 14
B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 813, 857 (1973).
540 TAX REFORM BILL OF 1973, ADMINISTRATION's PROPOSALS FOR '.rAX CllANOE WITII
TREASURY EXPLANATION, 93D CoNo., 1ST SESS. 97-100 (Comtn. Print 1973),
s5o I d. at 100.
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Associated net related income is computed without regard to
accelerated deductions, which are then allowed up to the amount
of such net income with only the excess being deferred. Tlte net
effect is identical to the tier system under section 183-nonaccelerated deductions in effect are first allowed against associated
gross related income and then accelerated deductions are treated
in effect as tier 2 and 3 deductions allowable up to the remaining
amount of gross income. But here the analogue of the scope of
the section 183 activity issue is even more significant.Gst Unlike
the activity portion of the section 183 regulations, the scope of
related income is overtly articulated in terms of the underlying
tax policy towards providing particular accelerated deductions as
incentives and thus varies from accelerated deduction to de_duction. Accordingly, in recognition of the current ta.x policy of
providing incentives for oil and gas drilling, related income in
the context of intangible drilling costs includes mineral income
from all oil and gas properties. Furthermore, any artificial loss
attributable to a dry hole is allowable in full against any category
of income.552 Similarly, reflecting the more favorable accelerated
depreciation rates currently allowed residential rental property
as defined in section 167(j) (2) (B) and property held primarily for
sale, the class of related income here is broad, including both
rental income from all residential real estate and sales income
from real property held primarily for sale.lm3 A partner or subchapter S corporation shareholder is entitled to treat ltis undistributed share of a partnership or corporate LAL item, respectively, as if he owned a comparable interest in the partnership or corporate property outright.554 Conversely, related income
from nonresidential real property and net leased personal property, which does not enjoy equal accelerated depreciation rates
includes only the rental income from the particular property to
which the accelerated deductions are attributable.liss Again the
Treasury pursued a lib.eral tack as to accelerated farm losses:
Income from all farming units in which the ta.xpayer is personally
engaged as a trade or business as distinguished from units in
Id. at 97.
at 98.
553 I d. at 99.
55-I I d. at 104.
555 Id. at 99. Generally eaeh building is treated ns n sepnmte property, but one or more
buildings on a single (or continuous) tract or parcel maunged uud operated tl8 n unit nrc
treated as a single pr,_operty.
551

552 I d.
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which he is a passive inYestor constitutes a single class.666 The
distinction here is between the bona fide faruwr and the investora distinction which will probably prove hard to draw in actual
practice. 557
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the liberal categories of
related income is tlw opportunity it offers for pyramiding-sheltering taxable income from a tax sheltPr that has turned around,
begun to generate taxable ineouw ratlwr than tax losses, with
a new tax shelter, committed for aftpr the effPcth·e date of the
LAL. Before tlw LAL was proposed pyramiding was ofh>n tlw
only acceptable solution to tlw tax problems inlwrent in a slwlter
which has turned around, 558 and if the LAL is Pnacted as proposed in years to come undouht(:'dly therp will be a booming
market in second, related income tax sheltPrs.
The Secretary of the Tr(:'asury noted that the LAL permits a
taxpayer to slwlter incouw from the inwstnwnt itst>lf, thereby
leaving a substantial area in which tax inc(:'ntiws may operate.
He was obviously rpferring to tax-free cash flow, which in the
context of rental real Pstatl' consists of net r!:'ntal income from
an activity, in excpss of opPrating costs and d!:'bt amortization,
sheltered by either tlw aecPlerat!:'d dPpreciation or a combination
of the straight line and accPl(:'ratPd components of the total depreciation allowable with rPspPct to tlw activity. Thus, the Secretary continuPd, a taxpayer may still buy inv(:'stments that yield
tax-free income for substantial pPriods, but lw must use his
own money, rather than tax dollars, to purchase them. 559
The thrust of the compl(:'X pffpctin dat(:'s in the administration
proposal, which arP Yery likPly to bl' push('d to later dates in
any final legislation, is to lt>ave unaffe<"t.Pd prPsently existing tax
shelters or those for which commitnwnts haV<' bN•n made, rl'flt>cting a }Jolicy choicP not to disturb im·<'shnents madP in reliance
upon existing law. 560 'l,lms, by and largP, the LAl.J as }>I't>st>ntly
proposed would lw applicahlt' to taxahlP ypars h(•ginning afh~r
December 31, 1973, hut t>ven tlwn on I~· as to transactions PntPrPd
into or commitments madP after April 30, 1973. 'Phus, dP}H'Pciation or amortization arising from rPal Pstatt> and (•quipmPnt lensat 100.
See, e.g., Maple v. Conun'r, 440 F.2d 10:)!) (!lth Cir. 1971).
558 Sec Ehrenkranz, The "Investme11t" Limited Pm·t11C'I'sllip (Other Than Real Estate):
Problems and Pote11tials, 26 N.Y.U. INST. 147, 16:i (1968).
559 TAX REFOIC\[ BILL OF 19737 AD:UINISTRA'l'IOX 7S PltOPOSALS FOR TAX CIIANm: Wl'rii
TREASURY EXPLM\A'riON, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS. lii (C'onun. Print 1973),
uGO Id. at 17; c•f. icl. :~t 7:1.
ssa Ill.

557
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ing (net leased personal property) tax slwlters will m•ver be
affected by the LAL if acquired, construch•d or lensed prior to
May 1, 1973 or thereafter but pursuant to a commihnent tltnt
was binding on April 30, 1973. A similar <.>xclusion is pro,·ided for
intangible drilling costs paid or incurrt>d prior to the t•fft•ctive
date, but it will not have the long lasting <.>ffect that tlu• t•xisting
real estate tax shelter exclusion will hnvt•.'; 61 On the surface, the
exclusion for existing farm tax shelters npvears more limited tlmn,
for example, that provided for real t•stnte. Tht• specific <.>ffective
date discussion excludes only costs paid or inctllTt'd prior to
1fay 1, 1973, or thereafter but connnittt>d for on April 30, 1973.
The closer parallel would han• lw<'n to exclude devt•lopment costs
for cro1Js or livestock acquired prior to the t•fft•ctin• date. In
reality, however, the no increast• rult• will in most instances be
the vehicle by which taxpayN·s owning existing farm ta.x shelters
(other than one-shot, prepaid feed slwlters) will continut> to he
excluded from the LAL, in many instances longer than a real
estate tax shelter would bt• ablt• to bPnefit from the exclusionmost real estate tax slwlters run around in six to ten years, while
breeding herds connuonly rl'main in a stnrt-uv stage for ten to
15 vears. In this conh•xt, unlikl' the articulah•d rationalt• tltat
only a net increase in accel<•rah•d dl'ductions crentl's a loss distortion, the no increase rul<> is workable and justifiablt•. Ironically,
the intended policy undPrlying tlw no incr<•ast• ruk>-to pro\'ide
an exception for tlw ordinary famwr li 62-would ha,·e hl'en better
met by providing a floor for aceel<•rah•d deductions or on nonrelated income to enahl<' a nl'w ordinary farnwr to t•nter into a
farming activity without being affeetl'Cl by the IJAL. Undouht<•dly.
the Treasury's unfortunate• ex}writ•nce in tlw Tax Reform Act of
1969 with the section 1251 floors dissuadNl it from following this
approach.
The administration's }H'Ollosals as to tlw <•fft•etiw dah• are silC'nt
in a very hnl)ortant art•a: syndications or limited partn<•ndtips,
the usual vehich• for marketing rt>sidt•ntial rt•al l'Stah• ta.x ~lwlh•rs.
The basic question is wlwtlwr tlH• <•ff<•etiw date appli(·~ to the
date that the J>nrtm•rship ac<tuir<.>d or committl'Cl for tlw construction or vurchasl' of a dcprPeiahh• asset or construction period
preopening l'X}>Pnsl's or to thP datl' that tlw im·(•stor acquired
or committed to acquin• his }lartnl'rship inh•rl'~t..Undt•r the genSGl]d.
SG2ld.

at 102~03.
at 100.
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eral rules applicable to taxation of partners and partnerships, the
effective date would apply at the partnership level and not at
the partner level. Furthermore, under such rules a transferee
partner would step into the shoes of his transferor (subject to
the termination rule). If this is the case, a premium will be
placed on unsold and resale of partnership interests in preeffective date tax shelter partnerships. 563
The LAL frequently oYerlaps with the various recapture provisions and in some circumstances might produce unintended
results, unless conforming amendments are added to sections 1250
and 1251 or the LAL itself contains special provisions. Assume
that the total amount of the accelerated portion (lOOM) of the
double declining balance depreciation (200M) taken with respect to a parcel of improved residential real property in 1974
constitutes an artificial accounting loss. Thus, lOOM would have
been added to the DLA in 1974 and the basis of the property would
have been reduced by 200M. Assume further than in 1975 while
a lOOM balance remains in the DLA the property is sold for
200M above basis. Under the current LAL proposals the adjusted
basis of the property would be increased by lOOM, and lOOM
subtracted from the DLA, resulting in a gain of 100M.564 Under
section 1250 this entire gain would be taxed as ordinary income,
i.e., recaptured, since additional depreciation (accelerated or recapturable depreciation) is defined in section 1250 as depreciation adjustments in excess of the amount of adjustments that
would have resulted if such adjustments had been determined
for each year under the straight-line method of depreciation.GGG
Thus, additional depreciation would be lOOM (200M total adjustments less lOOM adjustments under straight-line method). However, the purJlose of section 1250 was to prevent conversion of
ordinary income into capital gain by taking depreciation while
gain on the sale is treated as capital gain-Congress believed that
this occurred when depreciation, deductions reduced basis faster
than actual decline in the value of the property. But due to the
general inflationary increases in the valut> of improved real estate
it limited recapture to "what may truly be called <'Xcess depreciation deductions" (depreciation in excess of straight line). 566 Yet
sa3

See Rollin & Michi, Tax Shelters Attacked, 59 A.B.A.J. 780, 782 (1973).

TAX REFORM BILL OF 1973, ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS FOR TA.'\: CHANGE WIT11
TREASURY EXPLANATION, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS. 102 (1973).
G65 I.R.C. § 1250(b)(l).
sao S. REP. No. 88-830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 131-32 (1964).
S64
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when the LAL applies, such excess depreciation deductions never
offset ordinary income.
Similarly, under section 1251, additions would be made to the
EDA for developmental expenses constituting farm net losses in
excess of $25,000 (if the individual-ta.xpayer has nonfarm adjusted
income of $50,000), but if those expenditures were more than
25 per cent in excess of the prior year's developmental expenditures, they would be deferred and added to the DLA under the
LAL proposals. If the farm property were sold in the following
year for an amount in excess of adjusted basis equal to the sum
of the amounts added to the DLA and the EDA, recapture of farm
losses would result, although such losses had never been offset
against nonfarm income.
One approach to avoid such overlap would be to modify the
definition of recapturable losses in tl1e various recapture provisions to exclude losses added to the DLA. This would probably
entail extremely cumbersome modifications to cover the partnership back-up provisions (section 751) to the recapture provisions.
The simpler approach would be to provide in the LAL itself
that where a deferred loss is recaptured, or section 751 applies by
virtue of potential recapture, UJ)On the disposition of t11e property,
that it will. be allowed as an ordinary deduction rather than being
added to basis. This is the approach taken when addition of a
deferred loss to basis would result in or increase a capital loss
on the disposition. 567
On a literal plane section 183 and the LAL cannot overlap, just
as sections 183 and 1251 cannot. ·where deductions turn on a
profit motive, the LAL is applicable only if the activity is engaged
in for profit, conversely, section 183 applies only if it is not engaged in for a profit. Yet in reality the LAL accomplishes wltat
the Service has long attempted to achieve under the definition of
trade or business, either through the profit motive test or otl1er
glosses, i.e., matched income and deductions. In an ideal world,
the LAL would (:'liminate the temptation for the Service to attempt
utilization of section 183 and the various trade or business definitions to match income and deductions, and section 183 would be
limited to activities in which the primar~T motive was personal
or tax reduction without an ultimate hefore-ta.x economic profit.
But in the real world, we may expect, at least initially, the Service
fi61

TA..X llEF(JRM BILL OF 1973, ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS F(JU T.hX CIIANOE WlTR

TREASURY EXPLANATION, 93D

Co:m.,

1ST SESS. 102 {1973).
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will launch alternative attacks relying on section 183, the LAL
provisions and the common-law capitalization doctrines, all yielding different results. 568 Certainly where LAL does not apply (pure
hobby loss activities and certain tax deferral situations such as
real estate tax shelters in operation prior to the effective date
of the LAL, farming tax shelters without an increase in the level
of developmental expenditures, real estate where straight-line depreciation results in losses such as dual use beach houses, or the
expenses of writers, artists or inventors) section 183 will be invoked frequently even if the LAL is enacted.
Conclusion

A leading commentator on the current farm tax rules has criticized section 183 stringently on the grounds that it does nothing
to curb the liberal cash accounting rules accorded farmers. Indeed,
the argument continues that the pro-taxpayer presumption of section 183 (d) creates a hav<.>n for hobby operations, because few
cash basis farmers, with their control oYer deferment or anticipation of expenses and income, will fail to show a profit in two out
of five years. 569 As discussed abow, presence of a bona fide profit
motive is not, however, inconsistent with deferral of taxes through
accelerated deductions, farming or otlwrwise, or with the tax
swing created by enjoyment of cmTent ordinary d(•ductions with
corresponding future income being taxed as capital gain. Furtlwrmore, this commentator acknowledgPs that the HousP's negative
presumption as well as the ·Treasury's earlit>r proposal to
strengthen section 270 by making it applicable where in three out
of five consecutive years the taxpayer incurred losses in PXcess
of $50,000 annually would have had erratic results and would
have applied where there was true economic loss as wt>ll as losses
created by accelerated deductions.
The real criticism, therefore, must bt> of the pro-taxpay<.>r presumption. It is submitted that such criticism too is misplaced.
"'While it may be true that the presmuption will usually be available where accelPrated dl'ductions alone are involved, this is only
as it should be. For a profit motive test is inapt>licahl(• to accelerated deductions as long as tlw taxpayer expects an overall
sos Compnre the altt'rnative S('('tions 209, 482 and liilil togt'ther with sham m·gumcuts
that the Commissioner launehecl against multiple surtax exemptions.
sao Davenport, Farm Losses Under tlw Tax Reform Act of 1!161): J[ecpin' 'E111 Happy
Down on tllc Farm, 12 B.C.. !KD. & CoM . L. REV.. 319, 330-33 (1971).
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economic profit after completion of the start-up loss period (possibly caused by the accelerated deductions tlu•mseh·es). Furthermore, a survey of the vast body of hobby loss cases, decided in
favor of both the government and of the ta.xpayc>rs, reveals that
in only a handful would the presumption lmvc> applied. Moreover,
in situations not involving accelerated deductions, but where the
taxpayer through manipulation of items particularly within his
control, such as expenses, has created thP requisitP two profit
years, the Service will undoubtedly find that tlu.• presumption is
readily rebutted. The Barcus case points in this direction. Accordingly, section 183 should properly be vi<.>wed as neutral visa-vis accelerated deductions, whether farm or otherwise, as long
as an economic gain is ultimately expc>cted. Not only should this
state of affairs not be disturbing, but also neither the House
negative two out of five year presumption nor the Treasury's
suggested strengthened section 270, whieh basically followed the
same approach, should be the remedy for eithc>r acct•lerated deductions or the mismatching of ordinary deductions with capital
gain. If tax reform is directed primarily at the elimination of such
mismatching, then the goal should be a strengthened section 1251
in farming areas and a similar str(.lngtluming of the depreciation
recapture provisions. On the other hand, if the r<•form is aimed
at deferral aspects as well as the mismatching of capital gain and
ordinary losses, then an approach along the lines of the LAL is
in order.
The merit of section 183 should, th<•refor<', not be sought in
the tax shelter area, instead, it should be sought in clarifiention of
the vast sea of the hobby loss decisions d<•aling with tlw diff(•rent
problem of taxpayers' subsidizing with tax dollars tlwir (usually
personal) activities in which th<:'y never PX})N't an ('('Onomic profit.
Section 183 itself affords relativE>ly littl<'. It rt'~oh·<•s a ft•w ttuestions such as the r<.>asonahle (lXpectation of profit nrsus bona
fide expectation of profit controversy and 11ossihly th<• suhjc•C'tive
versus objective am>roach, hut its most signifi<"nnt contribution
is the more precise uwchanism for .allowing decluC'tions to tlw extent of gross income from an activity whi<"h is not <•ngngcd in
for profit, i.e., the tiN· syst<:'m. This hcm•fit probably offst>t~ tlte
confusion created by tlw n<>w concept of n<•tivity, r(>ally the SPC'tion
270 separate business l'P\·isited.
The section 183 rPgulations on thP other hand, whil<' by and
large doing a cr<>diblc joh in (lXplicating thc Jll('(•hnnies of tlte provision (th<• acti,·ity portion is thE> mm~t <'Ontro\"N'sinl), do a truly
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commendable job in charting the heretofore boundless sea of cases
and isolating the factors establishing profit motive. With minor
exceptions set forth above, the nine regulation factors faithfully
distill from these cases a framework upon which future decisions
can build, particularly if the primary sources-presection 183 cases
-are used to add depth to this road map provided in the regulations. If this occurs, this aspect alone should justify the time
devoted to the hobby loss area by Congress and subsequently the
administration in drafting the regulations.
In addition to the inevitable interstitial development of section 183, a major task remains with the courts: separating and
identifying in the cases which come before them the profit motive
and tax deferral elements. From this should flow not only the
meaning of the term profit, presently undefined by the code or
the regulations, but hopefully for the first time a clear distinction
between the profit motive test and the melange of concepts such
as the continuity, the holding one's self out to others and the preparatory to engaging in a trade or business doctrines. This distinction is vitally necessary as is shown by the tortuous development
of case law considering the latter concepts. The sharp exposure
by the LAL of the underlying issues here should manifest that
neither these doctrines nor the profit motive prerequisite, all derived to one degree or another from the term ''trade ,or business,''
are suited for dealing with accelerated deductions, i.e., matching
of income and expense. Should the LAL be enacted, it is hoped
that it and section 183 together with the residual effects of the
recapture provisions will come to be the exclusive tools applied to
the problems of hobby losses and accelerated deductions, with
the various other doctrines, particularly the preparatory to engaging in a trade or business doctrim•, falling into the oblivion
that they so richly deserve.

